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THE ATLANTIC IN A WORLD WAR— WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

By ADMIRAL SIR MICHAEL M. DENNY, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 15th February, 1956, at 3 p.m.

ADMIRAL SIR GEOFFREY OLIVER, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: This afternoon we are going to hear about the Atlantic in a world war—what does it mean? We are particularly fortunate in having Admiral Sir Michael Denny to tell us about it and, I hope, to tell us what it does mean.

I need not introduce Admiral Denny to this company. I need perhaps only recollect that in and around the Atlantic he is not altogether unknown. He was the captain of a cruiser during the late war searching for the Bismarck, sinking supply ships, and in all the various ups and downs of war, and more recently—in fact until a few weeks ago—he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet. I have the utmost pleasure in calling on Admiral Sir Michael Denny to deliver his lecture.

LECTURE

THREE hundred years ago more than one-half of the adult population of this realm was employed on the sea, or at the ports on maritime affairs. Today the proportion is much less. But the quantities of goods carried across the ocean to these islands has expanded considerably, at a rate far exceeding that of the growth of population in the intervening centuries.

A representative figure for imports into the United Kingdom in the five years before the 1939–45 War is 56,000,000 tons. Of these 56,000,000, only 8,000,000 tons were crude oil and refined products. Compare this with the 25,000,000 tons of oil imported into the U.K. in 1955, which tonnage is expected to rise to 50,000,000 by 1965.

We produce only half our food and feeding stuffs for livestock. *We possess* in these islands only three important raw materials for our industries: coal, iron ore, and china clay. As examples we have to ferry across the seas all our tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, copper, aluminium, crude oil, tobacco; *at least* three-quarters of our wheat, sugar, butter, sulphur, raw wool, soft woods; and *about one-half* of our meat and iron ore.

These import figures are stupendous and are in no way moderated by the development of air transport; in fact imports are increased by the ever increasing requirement in peace and in war for aviation spirit, all of which, whether in crude form or refined, has to be imported overseas into the countries of western Europe. As an interesting illustration of this fact, if a transport or freighting aircraft crosses

the Atlantic eastwards loaded, there must be located in Europe one ton of aviation fuel for every ton of cargo then delivered to Europe to enable the aircraft to do the return flight.

In 1954, U.K. imports and exports by air from all areas was approximately 30,000 tons out of a total of dry cargo imports and exports of 90,000,000 tons. Thus, one ton in every 3,000 of dry cargo was conveyed by air.

To illustrate the relative carrying capacity of ships and aircraft I give a rough comparison between a modern cargo vessel and a Bristol Britannia. It is estimated that it would take 20 Britannias to carry in one year the same quantity of bulk cargo across the Atlantic as one modern cargo vessel of 10,000 tons deadweight. This estimate is based on the assumption that the aircraft would each fly 3,000 hours a year and that the ship, under war conditions, would make about four and a half to five round voyages annually. As a new vessel of this kind would cost under £750,000 and the cost of the 20 Britannias would be in the region of £15,000,000, it is clear, even without taking into account the substantially greater manpower necessary for their operation and maintenance, that the use of aircraft for the conveyance of any worthwhile quantity of bulk cargo would be impracticable, even if the number of aircraft required could be spared for such a wasteful service.

You will note that I have virtually made no mention of exports—the key factor in the economic survival of this Country in peace. This is so because this lecture relates to war, and the exporting of merchandise from the U.K. in war is of relative insignificance compared with imports, and with the passage of war materials and personnel outwards from the U.K.

If we look at the Atlantic in the event of a N.A.T.O. war the world's traffic is eastbound and, indeed, this traffic should properly be regarded as the 'lifeline.' The safeguarding of this lifeline and the provision of its strand by an adequate flow of merchant ships is an important prime factor in the N.A.T.O. set-up.

Let us recall that in the Spring of 1943 the following pronouncement was made in high places: "The shortage of shipping is a stranglehold on all offensive operations." And equally it was to prove to have a stranglehold on essential civilian services in all countries except the Americas.

In peace-time the huge volume of shipping that traverses the Atlantic is owned, controlled, and operated by what can best be described as private enterprise. We have learned the hard way that in war this is not permissible. So it is agreed that both national and N.A.T.O. authorities shall take over responsibility for the operation of seaborne traffic and of the utilization of shipping. So now I will say a little about the N.A.T.O. organization.

N.A.T.O. AND THE MAIN DIVISION OF COMMANDS

N.A.T.O., as everyone knows, is a defensive alliance created in order to deter, and if that is not possible, to resist aggression in Europe or North America. It is important to remember that N.A.T.O. is in fact a political alliance; N.A.T.O. will only work if it stems from the people through their politicians, and again it will only work when all the countries in N.A.T.O. are unanimous. Therefore we must continually strive to make the people believe in and support N.A.T.O., and indeed sacrifice something of their national outlook, actions, and aspirations in order to make N.A.T.O. efficient.

If we look at all the countries in N.A.T.O. we are impressed by the vast area of the world over which they spread and the sea areas which extend between them, and

also by the fact that the power centre of this alliance is the United States. This defensive alliance is operated in war by the Standing Group of the Military Committee. The Standing Group is, of course, comparable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war.

When it comes to commanding the varied forces that will be operating in war over this large N.A.T.O. area it is clearly too much for a single command, and it seemed logical to the architects of N.A.T.O. to divide the area into two—the area in which the fighting in Europe is likely to take place, and the sea area behind it across which this battle in Europe has to be supported and sustained. There was then considerable opposition to the formation of an Atlantic Command and it was not until SACEUR had been going for some 18 months that SACLANT was finally established in January, and inaugurated in April, 1952. So we have ACEUR and ACLANT, the one mainly land/air and the other mainly maritime.

The views of certain countries and some other considerations led to the inclusion of the Channel Command as well as the other two. In passing, we must remember that the battle for the command of the air, on which all else may well depend, will know no boundaries.

The Atlantic Command, the first international ocean command in history in peace-time, was finally established at Norfolk, Virginia. The staff of SACLANT is drawn from the navies, armies, and air forces of eight countries: Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, these nations, as well as Belgium and Iceland, have national liaison representatives accredited to SACLANT. Direct liaison is maintained with SACEUR through the SACLANT representative in Europe.

The Atlantic Command extends from the North Pole to the tropic of Cancer, and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, except for the English Channel and waters around the British Isles. It is at present divided into two major geographical command areas.

The Western Atlantic area is commanded by an American naval Commander-in-Chief, at present SACLANT himself. The Eastern Atlantic area is under the joint command of a British naval Commander-in-Chief, and a British air Commander-in-Chief. Both areas are further divided into sub-areas. The important Atlantic islands, such as Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, Bermuda, the Faroes, are placed for military defence purposes under Island Commanders, all but one of whom is a national of the sovereign island power.

A third area, the Iberian Atlantic Command, covering the south-easterly portion of the Atlantic Command, has been defined but not yet established. Pending a decision, responsibility for the area in the event of an emergency has been assigned by SACLANT to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic.

Directly subordinate to SACLANT, and an operational rather than a geographical commander, is the Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic. This fleet is a force of heavy surface ships, aircraft carriers, and necessary supporting units. Its role in time of war would be to undertake offensive and support operations, rather than the direct defence of the Atlantic trade routes. It is contemplated that the Striking Fleet would furnish support to other N.A.T.O. Supreme Commanders besides SACLANT.

Another important operational command is that of the Commander Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic, who is responsible, under the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern

Atlantic, for co-ordinating the operations of all submarines assigned to those waters. Submarines from six nations have already undergone training.

SACLANT, like his colleague SACEUR, is directly responsible to the Standing Group. His peace-time duties are :—

- (1) to develop defence plans ;
- (2) to organize and conduct combined training exercises ;
- (3) to make recommendations to the Standing Group and to national authorities on military questions which will affect his ability to discharge his war-time and peace-time responsibilities ;
- (4) to establish an efficient organization suitable as a nucleus for war-time expansion.

Turning now to the EASTLANT area of the Atlantic, in EASTLANT headquarters, which is predominantly a British controlled formation, we employ for the conduct of maritime operations the system known to us as Joint Command, as opposed to that employed, for example, in the United States, where a unified command is normal. In our system the responsibility for maritime operations in areas of British responsibility is shared by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, governed by formal agreement between the two Service ministries.

This agreement is on the basis of the 'predominant partner' which in effect means that, although the problem and responsibility is a joint one, the war at sea is primarily the concern of the Royal Navy, whereas only one portion of the Royal Air Force is specifically equipped, trained, and normally employed on maritime operations. Normally, therefore, the naval commander is the predominant partner and as such would be responsible for co-ordinating the operations of naval forces and shore-based aircraft. The efficiency of such an organization has been well illustrated both in peace and war. The close partnership is reflected in the joint organization and system of control which is followed both in the national and N.A.T.O. organizations which make up our several responsibilities in the Eastern Atlantic.

All the N.A.T.O. nations except one border on the sea ; 11 on the North Atlantic and four on the Mediterranean. We are separately and collectively dependent on sea lines of communication for our mutual economic support and military survival. If any nation were denied access to the seas it would be a disaster to that nation and a major set-back to N.A.T.O. If our losses in the Atlantic were unacceptable, N.A.T.O. could not long survive. It is significant that we are formed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Our dependence on the seas and on sea-borne transport is not reduced by the steadily increasing importance of air power. On the contrary, the heavy demands of air forces for operational maintenance and for fuel have placed greatly increased demands on seaborne transport. Likewise, the tonnage requirements of modern armies are far greater than ever before. And furthermore, the civil requirements of nations for shipping will be increased by an immeasurable amount by reason of atomic damage to their cities, their sea ports, and their national resources.

Thus, while we in N.A.T.O. should regard the Atlantic as the lifeline, a potential enemy would regard it as a suitable theatre for applying the stranglehold. In this connection let us note that the second largest fighting Navy in the world, and indeed the largest if measured by size of the naval force kept in commission in peace-time—is not in N.A.T.O. nor is it a Maritime Power when tested by the yardstick of overseas trade and of overseas possessions. The world knows, as well as we do here, of

N.A.T.O. dependence on the sea lanes for supply and reinforcement of the European partners in N.A.T.O. It knows how potentially vulnerable these sea lanes are to under-water, surface, and air attack. Thus all should consider the possibility of making the Atlantic a barrier separating Europe from North America rather than the lifeline through which shall flow support and reinforcement to Europe and between the nations of Europe.

Let us therefore consider some of the N.A.T.O. tasks in the Atlantic.

SACLANT's tasks are to control the seas within the Atlantic Command region, to deny them to the enemy, to assure that the Atlantic remains, in war, as it is in peace, a main highway for the supply and reinforcement of our nations and our military commands, to assure that N.A.T.O. has channels for the projection overseas of the national military power and resources necessary for their mutual support.

In addition to the maintenance of the security of the seas, the task is to render support and assistance to adjacent N.A.T.O. and national commands. In turn, SACLANT is dependent upon these commands to provide air defence of ports, to provide for clearance of mines in their national waters, and to secure the Baltic and Mediterranean exits to the high seas.

Thus SACLANT's primary task in time of war is to provide N.A.T.O. with security in the Atlantic Ocean by guarding its sea lanes and denying its use to the enemy. In other words, his mission would be to protect the lifelines in the Atlantic of the free world. This weighty responsibility requires sufficient escort vessels and aircraft to protect an intricate convoy system, adequate hunter-killer forces to combat the underseas menace, a highly mobile striking fleet, and an effective submarine force.

In time of peace, forces are periodically placed at SACLANT's disposal for combined training, but he has no forces permanently assigned to him. The reason for this arrangement can easily be explained. The Atlantic maritime powers of N.A.T.O. naturally maintain naval forces and maritime air forces to protect their national interests in those waters in time of peace. To have created a separate N.A.T.O. naval force for the specific purpose of guarding Atlantic Ocean lifelines in time of war would have been impossibly expensive. It was therefore decided by the countries with interests in the Atlantic that the naval forces which they maintain there in time of peace for their own national purposes should be dedicated in time of war to the common cause of protecting the lifelines across the Atlantic Ocean. Seven countries have, therefore, earmarked forces for SACLANT. Naturally enough these forces are predominantly naval, but some ground forces and land-based air forces are included.

Lest the number and variety of ships and aircraft having undergone N.A.T.O. training, as reported in the Press, present too optimistic a picture of the forces available to SACLANT for the accomplishment of his mission, it must be understood that there is at present a shortage of escort vessels and maritime aircraft.

There are certain military forces not assigned or earmarked to any of the Supreme Commands, but which are nevertheless of great value to N.A.T.O. Although these forces are retained directly under national command their potential contributions to the defence of the West are massive and might be decisive. For example, the United States Strategic Air Command, based largely in North Africa, the British Isles, and the United States, is of particular importance as a deterrent force. Similarly, the United Kingdom Bomber Command is equipped and trained for strategic air operations. The United Kingdom also has a large interceptor force for

the defence of the British Isles. Finally, each N.A.T.O. Country is responsible for the defence of its own coastal waters, and therefore retains some naval forces primarily equipped for inshore minesweeping, harbour defence, and similar tasks.

Admiral McCormick, in a B.B.C. address, has said : " The desperate days of World Wars I and II cannot be forgotten. Also I ask you not to forget the tremendous number of ships and aircraft which were finally required in both these wars to bring about the final days of victory. When I compare them to those I now see available to me, I cannot say that I am happy. . . . We must continue to exert every pressure . . . to continue the planned build-up of N.A.T.O. strength."

In this context it is well to remember that there is in existence a non-N.A.T.O. submarine fleet whose current strength in ocean-going U-boats greatly exceeds the maximum U-boat strength deployed against the Allies at any stage of the two World Wars.

Let us take a look at the control of merchant shipping in war.

The control of merchant shipping really means keeping the shipping situation in hand by marrying to the best advantage the shipping available to the large number of demands on it.

It is historically correct to state that, until 1945, the shipping situation never permitted either the military or the essential civilian requirements as postulated to be met in full and timely fashion. This was not solely due to the war losses of merchant tonnage due to enemy action, it was as much due to the combination of other factors such as congestion at ports, time wasted in ports due to slow cargo-handling, enemy action reducing port capability, lost capacity inherent in the convoy system due to the increased overall time required for the round voyage there and back, consequent on time spent in assembly, etc., and theatre commanders locking up shipping as warehouses or keeping them locally in expectation that they might need them in the future.

On this latter point it is of interest that the misuse of merchant shipping, especially that of America by theatre commanders, caused the President to issue a directive on 9th December, 1944, ordering theatre commanders to mend their ways in certain specified directions. The result of the President's directive produced a spectacular sudden flush of tonnage, considerably exceeding expectations. It now seems probable that at the end of 1944 American shipping capacity was being wasted at the annual rate of 9,000,000 deadweight tons through this particular form of misuse.

Whatever may have happened in the last war, the shipping situation in the next will be far more troublesome, as from D-day.

Control of shipping takes two forms :—

- (a) *Control of its employment.*—This, which includes the establishment of shipping pools and the allocation from these pools of shipping required for specific tasks, is the responsibility of various civilian agencies.
- (b) *Control of its movement.*—This, which is clearly bound up with the enemy threat to shipping and the conduct of naval operations, must be vested in the naval authorities on whom rest the responsibility for protecting shipping at sea.

Effective protection of shipping at sea implies effective control of the movements of that shipping by the naval authorities responsible for protecting it. The task facing the N.A.T.O. naval commanders at the outbreak of the war is, therefore,

unprecedented. For quite apart from the comparative paucity of the forces which will be at their disposal, and the greatly increased scale and nature of the enemy threat to shipping resulting from the development of modern weapons and technique, the shipping itself will be largely disorganized and not even under effective national, let alone N.A.T.O., control.

The safe and timely arrival of each ship or convoy at its destination as prescribed by the above national authorities remains the primary aim of the appropriate Allied naval commander in the exercise of his responsibility for protecting shipping. In pursuit of this aim he will take all steps which are operationally necessary, including, should the need arise, diverting shipping away from particular ports or localities, holding it temporarily in refuge or assembly anchorages for its better protection or organization, and so on. But in all cases it is his duty to endeavour by every possible means to get each ship to its prescribed destination, as and when it is required there. This will clearly call for very close co-operation between the Allied naval authorities and the national authorities concerned with the reception of shipping.

The North Atlantic Council turned their attention to these matters soon after they were established. In May, 1950, they created a Board and gave it the task of working out plans to ensure the most efficient use of the available shipping resources in time of emergency.

The most important principle on which the Board has agreed is that, in order to diminish the effects of a shortage of sea transport at the outbreak of war, the great bulk of ocean-going merchant ships under the flags of N.A.T.O. countries would be pooled and, for allocation purposes, put at the disposal of an inter-Allied body to be called the Defence Shipping Authority. This authority will be responsible for the allocation of ocean-going shipping throughout the whole area controlled by, and friendly towards, the member governments of N.A.T.O., its Allies, and partners.

A rapid turn-round of ships can only be achieved if vessels can be loaded and unloaded speedily in ports which are free from congestion. To this end, in each country in Western Europe, an organization has been set up. The role of this organization in an emergency would be to decide the destination ports for ships before the sailing of convoys, and the diversion of ships in convoy to other ports, if the original destination port became unable to receive them. It is also important to have, in time of war, day-to-day information on the arrival of ships, so that internal transport by rail, road, or inland waterways can be expeditiously and economically used.

In conclusion, I feel you all will agree that in an examination of the shape of a future total war two major tasks emerge, these are to gain command of the air and, while that battle is going on, to prevent the enemy land forces from occupying the territories of the N.A.T.O. nations.

But there is a third major task.

That third task is to ensure control of the oceans and seas, so that convoys can cross the Atlantic, traverse the Mediterranean, and deliver to the N.A.T.O. land and air forces in Europe all they need to conduct the struggle, and also to give us increased flexibility in the conduct of operations.

Nothing so far invented, including stockpiling, can do away with the vital need to deploy in Europe the power of the American continent, and that could not be done if we lost command of the seas, and in particular of the Atlantic.

In my association with N.A.T.O. I have encountered many political and military leaders who are inclined to take for granted that the seas will, in some way and by some means, be secured for use by N.A.T.O. and that the reinforcement and supplies so sorely needed for the defence of Europe will somehow be provided. I regret that I cannot share this easy optimism. This cannot be taken for granted.

Perhaps I might be permitted to ask myself the question : " What is the greatest threat in peace to the successful operation of the N.A.T.O. concept in war ? "

As a purely personal opinion I would answer : " During the last two wars the minds of all combatants, and of civilians in their war efforts at home, have been open and receptive to the visible, strenuous, bloody fighting of armies on land and on the beaches, and to the deadly impact of air fighting and air attack on their own family life and occupation. The war efforts of the merchant navies, the fighting navies, and maritime air forces have been taken for granted. Though in each war we have been on the brink of disaster and of total defeat in our maritime affairs so as to lose the war, this has not happened. On the other hand the great British Public have been painfully aware that our armies have been driven out of continental countries, that our Allied continental Powers have been defeated and their countries subjected, that our homes have had to accept direct attack from enemy air forces."

These historical facts have bred a frame of mind that the navies are all right and that maritime forces, sea and air, are there and will do their stuff because they always have.

This is dangerous thinking.

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN : Out of a whole host of interesting and provocative statements that we have heard from the lecturer, I should like to ask, within the limits of security, what his feelings are on the subject of the availability of merchant shipping. We have heard about the shortage of maritime aircraft and the pooling of merchant shipping, but I am not sure whether we have heard of the availability of world tonnage on the N.A.T.O. side.

THE LECTURER : The world tonnage available to N.A.T.O. would, we hope, be in excess of what was available to the Allies the last time, and by virtue of the organization which has been set up, when it works it will bring into use for N.A.T.O. purposes and under N.A.T.O. control a tonnage which, if properly used and if adequately protected, will be sufficient to carry out this task of supplying materials and reinforcements to Europe, and of rendering the military forces mobile when necessary.

There is a question concerning the increasing tonnage requirements of liquid fuels. At the present moment the construction of new tanker tonnage is keeping pace with the increasing requirements for liquid fuels. There is no margin, and it will be difficult to get the tanker tonnage where we want to use it in the early days of a war. One hopes of course that stockpiling will provide the necessary reservoir to allow for that adjustment.

CAPTAIN A. R. FARQUHAR, R.N. : Arising out of that, something like 10,000,000 tons, approximately half of which are tankers, sail under the flag of Panama, etc. Will you be able to lay your hands on them ?

THE LECTURER : You will notice that I used the phrase " N.A.T.O. nations, their friends, and partners."

LIEUT.-COMMANDER D. W. WATERS, R.N. : I wonder whether the lecturer would resolve the question into numbers of ships ? The importance of this point is that, for instance, the modern tanker is now tending towards 50,000 tons whereas in the last war it was 12,000 or 15,000 tons. Thus, the shipping situation is not merely a question of

tonnage but also of numbers of ships,* and numbers are particularly pertinent so far as tankers are concerned. An increase in total tonnage does not necessarily indicate an increase in the number of ships available.

THE LECTURER : In actual fact the tanker companies, who decide what ships shall be built and who pay for building them, are not, for reasons which are associated with peace-time trading more than war, tending to crowd out the utility size tanker by the large mammoths. The number of mammoths being built is strictly limited and still remains a small proportion of the tanker fleet required to lift 25,000,000 tons of liquid fuel to the United Kingdom, for example, and the employment of mammoth tankers is, generally speaking, on fixed runs, and they do nothing else. There is still adequate flexible tonnage remaining in the liquid fuel transport world. Fortunately, there is no sign of tanker companies ceasing their building programme.

In the dry cargo field, having regard to the necessity for the dispersal of shipping and the danger of damage to ports, probably the gravest shortage is of small vessels of the coastal type for increasing our unloading facilities away from the wharves of major ports.

CAPTAIN E. A. S. BAILEY, R.N. : In the last two wars we have been able to build up our ability to fight a battle of the Atlantic as the threat to the Atlantic has been built up. At the beginning of the last war, for instance, there were about 30 or 40 submarines against us. The position is now quite different ; our own resources to deal with this battle are less whereas those of a possible enemy are probably 10 times more. I wonder whether the lecturer would care to give us his views on our ability to survive in this very important theatre when our shipping, industry, and homeland are being threatened ? How shall we survive unless we do something materially to improve our position in this vital theatre ?

THE LECTURER : In your question you used the word " our." If you are referring to the United Kingdom the answer is that of course by yourself you cannot survive. If you mean by " our ", N.A.T.O., that is a very different matter. You are right in saying that the visible threat to the lifeline, if measured against United Kingdom maritime resources, shows a deterioration on the pre-war balance to a degree which is startling, but when you compare N.A.T.O. resources with the visible threat to the lifelines, then the balance for and against is not all that bad. Forewarned is forearmed, and providing N.A.T.O. continues to progress and to build up its forces, and providing that a fair proportion of the N.A.T.O. resources is allocated to this particular task, then we can face the future knowing that if there is to be a bloody and dangerous battle we shall not be unarmed beforehand.

AIR VICE-MARSHAL C. E. CHILTON : May I suggest that the answer you have just given presents a slightly misleading picture, because in your lecture you made the point that we really have twice as much shipping to protect now than we had at the end of the war. So that taking 1945 as against 1955, we now have twice as much shipping to protect. That can be regarded as a factor of two.

The modern submarine is twice as dangerous as the submarine in 1945 by virtue of better torpedoes, higher underwater speeds, radar devices, and other improvements. That is another factor of two. Therefore, two by two gives a factor of four.

In addition, we have only one-third of the escorts that we had in 1945 now available to N.A.T.O., which gives a factor of three, and four by three makes us a total factor of 12 down.

THE LECTURER : We have been told that submarines will be twice as dangerous as those with which we were dealing in 1945. I am prepared to accept that on the understanding that you assume that submarine warfare in the next war is conducted by, and the actual submarines themselves are commanded by, people who are of the same capability, knowledge, and quality as what we were up against in the last war. If you think that is so, then I would agree that the odds are that the submarine is twice as dangerous today

than it was in 1945. On the other hand, I immediately claim that each aircraft or anti-submarine vessel which we put into use to combat the submarine in 1956 is more than twice as dangerous to the submarine than in 1945. Therefore I think that cancels out.

The fact that there might be twice as much tonnage to be protected in these dangerous areas than in 1945 may be true, but making the convoy twice its size does not double its security risk and does not make it twice as vulnerable. I could make no prediction as to how much the threat is increased by the fact that there will be more ships in the traffic.

When it comes down to the actual number of escorts and aircraft, the fact does remain that with the present allocation of the forces available to N.A.T.O. it is reasonable to suppose that the actual number of ships which would be available to N.A.T.O. commanders within a few days of D-day would not be more than one-third of what we were operating for the same purpose in 1945 in the same area.

In maritime aircraft the situation is fluid, but I do not think that we are anything like as badly off as that. Like everybody in the armed forces who has studied these things, no commander is ever satisfied that he has been provided with abundant forces. All the commander has to ask himself is has he the forces adequate to continue the battle and to prevent defeat, and I shall not say that N.A.T.O. is not strong enough to do that in this particular anti-submarine role on the Atlantic lifelines.

COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS: We had some very reassuring remarks about co-operation between N.A.T.O. maritime nations which have been carrying out these exercises, but could we hear something about the dependability of their contributions to the defence of the Atlantic in war-time in view of the political fluctuations to which the countries of N.A.T.O. are subject?

THE LECTURER: It would be unwise for me to attempt to be a prophet, but as far as N.A.T.O. has gone so far, there has been no diminution or reduction in the number of forces declared to N.A.T.O. for the ATLANTIC area during those four years. The declarations by the separate nations to the N.A.T.O. authority purported to show what would be done this year and next year and so on. So far those undertakings have been fulfilled, that is to say, each reprint so to speak of the declaration of each separate nation has reaffirmed what was in the previous print. So I am not entitled to argue on whether there will be any easing up or walking back. There have been no signs of it so far.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER: We have forgotten more about the control of ocean spaces than our probable enemies will ever know, and if I were the probable enemy's commander-in-chief, I would not operate west of Finisterre. The lecturer referred to terminal ports and said they were under national control. It is no good flogging convoys across the Atlantic to make bonfires in Bristol and Bordeaux. I should like to ask whether security of the terminal areas which are in national hands are now in phase with the security plans that he has spoken about, or are we letting that slide?

THE LECTURER: Of course I am only entitled to express a personal opinion, but what was the question I posed myself at the end of my lecture? I am sure that the question of possible failure of national authorities or of N.A.T.O. to take note of the need for the protection of the ports, and particularly to make arrangements for safeguarding the unloading points and their security from attack, has not been neglected, is not likely to be neglected, or that it constitutes a weakness or deficiency in the N.A.T.O. concept as at today's date compared with the progress that has been made in other conceptions of N.A.T.O.

SUB-LIEUTENANT R. H. ROBERTS, R.C.N.: There has been concentration on the underwater threat to the lifelines. Would the lecturer comment on the possible use of large heavy cruisers in this respect, both singly and in combination with wolf packs? It seems to me that escort vessels provided for one form of defence are not necessarily good for another.

THE LECTURER : The biggest navy in the world includes the greatest number of cruisers in the world, but they are not for coastal waters. There is sound reason to think that the old fashioned concept of cruiser warfare still stands, and that there is a nation which has the right kind of cruisers for carrying out cruiser warfare, that is to say, the raider attempting to sink and destroy and to disrupt merchant lines of communication.

For the destruction and frustration of that form of attack you require different forces from those which are required to deal with underwater threats.

I mentioned the Striking Fleet which contains a large number of ships of types suitable for dealing with the raider threat. Those ships do in fact exist. In addition, the maritime air force at the disposal of ACLANT makes it possible to keep a watch on the Atlantic as and when required, and the chance of a raider being loose for long without being detected is small, and once he is detected there is no reason why he should not be under constant surveillance. Once he is under constant surveillance he is useless to the enemy. We merely divert shipping and ultimately sink him at our leisure.

COLONEL F. H. SMITH : Has the lecturer considered that on the one hemisphere centred on London, you have practically the whole of the world's population in this one hemisphere and 98 per cent. of its industries. Has the lecturer taken that into account in his calculations?

Secondly, in view of the fact that vessels after a five- to 10-day voyage often have 15 to 20 days lying, subject to aerial attacks, in port waiting for discharge even with modern winches and cranes, has the lecturer considered proposals for the self-loading and self-discharging type of vessel which can discharge a complete armoured fighting unit in almost as many minutes? Of course in the construction of those vessels you have the self-loading and self-discharging design for rapid handling of cargoes both in peace and war.

THE LECTURER : It is true that if you used another projection a chart could be produced which would show that for the N.A.T.O. area one could find the centre of the whole population and centre of gravity of industrial activities. That merely symbolizes in my mind the importance of N.A.T.O. and the realism of all the water areas including the Atlantic itself which somehow has to be converted into a convenient and readily used means of communication.

On the question whether consideration has been given to the changes in design of ships to facilitate the rapid loading and unloading, because of the waste of turn round time, the answer is, of course, that in peace-time even N.A.T.O. and the separate nations which go to make it up are disinclined to add to the number of ships, lorries, or vehicles of any sort which are of a highly specialized type and of no earning power, but which merely form part of the protective armaments. The sort of ships we are talking about would have no commercial value under our present system of trading overseas. Consequently, private industry would not construct ships of that nature to conduct their business and carry out trade. If such ships were built in large numbers they could only operate in competition with other trading systems of the world under subsidies which, of course, add to the defence votes of the nations who have to pay the subsidies.

You see an exact parallel in specialized forms of vessels which were brought into existence by amphibious warfare concepts. In war-time one could see very similar ships being almost ideal for carrying dry cargoes about the world under conditions in which we expect a great number of European ports will be after D-day, but it would be wishful thinking in the extreme to imagine that such merchant fleets of that type could be constructed and operated in peace-time and therefore be available in war, except under most dire and certain threat that they would be needed, and even then governments would have to balance up the cost and effort to produce those ships against the cost and effort to produce some more offensive weapon.

COMMANDER F. BARLEY, R.N. : You mentioned that it was considered that there was an adequate number of merchant ships to maintain N.A.T.O. forces and the population of the N.A.T.O. countries in the event of war. Ships can remain adequate in numbers

only if they stay on the surface. Would it be axiomatic, in the event of the outbreak of war, that the naval control and protection of shipping should have as its basis the convoy system, observing that sailing ships in convoy is about 10 times safer than sailing them independently?

THE LECTURER: The N.A.T.O. authorities are firmly wedded to the convoy system and would seek to bring it about at the earliest possible moment.

SQUADRON LEADER L. T. MERSHAM: Is it an over simplification to state that perhaps in a future war this problem of the lengthy maintenance of supplies across the Atlantic will not exist, if the concept of a short, sharp, nuclear war is accepted? If victory does not come in a few days and we in the U.K. face prolonged nuclear attack, might I suggest that there would be precious little left to which supplies must be brought?

THE LECTURER: I can see your point! The hypothetical enemy who has a gigantic submarine fleet which is capable of operating without any bases at all, except floating bases, for a considerable period, can perhaps visualize dispersing his submarine fleet over the ocean so that they can do their work, and the particular war of devastation which the questioner has in mind would have little effect on this horde of scattered submarines. When the atomic battle came to an end and one or other side is in a state of prostration and exhaustion, whichever that side may be, the force which still possesses at that moment a strong submarine fleet must be in the stronger position.

If you have in mind that we are unwilling to proceed beyond D plus X days, then I would accept your thesis that we could pack the whole thing up and that it does not matter a damn; but if I accepted it I should have a guilty conscience unless I was absolutely certain that I was going to win that atomic war.

Most people would say, "What do you call winning and losing? Both sides will be shattered." That is quite true, but you cannot go on living in these islands or in many parts of Western Europe after that war unless things are brought across the sea, and that is one justification for what we have been talking about.

AIR VICE-MARSHAL C. E. CHILTON: Surely, if you do not accept the philosophy of the last questioner I would like to return to my earlier point. I still say that we do not have sufficient forces on the sea or in the air to win a war of attrition against the Soviet Union submarine fleet. Therefore, if you do not accept that philosophy, then where are these other forces coming from?

THE LECTURER: It is suggested that we have not in N.A.T.O. an adequate number of anti-submarine units to put up against the submarine threat as good a show as we put up in the latter stages of the last war. For propaganda purposes I should be delighted to agree on the one hand in hopes that even more money would be poured out of the nations' pockets to give us more, but I do not think that I should feel quite honest if I did that.

I might equally take another line and say that all is well. But I have described how dangerous that is. It is true that there is a deficiency in the number of escorts available for that task, but what the measure of deficiency is, is arguable. If the individual submarines themselves are as well commanded as they were in the late stages of the last war, then that deficiency is very great indeed. I think that the authorities who control the affairs of N.A.T.O. have been aware of this, and avoid making the mistake of putting too much money and effort into one thing at the expense of something else. It may be that national authorities have not been putting enough into anti-submarine provisions. That may be so, but what are they to give up in order to put more effort into it?

CAPTAIN E. A. S. BAILEY, R.N.: To follow up the question before last about the length of this war, there are good reasons to suppose that this war will not last just a few days, providing that certain measures are taken, and that we can survive the initial nuclear phase. In that event we in this Country, although we belong to N.A.T.O., must look to our principles of war to decide in which way we are to spend our money. The first principle of war—before you can do anything offensive—is security of your base.

We have two main things on which to spend money ; one is the punch out from here—the deterrent—and the other is our ability to keep ourselves going. Our national punch is a very small proportion of the overall N.A.T.O./Allied punch, and its size probably does not make too much difference to the course of the war ; but the survival of this Country will depend absolutely on our being sure of our lines of communication, and I therefore submit that we should give higher priority to that in time of peace.

THE LECTURER : I asked the questioner the last time he spoke whether by " our " he meant the United Kingdom or N.A.T.O. I now know that he is talking about the United Kingdom. That is exactly what I hoped this lecture would do, namely, to correct this idea because it is utterly wrong in these days to think in terms of what the United Kingdom can do. The only reasonable and sensible thing to ask is, " what does N.A.T.O. require ? "

We talked about the main base. I can conceive a situation in which ACLANT does not regard the United Kingdom as the main base. It is true that we have been regarded as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, and perhaps we still are, but we are only such acting on behalf of N.A.T.O. and our contribution is only on the same scale as the contribution of Norway, France, and everybody else, *pro rata*. The essential requirement is to bring the power of the United States to bear on this war. It is essential because without the power of the United States in this theoretical war, N.A.T.O. is sunk and as part of it we shall be sunk with it. We can deal with the next war providing we act as N.A.T.O. We shall lose it if we do not.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER D. W. WATERS, R.N. : The lecturer said we are like an unsinkable aircraft carrier, but he did make the point that the Strategic Air Command of the United States and Bomber Command of this Country are not under N.A.T.O. I think the last questioner's point was that this being so, should we not be prepared to spend as much additional effort on making sure of the security of the ships that supply this independent bombing force's base as we are to provide the bombers ? For, being independent of N.A.T.O. there is no reason why the security of their supply should be a N.A.T.O. commitment.

THE LECTURER : If the last questioner meant that then I make my apologies. The fact that the Strategic Air Command in the United States and Bomber Command in this Country are not N.A.T.O.-declared forces is a matter of political control in N.A.T.O. If there is a war and it is a N.A.T.O. war, then it is reasonable and correct to assume that, whether declared or not, the forces available to the separate nations making up N.A.T.O. within N.A.T.O. territory will be operating in aid of that N.A.T.O. war. If we do not believe that, we might as well pack up now. That is the faith of all of us in N.A.T.O. It is a fact that as at this date today the Strategic Air Command and Bomber Command are not N.A.T.O.-declared forces. In my view it does not affect the situation because the nations who own those forces are members of N.A.T.O.

THE CHAIRMAN : I think that the lecturer has dealt very patiently with us and I should like to assure him that the real appreciation of his lecture is evident from the provocative nature of the questions, the sting with which he has replied, and, above all, his faith in this N.A.T.O. set-up in which we find ourselves at present. I was very heartened by his remarks. He has seen a great deal of the work of N.A.T.O. at sea. In a small way in my last job I saw bits of it, and can endorse everything he said about the extraordinary fusion of these maritime forces under this new concept which, of course, is the basis of our confidence in the future.

It only remains for me to express, as I know you will wish me to do on your behalf, our very hearty thanks to Admiral Denny for his lecture to us this afternoon, and I am sure you would like me to add our very good wishes to him in his forthcoming exceedingly important N.A.T.O. appointment in Washington, where the faith which he has shown us here this afternoon will be translated to the highest level. (*Applause.*)

THE HIGH LEVEL CONDUCT AND DIRECTION OF WORLD WAR II

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR IAN JACOB, K.B.E., C.B.

On Wednesday, 14th March, 1956, at 3 p.m.

THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF SWINTON, P.C., G.B.E., C.H., M.C., D.L.,
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: My pleasant duty is to introduce Sir Ian Jacob who will talk to us about the high-level conduct and direction of World War II. There is nobody more fitted to lecture on that subject than Sir Ian Jacob for he saw the conduct of the war at high level and played an important part in that conduct himself. It is a subject which is not only of historic interest but of great importance to us at the present time.

I have great pleasure in calling on Sir Ian Jacob.

LECTURE

MY purpose this afternoon is to examine the manner in which the Second World War was conducted, and then to speak about the present and the future in the light of our experience then. I do not, of course, propose to go into the many questions of grand strategy that arose and had to be solved. To do this would require a book. I want to try to bring out some of the principles that must underlie any successful organization for conducting war, to see how we applied those principles in the past, nationally, and internationally with our Allies, and how they can be applied in the future.

The evolution of the British system for the conduct of war has often been described before audiences in this Institution. I do not intend to cover the whole ground again; I would rather concentrate on the essential requirements of a satisfactory system of control, and try to indicate how the system we built up satisfied these requirements. We all know, I think, that the task of preparation for war was entrusted from 1904 onwards to the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory body with the Prime Minister in the Chair and with a flexible membership. Under the Committee of Imperial Defence there was a large number of sub-committees, each dealing with a different aspect of defence preparations. The essence of the system was that in the Committee, and in its subordinate bodies, those people who had responsibility for execution were brought together to think out the problems that war would bring and to make plans and preparations to solve them. The C.I.D. was not designed as an executive organization, and consequently in the second war, as in the first, its activities came to an abrupt end when war broke out. The conduct of war passed into the hands of the War Cabinet, under whom those sub-committees of the C.I.D. which remained of importance, such as the Chiefs of Staff Committee, continued their existence. This transition was smoothly accomplished because it had all been thought out and prepared in detail beforehand.

Let us now turn to the requirements of an effective war-time system. The first I would describe as effective national leadership. This is only to a small extent a question of organization. To a much greater extent it is a personal matter. Nothing would be more futile than to suppose that a good organization can of itself produce good results. The impulse and drive can only come from the man or men who are operating the organization. National leadership has to operate within the Cabinet, in Parliament, and through the nation. I well remember the period of the phony war from September, 1939, to May, 1940. The organization was all there; it had effectively been brought into action on the outbreak of war; Ministers were appointed

to their posts, question were considered in appropriate committees, and papers were brought forward in an orderly manner for decision by the War Cabinet. Those of us who were working within the organization knew that it was operating smoothly. Nevertheless, very little actually happened. This was partly due to the curious circumstances of the time, but it was to a greater extent due to the lack of drive from the top. When in May, 1940, the leadership changed the effect was immediate and striking. There was a great deal more friction and disorder in the working of the mechanism, but this was merely a secondary result of the powerful impulse imparted to the conduct of affairs by the new Prime Minister. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the element of national leadership to the success of the operation as a whole. It hardly seems necessary to emphasize what must be apparent, that the Prime Minister cannot delegate his activities to a Minister of Defence or other Ministers. The task of conducting the war in both its civil and military aspects must be carried out by the Prime Minister.

The second requirement is that the higher control of civil and military affairs must be undivided and constitutionally acceptable. One cannot separate nowadays military from civil affairs in war-time. They are completely bound up with each other, and they must be gripped effectively by the Prime Minister. The conduct of military operations and the evolution of military strategy no longer hold the separate and dominating position that they did in the past. Parliament and the Country have got to feel that the whole war effort is continuously and comprehensively directed in a manner which fits in with the general constitutional structure of the Country. The effectiveness of Churchill's war-time administration would not have been anything like so great if he had not been so conscious of Parliament as a governing force in the nation, and had not been able to carry with him those forces in the Country which ultimately control and dominate its life.

The third requirement is a well understood chain of responsibilities. This requirement presents little difficulty within the Services themselves. It is far more difficult to achieve in the civil side of the national effort. But it is when the strands are all brought together at the top that confusion and irresolution can make themselves felt, and that the application of wrong principles can be fatal. The essential characteristic of the British system of control has for many years been well understood and insisted upon. It is, that the framing of policy and the making of plans should be in the hands of those people who bear the responsibility for carrying them out. The apparatus of control has therefore been built up in such a way that at all levels the responsible people from different departments or from outside agencies are brought together within a single framework of committees which has at its apex the War Cabinet. It is very tempting at times to believe that a small body of men not having day-to-day administrative duties will be able to think up plans which will be far better than those suggested by ministers or officials who are burdened with the conduct of affairs. It would have been easy for Mr. Churchill, when he assumed the position of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, to build up his own staff of officers separate from those in the Service or other ministries, and to issue orders to the latter based on the advice so given him. Most people in responsible positions have a hankering after the unattached, and therefore apparently unprejudiced, adviser who will probably give them much more palatable advice than that which they receive from the official channel, where the full facts of the situation are only too well known, and where the possibilities can be assessed. Up to a point something can be done in this way if it is limited to suggestions which can be put and tested against official advice, a process which can help to force the

official advisers to make sure of their ground. But if it goes beyond this point it is most dangerous. One of the great services performed in the war by Lord Ismay was that he ensured that the Prime Minister's immense energies were properly served by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the other regular inter-Service bodies, thus averting the tendency to turn to others, a tendency which might have become unmanageable if the official machine had not run smoothly and efficiently.

I think it will be generally recognized that in the course of Mr. Churchill's administration in the last war the requirements which I have mentioned for a successful system of control were all present. The War Cabinet in which sat a small number of ministers who either headed most important departments or supervised the activities of several, was backed up by the Defence Committee on the military side, the Lord President's Committee on the economic side, and by the Home Defence Committee which looked after the home front. The Chiefs of Staff headed the military machine and throughout the war gave their collective advice to the Minister of Defence or to the Defence Committee or to the War Cabinet as necessary. The whole machine was served by the small staff of the War Cabinet Office under Sir Edward Bridges and General Ismay—a staff which was in no sense advisory but which saw to it that the work flowed along the right channels speedily and efficiently, that the committees operated as parts of a co-ordinated whole, and that the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence obtained from the right official channels information, plans, and advice to serve his needs. The system carried to extreme lengths the idea, evolved and perfected over the previous 40 years, of co-ordination and co-operation by those who held responsibility in many differing fields. All worked for the common good under the overriding compulsion of national danger. Above all, there was the quality of leadership in a remarkable degree.

Anyone who has studied Mr. Churchill's volumes on the Second World War will have observed the tremendous range of his personal interest and the persistence with which he pursued matters which, though apparently small, nevertheless had an importance in the general picture. He has described in his book his method of work, which was marked by a complete absence of instructions given in any form other than in writing. This did not by any means imply that he did not see things for himself or get to know the principal actors in the different spheres. On the contrary, he made the maximum use of Chequers to enable him to converse in free and easy fashion with ministers, commanders-in-chief, important visiting personalities, and experts of various kinds. The characteristic which impressed me most among many was his thoroughness, because although his range was so extensive and his interests so varied, he liked best those times when he had a concrete problem to work on and some difficult operation to drive through. At these times nothing was allowed to divert his attention, and his persistence and energy were carried through till everything was complete. He never liked working on other people's drafts. In his view the first draft was the important one as it was bound to contain the exact thought of the person who made it. Thus, when he was that person he did not wish other people's thinking to be interposed. From the very first moment of the war he realized the supreme importance of the United States and of securing the confidence of the President. Consequently, when the United States was attacked, the basic foundation for a close relationship had been laid, and when he journeyed to Washington immediately after Pearl Harbour he fell easily and rapidly into harmonious working with the President. The importance of this fact can hardly be exaggerated.

One could talk for hours about other instructive aspects of the Prime Minister as a great war leader. One cannot deny the weaknesses which were mixed with the superb powers he displayed. I think I have said enough, however, to rub in the point that the successful war-time system is one in which great personal qualities are harnessed to a rightly conceived organization.

Before considering the combined control which came into force with our Allies, it is interesting to look at the situation in 1940 and 1941 when we stood alone supported by the Commonwealth and a few exiled European governments. The Commonwealth was united in purpose, tradition, and methods. There was a great disparity of force between the United Kingdom on the one hand and the other members of the Commonwealth on the other, and although all were taking a full share in the struggle, none of the Dominions was directly threatened until the Japanese menace began to emerge towards the end of 1941. Hence the system of control naturally centred itself on London, and the Commonwealth countries were content to leave the strategic direction in the hands of the United Kingdom Government. But even in these favourable circumstances considerable strains appeared at various times. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand became distinctly uneasy when disaster overtook the forces in Greece and Crete, and these events might well have caused a disastrous cleavage if the bonds between the different parts of the Commonwealth had not been so strong. An alliance of foreign countries faced with this situation might well have broken down. It does not seem, however, that we should draw the conclusion that some kind of Imperial War Cabinet or combined system of strategic control would be advisable in such circumstances if they ever occurred again. The wide geographical distribution of the Commonwealth and the difficulty of bringing together ministers and others who could speak with authority would make it almost impossible to create the kind of imperial defence system that has often been thought of as a dream in the past.

It was an accident that placed Britain and the Commonwealth in a position of fighting a war practically unaided, and it was not long before the situation changed. It seems inconceivable that we should stand alone in a major war in the future. It is, therefore, interesting to consider how the Allied system of control operated, and see what lessons we can draw from it for a future occasion. We can, I suggest, dismiss the alliance with Russia for this purpose. Our relations with Russia were in many respects extraordinary. There was no real harmony of political aim. There was little or no communication of facts or ideas and we had no real idea of Russian military thinking. The fundamental Russian distrust of the West, which was temporarily allayed by the German attack on Russia and our immediate response to it, very soon re-established itself and prevailed throughout. Fortunately, the almost complete geographical separation of the Russian theatre of war mitigated these disadvantages. There could be no real mixing up of forces of the kind so natural in other theatres, and so long as the Russians kept on fighting on a large scale, the events in their theatre had little bearing upon the timing and objectives in other theatres. It is hard to imagine what would have happened had the geographical facts been different.

Our relations with the United States were a different story. We spoke the same language, there were world-wide possibilities of close operational co-operation, both Britain and the Commonwealth and the United States had access to every part of the world, and there was thus every incentive to take a combined view of strategic problems. It is interesting to note that when the U.S.A. was attacked, Britain and

the Commonwealth had far greater strength in existence and deployed against the enemy than could possibly be produced by the U.S.A. This situation is not likely to recur.

The combined system, which came into being when the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff went to Washington immediately after Pearl Harbour, was founded very closely upon the British system in spite of some constitutional differences. On the American side the President was not only Head of State and Prime Minister, but also Commander-in-Chief. He was thus in many ways suited to the role of opposite number to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom. The Americans had in a somewhat embryonic form a Chiefs of Staff Committee known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This could easily be bound together with our own Chiefs of Staff Committee into a single inter-Allied organ. The President was not dependent upon a Cabinet nor upon the support of ministerial colleagues. In this sense his position was different from that of the Prime Minister, but Mr. Churchill had secured a sufficiently dominating position to be able to count on support for whatever he did. It was thus easy to establish a simple but comprehensive mechanism for the conduct of the war. The President and the Prime Minister together formed the apex of the pyramid. Military advice was furnished by the combined Chiefs of Staff, and other important matters of an administrative nature were dealt with by the combined boards, for example the Munitions Assignment Board, the combined Shipping Board and so on. The matter was made easier by the fact that there was no other member of the alliance, if we exclude Russia, which had the forces and the industrial strength to merit a place as a permanent member of the supreme direction of the war. The members of the Commonwealth could be sufficiently bound in, partly through London and partly through Washington, to ensure that they all were kept fully informed and were consulted on matters closely affecting their interests.

There are a number of factors which affect the conduct of a war-time alliance, but of these I would choose three as being the most important. The first is that the political aims of the members of the alliance are never identical. All are actuated by a desire to win the war, though there is often a divergence on the question of what constitutes victory, but each Government has its own reservations and its own ideas about the extent to which political objectives should influence the choice of operations and the relative weight to be attached to alternative courses of action.

The second factor is that all military thinking springs from traditional, geographical, and historical experience and varies widely in different countries. The third factor is that the strength of allies is rarely equal, but relative strength or power is of vital importance in an alliance and is becoming more so with the growth of scientific inventions and the shift in the balance from military manpower to technical and industrial strength.

Taking the last two factors together, we found in the last war that the American Navy thought almost entirely in terms of the Pacific. They had existed for many years without having to pay regard to danger from the Atlantic which was formerly held by the British fleet. They had never had to face the problem of keeping open vital sea communications. The American contingent was almost entirely self-sufficient, and so long as the British held the Atlantic there was no threat. In consequence of this mental attitude and historical background the American Navy built up immense strength in the Pacific which they regarded as their private theatre. They were at no time willing to impart information about the Pacific and they were not ready to share with their Allies the strategic direction of affairs in that theatre.

The United States Army, on the other hand, had as their background General Pershing's campaign in France in 1917 and 1918. They looked for a theatre in which a very large army could be deployed and where with concentrated energy a blow could be struck at the enemy's heart. The British, on the other hand, had a tradition of maritime warfare which involved operations in many parts of the world and had as their primary preoccupation the maintenance of sea communications. They were conscious that Britain and the Commonwealth had narrowly escaped defeat, and though in possession of far greater forces than the United States in the early days, they had no large concentration in any particular theatre. British thought was thus directed towards the process of closing the ring round Germany, regaining complete command of the sea, fighting in theatres where the full German forces could not be brought to bear on land, and by these methods opening the way for a return to the Continent.

Because of the fact that the preponderance of force in the first 18 months following Pearl Harbour lay with the British, the Americans, try as they would, could not avoid fitting in with the British ideas of strategy, though they felt considerable frustration in the process. They gravely distrusted the Mediterranean operations, they had little interest in the political problems of Europe; they simply wanted to deploy the largest possible forces in the quickest possible time to bring the whole thing to an end regardless of the long term interests of their many Allies. As the balance of power gradually swung over, American thinking began to get the upper hand, until in the final six months of the war they declined to be influenced any more and firmly rejected anybody's advice but their own.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this factor of power. Every circumstance was favourable for the Anglo-American alliance. The system of control was easy to establish and smooth in its working. Forces could be grouped together and manoeuvred almost as easily as could those of the Commonwealth when acting alone, and there were exceptional men available to conduct the business. Yet as the balance of power changed the signs rapidly appeared of divergence of political aim and military thinking, and these decisively affected strategy.

If we look to the future it seems fairly clear to me what shape the control of an alliance will take. The alliance is in being, and it includes the United States of America. Thus, unlike the situation on previous occasions, we shall know fairly well what war we are likely to be fighting and who will be the participants in it. It has been suggested that the Standing Group of N.A.T.O. could be a possible successor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, though it would hardly have the cohesion and authority of the latter body. A possible alternative or modification which might emerge would be a three-fold grouping of the U.S.A., representing also Canada, the United Kingdom, bringing in other members of the Commonwealth, and a representative of Western European Union or of some similar European amalgamation. These three elements might each represent a sufficient body of power to make the three-fold organization a workable unit. Nevertheless, it is clear that the immense power of the United States would be a decisive factor. It seems almost certain that whatever machinery might be set up, the alliance would be completely dominated by the United States who would consult to a limited extent suitable representatives of other Powers whose forces were in a position to make more than a negligible contribution. One can hardly imagine that the Americans would allow their thinking to be materially deflected, even by the United Kingdom.

This seems to me to be a serious state of affairs, if only because the rest of the alliance, though relatively weak in military resources, is of great importance politically and each member has its own real interests at stake. The United States has not been remarkable up to the present for its understanding of these interests. What, therefore, should we do to ensure that in the event of a major war our voice has some influence?

There seem to be three things we can do. First, we can make sure that our own system of control is as good as it can be. Secondly, we should do everything to ensure that such power as we possess is of the highest class and is concentrated in those forces which have a decisive influence on modern operations. Thirdly, we should do all we can to strengthen the power of our voice in less ponderable directions. Political wisdom counts for something; so does the effective grouping of a number of participants who separately would have little say, but who collectively might exert an influence.

I should now like to say a few words about the future development of our national system which, as I have just said, should be as good as it can be. I think it important to study our system, not only so that it can be effective in an alliance but also so that it will ensure that the power that we can afford is suitably arranged with the least waste of money and effort. Changes in a system take a long time to bring about, and delay in making the study is undesirable.

First of all the characteristics required in a system for the conduct of war have not changed. They remain as I stated them earlier in my lecture. Two other things, however, have changed. First, the emphasis on the home front, which was indeed great in the last war, requires now to be even greater. Secondly, the increasing complication and expense of new weapons makes it essential that we should avoid rivalries and duplication in their development and use.

If we look at the military sphere, I suggest that our present organization has gone as far as it is possible to go along the road of co-operation and co-ordination. The goal set by the long-sighted men who created the Committee of Imperial Defence at the beginning of the century, and worked to develop and perfect the system of which it was the key member, has been achieved. The question now is whether a new goal should be set for gradual achievement or whether we should accept what we have as the best possible. The new goal could only be a unification of the Services, by which I do not mean their abolition as separate entities, but their merging at the top. The goal would be a single Defence Council replacing the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council, and the Air Council, with a single Defence Minister and Ministry. There would be a unified list for officers who have risen to Flag rank or its equivalent. There would be a single Chief of Staff backed, of course, by an appropriately selected military organization. The object of such an arrangement would be to carry into inter-Service life the conception which was long ago accepted in each particular Service. In the Army the arms and branches of the Service exist, and maintain their characteristics, *esprit de corps*, and traditions. But at the top all officers are members of the Army, no matter what their previous regiment may have been. The right man, chosen for his personal qualifications, his training and experience, is appointed to each post. A similar arrangement could be applied overall. The result would be that all senior officers would be in a position to form their views and to help in the taking of decisions from the point of view of military operations as a whole. They would have ceased to fight for their own corner, though their Service foundations would not have been destroyed.

Many obvious objections can be made to such an arrangement. I would not suggest for a moment that the case is proved for or against. I would simply say this: we should examine very carefully whether a new goal of this kind should be established, or whether we should leave the well-tried system based on three Services, co-ordinated and co-operating, unchanged. I suggest that an examination of this kind should be set on foot, perhaps by a successor of the Esher Committee of over 50 years ago. If the conclusion of this examination favours a change, then this should be accepted and made known, and every step from now on should be taken towards the ultimate goal. If it is against, then we should set our face against changes and should concentrate our energies on making the existing system work as well as may be. I do not think that we should allow matters to slide and merely leave to passing whim or chance the introduction of minor remedies when the system appears to show symptoms of disease.

There are other directions in which it would be unwise to assume that we have reached finality. The correct manner of integrating the scientists into every phase of war planning is an obvious matter for continuous study. The role of the Services on the home front is another. Some may think that a major war in the future is so unthinkable, and if it came the results would be so catastrophic, that the solution to these problems of war-time organization is academic. I do not myself believe that to be so. No one can tell what the real picture in any future big war would be; one can only be fairly certain that it would be different to our expectation. We should be foolish indeed if we did not do all in our power to be ready to play an effective part, whatever happens.

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: That was very stimulating and thought-provoking and, I am sure, discussion-provoking. I should like to keep what I have to say until the end, but I must say how greatly interested and fortified I was in hearing from Sir Ian Jacob with all his experience his support for what I have strongly advocated, namely, that we must progress now to an effective Ministry of Defence with real power in a single Minister.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEOFFREY BLAKE: I merely want to ask a question concerning a statement which Sir Ian Jacob made as regards our present set-up. I think he said that it was, in his opinion, the best possible. There has been a good deal of argument lately on the position of the additional Chairman to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As Sir Ian knows, we got on extremely well during the war with the three Chiefs of Staff, one of whom was the Chairman; but of course that was conditioned I think to a great extent by the great personality and leadership of the then Prime Minister. It would seem to me that this additional chairman may be in a slightly invidious position. I should like the lecturer to give us his opinion on whether he will be handicapped in any way, first, by being the intermediary, so to speak, between the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence and, secondly, by his responsibilities with N.A.T.O.

THE LECTURER: I assume that the reason for this appointment is that, first, it has been found that the Chiefs of Staff are constantly having to go abroad for N.A.T.O. and similar business, and secondly, it is a good thing that they should have an independent chairman. I only state those reasons tentatively because I have not seen any other reason given. I think that the appointment is a mistake unless it forms part of a well thought-out and steady chain of progress towards some further reorganization.

The reason why I think it is a mistake, is this. If the officer in question is to be merely a chairman and spokesman, then I do not think he is very valuable. If, on the other hand, he is to do more than that, then I think he is dangerous, because who is he to rely on for his information and advice?

The arrangement leads directly, in my opinion, to the setting up of the kind of

separate staff without operational responsibility that I mention as being of great danger. You may remember that during the war the Americans had a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy. We always wondered what he did and the answer, I think, was given by the title of his own book which is *I Was There* !

THE CHAIRMAN : I have one question on that. I would agree that this must be part of a transition for this to work at all ; but would the lecturer's views be somewhat modified if it were understood, as I feel sure it ought to be, that the Service Chief who becomes the independent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee would in no circumstances go back to his own Service, and that he would be of all Services and in a sense above all Services and would never be looking back to his own Service.

THE LECTURER : I have assumed that that was so. I do not think that it affects it much. It would certainly be worse if he went back, but I still feel that the appointment is one which has not really been thought out. Whether it is good or bad, time will show, but it does not seem to me to have the characteristics of a sound move made with solid argument behind it and as part of some considered change.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN ELDRIGE : The essence of the control in the last war was, I understand, centralized control. If the horrors which were envisaged in the White Paper on Defence did come upon us, it is possible that there would be a serious disruption of communications in general. It seems that it will be necessary to decentralize the control a great deal. There would have to be decentralized control of regions in this country which might have to be self-centred, and there would probably be some overall control of the war, possibly from the wilds of the United States. Therefore, has the lecturer any thoughts on the duplication of control or how control should be maintained in these conditions of seriously disrupted communications ?

THE LECTURER : It is, of course, one of the great difficulties, to foresee the kind of conditions which would rule if there were very serious disruption. But it seems to me that those conditions lead inevitably to there being a single man who can be placed in charge of activities geographically, or by theatre, or whatever it might be. To my mind it strengthens the argument in favour of greater unification. It is necessary to have single people who can take control in these very difficult circumstances to whom everybody can be made responsible. I think that it is difficult to take the thought very much further, but we all know that in conditions of great chaos you do in the end rely upon one man who takes control of the business and runs it. The more we split up into different bodies in our control mechanism the more difficult it will be. To my mind it makes it all the more necessary to go further along the line of unification rather than co-ordination.

GENERAL SIR KENNETH CRAWFORD : During the last war there seems to have been a fairly effective military organization, and although there were differences of opinion, ultimately the military decisions were taken together. There does not seem to be the same sort of set-up in the political field. From reading books on the subject it rather seems that as we came towards the war's conclusion, political aims were not properly co-ordinated. At the present time, in the cold war, the same thing is apparent, and it would seem that the situation may well get worse. Does the lecturer consider that some fresh form of organization is necessary to attempt to achieve agreement on the political aim in parallel with the plans of operation ?

THE LECTURER : This is a very interesting question and it is one that I have many times discussed with people in the Foreign Office. It struck any military person very forcibly in the last war that there was no mechanism for the working out of combined foreign policy. I never got anywhere in these discussions because if one can take our own Foreign Office—I do not know much about other Foreign Offices—their minds work in quite a different way from the minds of military people. I do not want that to be taken as meaning that they do not work very well, but they are different. They do not really accept the idea that you can plan foreign policy as a co-ordinated whole or like a strategic problem.

The other thing that bears on it is that in foreign policy you have the whole mechanism of democracy at work, with very conflicting ideas, and many political factors to heed in each country. So the actual job of harmonizing and forming a foreign policy is far more difficult. The Foreign Office might make a long-range plan, then there would be a change of political control and much would have to be thrown overboard and something else substituted. Therefore, the question has always seemed to me to be almost insoluble.

The same thing applies in the case of the cold war. If Cyprus may be taken as an example, one would have thought that at a time such as this our Allies in N.A.T.O. would be taking with us a combined attitude on the subject. But that is not the case. Furthermore, there is no likelihood of their ever doing so. I think that many of us hoped that the Atlantic Council of N.A.T.O., which is a political organization, might have been used for that very sort of purpose, but it does not seem to have been so used, and there seems to be very little chance of that. It may be that this is one of those problems which cannot be solved in the way suggested.

GENERAL SIR KENNETH CRAWFORD: I mention this matter because it seems that until political differences are reconciled it is difficult to see how the military effort can be properly applied.

MAJOR J. NORTH: In fairness to the American point of view about Cyprus, I should like to suggest that in the view of N.A.T.O., Cyprus is not—and can never be so regarded by the Americans—a feasible, secure base for any operations whatsoever. The Americans are embarrassed when we talk about this island as being a strategic base.

I was fascinated by the lecturer's reference to certain weaknesses displayed by Mr. Churchill in the direction of the war. I do not know whether he would suggest that there were vital decisions which the then Prime Minister took which adversely affected the conduct of the war; but, since they would make new history, I should like to ask the lecturer whether any decisions were taken which, in the light of subsequent events, were shown to have been taken erroneously?

THE LECTURER: That is a tall order! I might perhaps put it this way. It is possible to recall a number of occasions on which one felt at the time that he was proposing courses of action which did not seem very sensible; but he had the great characteristic that he was not prepared to impose his military ideas on the Chiefs of Staff if the Chiefs of Staff would not fall in with them. He never over-rode them and said: "I have had your advice. Thank you very much. We shall do something different." He forced them to the absolute limit and sometimes carried them with him beyond the point to which they would have gone if they had thought it over coldly; but one does not think things over coldly in war. Therefore, when you look back afterwards and think, as one always does think after the best-conducted war, that a number of mistakes were made, all one can say is that there were far less of them made on this occasion than usual. The Prime Minister's efficiency by that test was higher than that of the great majority of war leaders of the past. The efficiency came from a combination of the two things that I mentioned in my lecture, namely, the tremendous power of leadership harnessed to a strong military organization. It was the combination of those forces which produced the result.

I would not subscribe to the idea that Sir Winston Churchill conducted a war policy as a dictator. He forced everybody to the absolute limit towards accepting his ideas but discarded them when he was really opposed. Sometimes arguments went on for a long time, but in the end, if the Chiefs of Staff stood firm on something which they regarded as right, he fell in with their views.

THE CHAIRMAN: If there are no other questions perhaps I may make one or two observations.

Frankly, I do not like—and I have been thinking about this ever since the lecturer

said it—the suggestion made of an Esher Committee. I do not like the idea of the Government abdicating its responsibility on what is today, after all, one of the main decisions which ought to press on the Government and on which the Government ought to make up its mind. I do not think that a Government could put to a Committee, however high-powered it was, a decision of this importance. A government could hardly go to this 'Esher Committee' as litigants go to a High Court judge or an arbitrator. Moreover, the facts are known: what is wanted is decision and action. If the Committee were appointed it would take a frightfully long time. Everybody would want to be heard, and a number of people who ought to be heard and a number of people who ought not to be heard would come forward and prattle to this Committee. And when the Committee at last reported, even if the report was unanimous (a pretty wide assumption), it does not follow that the Government would accept the report. It would certainly not put it into action automatically. I know what happens to these reports to Government. The report would come forward, it would be considered, it would be discussed to start with in the Cabinet, it would then go on to the departments, every line would be fought out in the departments, and after months it would be the Government which would have to take the decision.

That does not mean that I do not think that the decision has to be taken, and I personally feel that the decision should be to move forward to closer co-ordination and more authority for the Minister of Defence. I say nothing about the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It may well be that if you get the effective control of the Minister of Defence somebody like that is necessary. I wholeheartedly agree with the lecturer that nobody could take the place of the Chiefs of Staff. I have heard that sort of idea adumbrated very often. I remember saying in the House of Lords that it used to be advocated by Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson before he became C.I.G.S., but not after! The Chiefs of Staff are the heads of their Services and with them rests the responsibility for action. I do not believe that anybody can take their place.

I have no doubt also that the lecturer is right that in war the Prime Minister must be the Minister of Defence and he will exercise supreme power and direction, and the Service Ministers will in fact be his deputies.

I cannot agree too strongly with all Sir Ian said about the dynamic leadership of Sir Winston Churchill in the war. Although he would fight like a tiger for his case he never forced it on really unwilling Chiefs of Staff. It is quite wrong to suppose that Sir Winston Churchill likes 'yes-men.' He does not. At the same time, he does not like 'no-men' and men who say "that cannot be done." I have never found that he was not amenable to argument, and if you had a counter-suggestion which you could persuade him was better than his own, nobody was more ready to accept it. Of course, very often his suggestions were a great deal better than yours, and he would not be Winston if that was not so.

It is axiomatic that the best preparation for war and therefore the best assurance that we do not have to go to war, is readiness. Readiness means preparation and preparation implies the minimum amount of change and improvisation if war should come. It also means—and it means this as much in peace as in war—that you need not only co-operation at all levels, but also decisions firmly taken, loyally accepted, and effectively carried out. It is necessary to avoid delay as much as possible. In war two factors ensure and, indeed, enforce this. First, the supreme power to take decisions automatically vests in the Prime Minister. The second factor, as I am sure that every Service chief will agree, is that day by day enemy action forces common thinking, co-operation, and combined action on all the Services. In peace-time, under our present system, neither of those compelling factors are present or, at any rate, present to anything like the same extent. Yet I think—and it was implicit in nearly every lesson which the lecturer drew—that the need is almost as great as it was in war. It is a need both to cope with our present problems and a need to have the machine which would be necessary in war working in times of peace. That is why I am reinforced by everything

that I have heard today in the recommendation that I ventured to make at the end of last year, that we really must now move towards having a Minister of Defence who will have real power and authority.

I know all the formulæ which have been contrived, but formulæ are not facts and they are not constitutional power. There is a world of difference in practice between a Minister of Defence who is constitutionally and in fact an arbitrator between three competing claimants, all of whom have a right of appeal to the Cabinet, and a Minister of Defence who is constitutionally responsible for initiating and executing a policy over the whole field. That does not mean that he has to take on every administrative job. Of course it does not mean that any more than it meant that Sir Winston Churchill took on all administrative jobs in the three Services during the war. It does, however, mean that he is responsible not only for priorities but for policy which will issue in action. I believe that is the only way we shall get the necessary decisions and the necessary co-operation.

Therefore, I remain firmly of the opinion that this system (after all it is the system which served us so well in the war) is the one which we need today to ensure the highest degree of co-operation, of efficiency, and, I may add, of economy.

On your behalf I should like sincerely to propose a vote of thanks to Sir Ian Jacob for his stimulating lecture. (*Applause.*)

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR NORMAN BOTTOMLEY: I am sure you would wish me to say to Lord Swinton how much we appreciate his kindness in coming here to preside over this meeting. Lord Swinton, as we all know, has had great experience in the conduct of war at high level, and has contributed a great deal to the solution of many problems in the higher direction of war. We are indeed very fortunate in having had him to preside here today. (*Applause.*)

GENERALSHIP AND THE ART OF COMMAND IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE

By GENERAL SIR RICHARD N. GALE, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

On Wednesday, 11th April, 1956, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR BRIAN HORROCKS, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : I have no intention of going through the very distinguished career of the lecturer, because I think it must be obvious to everybody that for this particular lecture there could be nobody better qualified than the man who holds, I would say, the most important command in our Army today. Sir Richard Gale has, however, two other qualifications in connection with this lecture which I should like to mention, and that is all I will say.

Firstly, he is, thank goodness, an infantryman and his feet are therefore firmly on the ground. That is very important today, because the military pastures are full of bright young theorists gambolling about happily like new-born lambs and it has never been more important to keep one's feet on the ground. Secondly, he is the most air-minded general we have got—and today the air is the senior partner. He raised and commanded the 1st Parachute Brigade and subsequently commanded the 6th British Airborne Division in Normandy.

This is what the late Chester Wilmot wrote about him in *The Struggle for Europe* :—

"When he spoke, the power of his blunt but lucid words revealed a man who could both devise a plan of daring originality and imbue his men with the confidence and courage to carry it out."

That is what Chester Wilmot wrote about Sir Richard Gale, and Chester Wilmot was a very sound judge.

LECTURE

I HAVE read diligently the late Field-Marshal Lord Wavell's three lectures on *Generals and Generalship* and I wonder at my temerity in giving you this lecture today. It can only be excused because times have changed. New impacts have come to bear on the problem. My task, as I see it, is to relate these events to our subject and to discern, if we can, where we now stand.

What are these events? I think if we list them we may get a glimpse of the size of the problem. I think, too, this is a good forum for such a discussion. Just as a painter stands back from his canvas to get a view of the picture as a whole, so we professional men should stand back occasionally and look at our works; and thus, perhaps, see whether we have indeed kept a sense of proportion. Theoretical study is good, provided always it is not indulged in too much; for continuous theoretical study is likely to blur the practical approach and lead to "El Dorado," which is not what we are after at all.

Here are five good reasons why I suggest we should undertake this study now. They are :—

I. Since 1939 there have been vast experiences, differing from those of previous wars and in many respects more dynamic in their results. We have had the experience of war in Europe, in Africa, and in Burma. We have been able to observe generalship as exercised by ourselves, by the United States, by the French, by the Russians, and by the Germans.

II. We have witnessed the full development of mechanization and of armoured warfare; advances in wireless and radio relay; the development of a virtually new staff system; and what I might even call the 'complex' of planning and of the conduct of large-scale operations.

III. There has been an immense development in aerial warfare; we have seen the impact of air strategy on overall strategy as well as upon the conduct of land campaigns. We have seen the advent of the guided missile, rocket launchers, and remote or electronic control of weapons over great distances. Finally, we have witnessed advances in the whole field of scientific development and an ever increasing adaptation of engineering skill to military activity.

IV. We are familiar now with the growing dependence of groups of nations on the resources and efforts of each other. We are in the era of grand alliances in the field of planning and actual conduct of operations; and we now have integration and standardization of both methods and equipment in peace as well as in war.

V. Lastly and most important of all, we have the impact of nuclear warfare upon the whole conception of war.

I will attempt to deal with these points individually. First, let me tell you this little anecdote. A certain well-known general, whom I will not name, once, seeing a governor drafting a telegram for the Colonial Office, asked the following question:—"How does a governor govern?" The governor was not amused! But the general pursued the point. He said, "I could explain to you how I command an army—one thing I wouldn't do would be to draft telegrams with my own fair hand; that would be the function of my staff!" That by way of introduction. To turn to the more particular. Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery will, in my opinion, go down in British military history as the man who showed us, perhaps more than anything else, how a general should command. Lord Montgomery separated himself from his staff: the whole staff machine he left to the control of his chief of staff. In this way he ensured that he would never get caught up in minor, nevertheless important, problems related to the implementation of policy. He was thus left clear to decide on the correct policy, to ponder and conclude the best line to take, and what was far more important, to look ahead and plan ahead. We can conclude that the general must not allow himself to be caught up in the work of the staff. He must leave this to his chief of staff and, if necessary, set up a small separate tactical headquarters from which he controls events.

We learned too, I think more clearly than we recognized in the past, that there is a quite distinct difference of function at the various levels of command. Army group, army, and corps commanders are not different people carrying out similar functions at varying levels. They each have their different functions within their respective spheres. These differences are manifested in many different spheres, but it is perhaps in terms of time that we find the simplest examples. A corps commander is concerned with the immediate battle and the events of the moment are his principal worry. The army commander is concerned with affairs perhaps one or two or even three days ahead. He watches the movement of enemy reserves and so, in terms of air reconnaissance and air action, he is looking deeper into the battlefield. Logistic support for the following phases of the battle is his concern and logistic planning requires a long view. The army group commander thinks in parallel with a tactical air force commander. He is concerned with the grouping of his armies for subsequent operations and, with his partner, the tactical air force commander, is planning for the development of operations on an altogether broader canvas.

At the same time each of these commanders knows that subsequent operations will be of little avail if today's battle is lost. This leads into the problem of decentralization, with which I will deal later. For the moment just let me say that

the frank recognition of these different responsibilities and functions calls for a great deal of mutual confidence. Unless, for instance, an army commander has faith in his corps commanders and leaves tactical decisions to them, delays will occur at crucial moments and great opportunities will be missed.

On the other hand, if full advantage is to be taken from the flexibility of modern long-range weapons, a degree of centralization becomes necessary, and this may at times bring the army level of command for specific purposes into the corps sphere. Nevertheless, the principle of difference of function at varying levels is of the greatest importance and neglect of it will result in interference and consequent muddle.

The great commanders of the last war generally put their problems, their analysis, and their intended plan over to their subordinate commanders personally. They understood the vital necessity for ensuring that their intention was known by the subordinate responsible for its execution. When they did it themselves there was only one person to blame if it was not properly understood. Lord Montgomery always adopted this plan. Moreover, he appreciated the necessity for simplicity. He was terse and to the point.

Let me tell you something I heard a Grenadier sergeant say the other day. A platoon of guardsmen was doing a small exercise. The men were on their stomachs along a hedgerow. The sergeant said, "Now, over there there's some enemy and I think they are going to attack this position. Now our task is . . ." and then he hesitated, and again he said "Now our task is . . ." and hesitated again—and then with a gulp he said, "Well anyway the enemy ain't going to get in here." You will see how very simple and how very dynamic his final instruction was. Everybody knew from that moment exactly what he had to do: irrelevancies went out and the task was simply stated. The conclusion here is that direct personal touch with subordinate commanders, coupled with the ability to put the intention tersely and in simple language, are essential to effective command.

In connection with this matter of clear, crisp expression I would refer you to [the elder] *Moltke's Projects for the Campaign of 1866 against Austria* and *Moltke's Correspondence during the Campaign of 1866 against Austria*¹. These documents are models of what I mean by clear, crisp thinking. They are worthy of study. They are the very soul of brevity. I have a suspicion that they are not read today by those who might gain much by the reading of them.

One of these papers deals with the effect of the entry of Bavaria into the war. No single implication of this is missed, nevertheless the whole subject is dealt with in a comparatively few terse paragraphs.

In this connection I have seen Lord Montgomery drafting a personal note and have been immensely struck by the care he took in the selection of words.

At the risk of appearing pedantic I would like to underline the importance of words. In a young officer comparatively loose statements are merely annoying. Little harm can result from them save this: that unless that habit of loose verbiage and untidy thought be early cured he will have to do a deal of learning later, or if he reaches senior rank, he will be in danger of becoming a nuisance or even a *liability*. Precision of thought is essential to good generalship: and precision of thought is almost impossible without a proper understanding of the meaning of words. Language, both written and verbal, is the only vehicle for conveying wishes, intentions, instructions, fears, and doubts. The clearer expressed the thought, the greater the chance

¹ Both available in the R.U.S.I. Library.

of its being grasped by others. This clarity of expression is of profound importance.

This leads to control of events once battle is joined. If I might use a cliché I would say "the art of command lies in the retention of it." In all theatres we soon learned that if a general wanted to ensure that his plan was being put into effect he went forward to see. Guderian in the German army was a good example of this and so too was Rommel, probably the greatest of the German commanders. Modern battle is on a big scale, and it may at first appear difficult for the commander to decide where is the best place to be. I can only say that the art of generalship lies in the ability of the general to discern where this point is.

There is one other very good reason for generals looking for themselves. Rumour is a lying jade and many rumours that reach headquarters well in rear are alarming; they present pictures often quite different from the true situation at the front. When, however, the situation at the front is indeed dangerous the general can gauge and decide on the spot what steps he should take to relieve the strain. His presence in moments of doubt, and in situations which appear bad to those on the spot, will often give confidence; and his personal approbation of action which they have taken will put heart into his subordinates. General Ridgway's command in Korea is a splendid example of the influence of a great commander in a battle when, through personal intervention, a well-nigh disastrous retreat was halted, giving way to offensive action in which every man had unbounded confidence.

This may indicate that I am advocating too rigid a control in an age when, as we shall see, we must be prepared to decentralize. My point is that whereas it is essential to decentralize and to give full range to subordinates to develop their initiative, it is equally important to keep such a grip that the commander is quite confident that it is his plan and not somebody else's interpretation of it which is being put into effect. The architect must watch the erection of the building. I believe Lord Nelson was the greatest exponent of decentralization. A study of his methods will show, however, that he was most meticulous over the plan. His captains were left in no doubt of it. His system of signalling was designed to ensure his control. Yet, I suppose no band of subordinates ever felt more free to develop their initiative than were his happy band of captains.

Wireless gives commanders and staff ability to retain control over large bodies of troops over great distances. Guderian's system of command exercised so personally was only made possible by the fullest use of wireless, which kept him in touch with his headquarters whilst he was forward watching events. We must, however, be careful that wireless does not detach a commander from the battle and give him that fatal feeling that with its aid he can exercise remote control from his main headquarters in rear.

Leading on from this my next remarks concern the relationship between commanders and their staffs. Nothing has been more alarming than the growth of staffs. The complexities of modern equipment, the size of modern armies, and the immense logistic tail which so characterizes large armies today have been largely responsible for this. Government by brief may be dangerous, but generalship by brief is worse. A full understanding of the staff machine is nevertheless essential. It has two straightforward functions. One is to serve the commander and the other is to help the troops. The present large and cumbersome staffs are in danger of defeating their object, and may, and do, sometimes merely create misunderstanding. Big, unwieldy staffs tend to take control of events. They tend to become unyielding. They develop a system of rule by brief unless the commander watches them. Nevertheless, failure

to use the staff machine for estimating problems may lead to trouble. Two commanders nattering together without reference to the staff may keep many people busy for many hours on much unnecessary work.

Now there are two elements in this business of command. One is the element of actual personal command to which I have referred and the other is the element of procedure. Procedure is an excellent servant but a shocking master. Now the whole staff machine is geared to the element of procedure. It is right that it should be. The number of different things that have to be done, the vast number of different units, both air and ground, that have to be got on the move, and the whole logistical or administrative activities that have to be set in motion demand an orderly approach. A system of procedures has been evolved and emerged and this is the outcome of experience rather than of whim or caprice. It has, however, been evolved in an era of war. In war, individual demands and even caprices are met because, as a general principle, those in authority will tend to do anything rather than hamstring the men directly responsible for the fighting. It is in this atmosphere that large and frequently over-large staffs were incubated. In peace, and particularly long periods of peace, the pendulum swings in the opposite direction and frequently essential elements to the smooth running of staff are cut, undue risks are taken. Those who had experience with the hastily thrown together staffs with which the British Expeditionary Force set sail in 1939 will know what I mean. The net result of this was that those who suddenly found themselves in authority when grim fighting commenced had to improvise and overcome odds directly resulting from this parsimony. Today we live in an era of cold wars: the danger, therefore, of over-complacency is less. Nevertheless, the need for economy, particularly of manpower, is great. Therefore, now, if ever there is going to be one, is the time for scrutiny of systems.

My next point is of very great importance and perhaps of the greatest importance; but in this mosaic which goes to make the whole it is perhaps wisest to omit priorities. I refer to the impact of air strategy and the air war on the land campaign. At the conclusion of the last war all students of military affairs recognized that armies were no longer capable of winning wars on their own. War on land is now, as it never was before, a joint army/air concern. Airfields require armies to cover them; ground must be fought for and held to provide depth to radar locating devices. Even a temporary defeat of air forces in the air battle is a military disaster. Any failure of ground forces to fulfil their mission has a direct influence on the struggle for air superiority. Plans become combined plans and the conduct of operations a combined affair. The air arm has deepened the battlefield, not merely by a few kilometres but by hundreds of miles. Generalship which fails to take full cognisance of this simple fact, or ability which fails to match itself to the complex problems which are its natural corollary, is not generalship at all.

The development of scientific weapons and the whole impact of this on equipment, organization, and conduct of battle makes a knowledge and understanding of these things essential to commanders of the future. The difficulty here will be in the extent to which this knowledge is essential. I put it to you that there is not half enough of it today, and that looking into the future, commanders must have a great deal more scientific and technical knowledge than they have ever thought necessary in the past. Woolwich, the old Military Academy with a high standard of technical training, has in fact produced an extremely high proportion of generals in the past. The modern Sandhurst and the Shrivenham of the future must brace themselves to this fact.

Lord Wavell referred to Socrates and noted with implied concurrence that Socrates put a knowledge of tactics last on his list. I, personally, firmly believe that a tactical sense is essential, almost I would say a first essential. Nothing succeeds like success and successful generals, even if they are not necessarily remarkable for their popularity, are always followed. A tactical sense is not easy to define, but it includes a knowledge of ground and what advantages ground can give. Ground to a general can be like the tide to a sailor. Wellington made brilliant use of ground and his selection of his positions at Torres Vedras and at Waterloo are but two examples of this genius. Montgomery's use of ground in the defence battle of Alam Halfa is a modern classic of what I mean. Ability to size up and make the fullest use of ground to further the plan can only be acquired by study and training. Brute force, weight of artillery, and air power make for victory, but at a bloody cost and even then inconclusively; the campaign in France in the 1914-18 War was an example of this.

Grand alliances are here and here to stay. Inter-continental air warfare and the long-range ballistic rocket are two military reasons for the development of grand alliances. Whereas in the past religious difficulties have tended to drive nations into groups for defence or otherwise, the fear of aggression and the fact of aggression have generally been the main driving forces forcing smaller nations into war-time alliances. Today the conflict of ideologies and the fear of aggression have forced nations into alliances or pacts, and a degree of integration has been achieved in peace-time which no other age has witnessed. The problems and cost of large-scale production of immensely complicated equipment and engines of war have developed an international interdependence of unprecedented size. Thus, whereas in the past generals had to co-operate with their allies in the battlefield, today they have to co-operate in peace. The importance of this must not be overlooked, for today the success or otherwise of a general may very justly be in direct relationship to his ability to co-operate with allies. One of his most important tasks is to gain their confidence, and then to retain it. This confidence issue is a mutual business. As Field-Marshal Sir William Slim once said when addressing some British and Allied generals, "Never forget that you are an Ally yourself." The importance of a knowledge of foreign languages is a corollary to this: while I should not call it essential, I think it is an unnecessary handicap to be without it. Interpreters are essential if confusion is to be avoided, but the ability of commanders to be able to talk on more personal matters with their allied colleagues is an advantage of great merit.

In the field of politics, too, there are new factors. An army group commander today may find himself in peace exercising a degree of command over forces of several nations. This brings him in contact with delicate problems, when tact and a political sense are essential. Those factors so ably brought out by Sir William Robertson in his *Soldiers and Statesmen* and by Wavell in his lectures still apply: the field, however, is larger. In the cold war, for example, commanders find themselves confronted by problems so bordering on, and so affected by, the political that unless they possess an understanding of the issues at stake, they may well find themselves advocating or adopting an unreal policy.

I now wish to refer to some of the more important impacts of the development of nuclear warfare in both the strategic and tactical fields of warfare. I do not want to get involved here in merits and demerits of strategical or tactical conceptions. The first and outstanding characteristic of the atomic weapon is its immense destructive power. Whereas in the past we have talked of six-inch and eight-inch guns or

even larger, whereas we have talked of army groups of artillery counting the number of barrels and of rounds per gun, now we talk of kiloton missiles. A nominal, though what I might call normal, missile of 20 KT represents 20,000 tons of T.N.T. This weight of destructive effort can be released in a few seconds and can be placed with accuracy many hundreds of miles from the point of departure. Fire plans that took days to make and to prepare for can be put into effect in so many minutes, but with a degree of ferocity and destructive potential many hundreds, if not thousands, of times greater. Nevertheless, we must not forget that we know, some of us in our own experience, how to stand up to devastating destruction. In the British Army alone on the first day of the Battle of the Somme we had 57,000 casualties.

The implications on generalship, and on the art of command, of the atomic weapons are, of course, immense and any tendency to underestimate them would be folly. First, they bring into a more poignant relief the relations between command in the air and on land. A frank realization of this may result in indigestion for some whose minds have not yet fully moved with the times: but its truth remains. Certainly the interplay between both strategic planning and operations and tactical planning and operations as between air and land forces is infinitely more intimate. The principles of deception, concealment, and surprise take on new life. In the order of factors affecting the construction of any plan they come right up into the front rank. There is one very good reason for this: it is not fear. It is that the atomic weapon has one very interesting and important limiting factor. It over-kills. It kills the man or destroys the one thing threefold—or even 300-fold. It is within a circle of comparatively limited radius that it utterly destroys by radiation, by heat or burning, and by over-pressure or blast. Deception and surprise with their corollary of concealment now come into perspective: particularly is this so in a defensive operation. In the offensive the element of surprise is no less important.

The telescoping of time will make many of our procedures too slow. Immediate action and reaction will be called for; and a degree of decentralization and broadening of the scope of individual initiative will be essential. Detailed orders must give place to broad instructions in which, while the subordinate is left in no doubt as to the commander's intention, he is given full range to interpret its execution as the uncertainty and impacts of the battle develop. Concentration in terms of space must give way to concentration in terms of time. This implies a definitely scientific approach to problems of deployment and movement. Long, tenuous, and crowded lines of communication become vulnerable and will be unsupportable. More than mere lip service must be paid to this. Administrative and logistical generalship take on new forms, calling for imagination and the willingness to take risks. When one considers that Sir William Slim commanded an army whose maintenance he so courageously planned to provide, and did in fact provide, by air lift, one gets but one example of what I mean.

Lord Wavell referred to robustness. He said: "What I hold to be the first essential of a general is the quality of robustness". May I quote what Surtees wrote of the Master of Foxhounds many years ago in his famous *Analysis of the Hunting Field*.

"He should", he wrote, "have the boldness of a lion, the cunning of a fox, the shrewdness of an excise man, the calculation of a general, the decision of a judge, the purse of Squire Plutus, the regularity of a railway, the punctuality of a time piece, the liberality of a sailor, the patience of Job, the tact of an M.P., the wilyness of a diplomat, the politeness of a lord, the strength of Hercules, the thirst of Bacchus,

the appetite of Dendo, the digestion of an ostrich, the coolness of a crocodile, the fire-enduring powers of a salamander, with a slight touch of the eloquence of Cicero and a temper as even as the lines of a copy book."

Wasn't Surtees really thinking of generalship!

In conclusion I believe that generalship today has much to learn from the past. It is always best when command is direct and personal. It requires of a man great robustness, but it also requires great tactical ability and a full and detailed understanding of those scientific and engineering developments which are so much the hallmark of our time. It requires a broad-minded and understanding approach to air warfare of today, and presupposes a complete understanding, not only of air strategy, but of the facts of air/land warfare. It requires an understanding of the staff machine and ability to use it to the hilt, whilst never letting it get control. It demands confidence in all levels which postulates the encouragement of initiative. It calls for the determination to control events and not to be controlled by them. It calls for political sagacity and tact, understanding and a reasonable humility. It calls for patriotic fervour but also an international outlook.

The impact of the atomic weapon on the tactical field heightens the necessity for flexibility of outlook, for placing full confidence in subordinates, and for the exercise of personal control when events demand this.

Here then is the back cloth on which I suggest that generalship and the art of command should be developed. The importance of this subject needs no underlining.

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting is now open for discussion. I am sure that if any of the budding Masters of Foxhounds would like to ask questions, the lecturer will try to answer them.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD LE Q. MARTEL: We all knew that we would hear a first-class talk from Sir Richard Gale, and I am sure we have all enjoyed it. The fact that passes through the minds of many of us at the moment, however, is to what extent this applies to the form of warfare which might be happening in the immediate future and whether it does not dwell rather on the form of warfare that has arisen hitherto.

Let us see what has happened. During the war, we had a first-class organization with a headquarters at S.H.A.E.F. controlling every aspect of psychological warfare with staffs at the headquarters of army commands, and a top level executive at home. That helped us tremendously in the war. Since the war finished, however, and from the moment that it finished, we have watched the whole thing fade away.

The Communists, on the other hand, have built up their organization on a far greater scale than they had during the war. For 10 years we have sat back and done nothing, and as a result we have watched the Soviet capturing half the world without casualties. That is an awful thing to think about, but those are the facts.

What are we doing about this? We all agree with the splendid advice from Sir Richard Gale and others, but the fact remains that the Communists, having captured half the world, have not the slightest intention of going back to an old-fashioned shooting war. Why should they when they have had such great success with their present methods, which they are continuing to use?

We see it happening day after day. They are taking our bases in Singapore and Ceylon, and so on, but nothing has been done to compete with them. The R.U.S.I., which has a tremendously good record in this connection, has had three first-class lectures during the past year and a half on psychological warfare, but all those splendid lectures have dealt with the staff side.

It is very important that we should get the organization right, but the fact remains

that nobody has been invited here with a standing equal to that of Sir Richard Gale to say that we must now set up a really first-class cold warfare organization and do this, that, and the other to regain what we have lost, without casualties, in the same manner as the tactics employed by the other side, and have a huge success on our side. There is no reason why we should not regain our whole position, but we have no chance of doing it unless we work out a real, first-class, cold warfare machine and organization.

THE LECTURER: I do not think that that really calls for any observation on my part because it deals with subjects which, although, as General Martel has said, are of terrific interest, are outside the scope of the subject which I have studied and which was within the framework of the organization that we have: What are the problems of generalship today?

MAJOR JOHN NORTH: The question I would like to put to General Gale really derives from his reference to the complexities of modern equipment and the huge logistic tails of modern armies. He will know that Field-Marshal Slim has at least emulated one of his performances and has written a book. From that book I would like to take four short quotations.

The first quotation is:—

"The campaign in Burma foreshadowed the coming pattern of modern war."

What was the nature of that warfare, as defined by Field-Marshal Slim? He says:—

"In Burma, we developed a form of warfare based more on human factors than on lavish equipment."

What does Field-Marshal Slim say about the coming pattern? It is this:—

"Success in future land operations will depend on determined troops who are prepared to jettison all but fighting essentials and to move in small, self-contained formations."

Field-Marshal Slim comments:—

"These small, self-contained formations will make their own way even through the chaos of atomic bombing."

This is the question I should like General Gale to answer. If that would appear to be—and I think it is—Field-Marshal Slim's recipe for success in modern land warfare, do the training exercises in General Gale's command in any way conform to it?

THE LECTURER: I came here today to talk generalship. I said that one of the things that was necessary in generalship—and I underlined it—was a good tactical sense, but I did not want to get involved in matters of tactics or strategy as applied to war in north-west Europe or anywhere else, because that opens up another whole theme. My contention is that the remarks I made about the art of generalship will apply whatever the organizations may happen to be.

As one who is responsible for advising the Chiefs of Staff as to the best organizations to deal with the situation today, I reckon that I have given the best advice that any living man could give, and I shall not go back on it. I think we all know what that advice is. There is nothing which Field-Marshal Slim has said which alters my opinion.

LIEUT.-COLONEL S. K. GILBERT: I should like to ask a question strictly within the limits of the lecture's title. We have had a magnificent dissertation on the intellectual side of generalship, but is there not another side? I refer to the creation and maintenance of morale, especially in difficult circumstances. Those two commanders, Field-Marshal Montgomery and Field-Marshal Slim, who have been several times mentioned, were masters of this art. Has the lecturer nothing to tell us on that?

THE LECTURER: I am grateful for that question, because when I came to work out the lecture, which was suggested to me, I took Lord Wavell's three lectures. I felt that it would be quite hopeless simply to repeat the things that Lord Wavell had put in his lectures, and I tried in my remarks today to touch only on the experiences of the last war and, in particular, new factors likely to bear on the question.

To answer the question directly, there can be no question that this morale business is of the highest order.

The first question that any general must ask himself is, "What makes the soldiers fight?" Unless he can answer that question, they may not fight. Soldiers are very peculiar people, and they come from very different backgrounds. I do not know what would happen to a great Highland division if its kilt was taken away; I wonder if it would fight with the same gusto! Who knows what makes a Cockney fight? Who knows what makes a Digger fight? One does not approach a Digger and a Cockney in the same way, although they have a lot in common. Who knows what makes a Belgian or a Dutchman fight?

Matt Ridgway had a wonderful knack of finding out what made fellows fight and getting them to do it, and he commanded a completely international force in Korea; but he certainly understood the differences of the different nationals and their temperaments.

And so the matter of morale comes top of the list, and it is and rightly should be the matter that worries the general as much as anything else.

BRIGADIER K. B. S. CRAWFORD: Would it be right to say that Field-Marshal Wavell, in his *Generals and Generalship*, stressed more than any of the other great authorities the amount of attention that a commander should devote to administration, and that Field-Marshal Montgomery, in his well-known habit of separating himself from the bulk of his staff, tends the other way?

THE LECTURER: In the first instance, I quite agree; it is right that one should do that. Lord Wavell very strongly underlined the administrative factor. I think one can picture the working of his mind. He was thinking that unless he fed a man, got his ammunition up to him, and looked after him, he would not be able to fight and the success or otherwise of the operation would be in direct relation to that.

On the other hand, as far as Lord Montgomery was concerned, I have heard him repeatedly say that no plan was any good at all unless the administrative arrangements were commensurate with the plan. Although he dealt with his Chief of Staff on all general matters exclusively, he certainly dealt with his principal administrative officer direct on all important administrative matters and never funnelled them through any other source.

I think that that is the way most of us work today. I work directly through my Chief of Staff, but on any serious administrative thing that looks like having a snag in it, I deal directly with my M.G.A.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is left to me to sum up this lecture, which I shall not attempt to do! There are only about two things I would like to say. One of them concerns the question of robustness. It seems to me that the general of the future must be very much more robust than he ever was in the past. Few people realize the appalling responsibility that rests on a general's shoulders. It is a heavy load, for he alone has to take the decisions. In the past, a *bon général ordinaire* could get away with it occasionally, but he will not be able to do so in the future.

We have just heard from Sir Richard Gale that a commander now has the power to unleash in a split second the equivalent of goodness knows how much artillery. He now has far greater personal influence on the course of the battle and therefore a far greater responsibility than he ever had before. In the future he will need to an even greater degree the robustness of which Lord Wavell wrote and the lecturer has spoken. The question of command is terribly important. We are getting back now to the days of the great captains of war again—the people who by their personal influence really won battles.

The only other thing I want to say concerns the position of a commander during battle. Anyone who reads the German war histories will find that one of the greatest criticisms which is made of us is that we did not command sufficiently from in front. That is important. I think myself that a general must be like an old dog, smelling the battlefield—going round the whole time. He must get 'the feel of it,' for if he fails to

do so his orders will bear no relation to fact, and the only place where he can get 'the feel' is in the forward area.

That does not mean that a general cannot keep control of the battle: thanks to wireless, he can do this from almost anywhere. I am not a great believer in red caps, but I would say that the only place where one is justified is, not in the front line, but in the forward area. Then the troops can say, "It cannot be too bad if *he* is up here"!

General Sir Richard Gale was a general who commanded from in front. He was always up in the battle area, and he was the type of man who really 'smelt' the battle and had the feel of it the whole time. That is why he was such a very successful divisional commander. I remember an occasion when one of his units ran into trouble. The men were licking their wounds when, suddenly, the immense figure of their divisional commander arrived. He listened to their tale of woe and then said, "Well, gentlemen, I want to give you a piece of advice which I had from my father. There are two things that every soldier must avoid like the plague—red heads and re-entrants." They never forgot that!

All that it remains for me to do, after that extremely inadequate summing up, is to thank the lecturer in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB: We have indeed been fortunate this afternoon in our lecturer and in what he has said, and we have also been particularly fortunate in our Chairman and in his excellent summing up. I convey to him, without the slightest hesitation, the thanks of you all for taking the Chair this afternoon. (*Applause.*)

SOME ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-65¹

By "ATHOS"

IT is nearly a century since the 13 Southern States seceded from the Union to form a Confederacy of their own. The subsequent conflict, the first of modern total wars, was fought to restore the Union. It cost over half a million lives and had a long, bitter aftermath.

Much may be learned from this old war for, though weapons change, human nature remains constant. This war is a good illustration of the fact that strategy is not simply a matter of common sense, but that its practical application requires a trained mind and strong character. Furthermore, that plans formed without regard to simplicity and the principles of movement and organization invariably go wrong. On the other hand, we may learn from the operations of General R. E. Lee "how much, given courage and determination, a master of the art of war can accomplish with inadequate means."²

It would be impossible in a short article to describe even the main operations in any detail. The aim, therefore, is to give a summary of the land operations and to review some aspects which appear of special interest at present.

POLICY, GEOGRAPHY, AND MEANS

President Lincoln decided that the Union could only be restored by taking the offensive. President Davis determined that the Confederacy should pose as a State defending its liberties.

The vast theatre of war was sparsely populated, with few roads, usually affected by weather, especially in Virginia; water transport on the main rivers was extensively used. The railways, many of which were unfinished when the war broke out, were rough and of low capacity. Most of the industries were concentrated in the North; the South had few factories and depended on the North or on imports for most manufactured goods and many of the necessities of life. Her main exports were cotton and tobacco.

The South had a long coastline with few harbours; in the west, the Mississippi, running north to south, divided the rest of the Confederacy from the great cattle-raising States. In the east, two geographical features had much effect on operations. First, the two rival capitals were only about a hundred miles apart, Washington being separated from Virginia by the estuary of the River Potomac which was also the northern boundary of the seceding States. Second, the Shenandoah Valley which, lying between the Alleghany Mountains and the Blue Ridge, afforded a covered approach into Maryland and Washington, the symbol of the Union and seat of the Federal Government.

Lincoln, a talented, commonsense man, had sound views on grand strategy. He understood the value of sea power and initiated a blockade of the South's ports which, weak at first but gradually tightening, was a major factor in the eventual outcome. On land the war developed into two main struggles. In the east the Federal object was to capture Richmond. In the west their primary aim was to gain control of the Mississippi. When operations commenced, the Federal armies

¹ A sketch-map faces p. 394.

² See *Wavell*—Major-General R. J. Collins.

invading the Confederacy from the north-west and north-east were more than 2,000 miles apart. It may be said that the combination of space and the undeveloped condition of most of the theatre of war was one of the great obstacles, if not the greatest, to be overcome.

Most of the Union Regular troops, about 16,000 strong, had to be retained in the far west to protect the settlers. So, before Lincoln could implement his policy, he had to improvise a new army. The United States Navy, 9,000 strong, was available and could be expanded; the Confederates had not the means to raise a large navy and from the outset the Federals had superior material and strength. Some 250 serving or retired Regular officers joined the Confederacy, but few naval officers did so, neither did the rank and file of either Service. The Southern Army, organized by Lee, made better use of the available officers than their opponents who retained 600 captains and subalterns with their units. The South, on the whole, had better human material, but the population of 7,000,000 whites was outnumbered four to one by that of the North.

The United States Army had an inadequate and archaic system of command. Army Headquarters dealt only with routine and technical matters, had no experience of conducting anything but a minor war, and was unready for any type of conflict other than forays against Indians. There were no maps and no intelligence branch. McClellan in his campaign of 1862 had to employ a famous detective agency for intelligence duties at which they were quite useless. There was neither a trained staff nor any technique of staff duties; the art of war had not been studied; West Point crammed its graduates with engineering, fortification, and mathematics, though some officers did study military history. The following example of an order for the battle of Malvern Hill in 1862 shows how bad staff work could be: "Batteries have been established to act upon the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same." The attack, which took place in close country, failed with heavy loss.

Both Presidents selected the generals. Lincoln chose a number of political chiefs and so saddled the Army for years with a number of incompetents, while many of the Regulars chosen were 'demoted' after their first failure. Davis, a West Pointer, who had seen service in Mexico, did better and only made one bad mistake in this respect, namely, his relief of Johnston by Hood in July, 1864. Thus, the war on land was fought by two improvised armies, one stronger and furnished with everything money could buy, the other better commanded, but much weaker, who relied often on what could be captured from their opponents.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST, 1861-1863

After spasmodic and unco-ordinated campaigns the control of the northern Mississippi was gained after Grant's success at Shiloh, Tennessee, in April, 1862. However, it was not until July, 1863, that Grant secured the surrender of the fortress of Vicksburg and opened the whole river to the Union gunboats. This was a serious blow to the South, but months passed while the Federals secured the State of Tennessee and tried to cut the railway linking Alabama and Georgia with Richmond. Though the railway centre of Chattanooga was reached early in September, 1863, the Confederates, reinforced by a corps sent from the east, launched a counter-offensive, won the battle of Chickamauga, 19th-20th September, and stopped the Federal advance into Georgia.

In October, 1863, Grant was given wider powers, achieved a concentration, won the battle of Chattanooga on 25th November, and drove the Confederates back into Georgia. Thus, by the end of 1863, the Federals had gained important successes in the west. In the east, however, they had failed.

OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1861-1863

The first major clash did not occur until July, 1861, when, in response to popular clamour, McDowell advanced from Washington towards Richmond. With an almost untrained force of militia, he attacked the Confederates in position on Bull Run. The attack failed and the raw troops streamed back to the capital; fortunately for them, their opponents were too disorganized to pursue. Davis would not allow a counter-offensive and a lull followed. Lincoln called for large contingents from all the States and McClellan was given command. A good trainer and organizer, he refused to move until he had licked the new volunteers into shape. In April, 1862, he landed his Army of the Potomac at Fort Monroe on the tip of the Yorktown Peninsula. But Lincoln, believing that insufficient provision had been made for the defence of Washington, refused to allow McDowell's Corps to embark. McClellan's movements were painfully slow in face of inferior numbers skilfully handled and, by the end of May, checked within a few miles of Richmond with his army divided by the swampy river Chickahominy, he was anxious for McDowell to support his exposed right flank. The President agreed that McDowell should march south from Fredericksburg on 26th May, but the move was cancelled and McClellan was isolated when he most needed help.³ Lee, reinforced by Jackson, launched a counter-offensive on 26th June, directed mainly against the Federal right flank. McClellan was driven back and forced to change his base from the York to the James. He lost heavily and had 16,000 sick, but held on to the Peninsula until ordered to re-embark at the end of July.

Meanwhile, Lincoln had formed another army under Pope, 47,000 strong, which started to concentrate on Gordonsville in mid-July. Lee decided to deal with Pope before he could be reinforced by McClellan's troops and sent Jackson on ahead. Pope, defeated at Cedar Run on 9th August, withdrew across the Rappahannock. Lee concentrated his army on the south bank and on 24th August decided on an audacious plan: Jackson to move rapidly north, west of the Bull Run Mountains, turn east and cut Pope's communications at Manassas Junction; Longstreet's Corps to follow after demonstrating along the river for 36 hours. Jackson succeeded, though hard pressed until Longstreet arrived. The action ended on 30th August, when the Federals, including three of McClellan's Corps, were defeated and driven into the Washington defences. The success of the operation was largely due to the skill and energy of Jackson and the mobility of the army.

On 4th September, Lee crossed into Maryland, which involved switching his communications to the Shenandoah Valley. Unexpectedly, the Federals did not abandon their strong post at Harper's Ferry, so Jackson was sent to take the place. On 5th September, McClellan, who had assumed command again, moved slowly at first, then with unusual speed and confidence for, on 13th September, a copy of Lee's orders had fallen into his hands. Lee withdrew westward from Frederick and took up a position behind the Antietam creek at Sharpsburg where Jackson rejoined just in time. The Confederates, outnumbered two to one in the desperate struggle which took place on 17th September, won a tactical success. But Lee was now too weak

³ See attached Appendix, Part I, and sketch-map.

to continue the campaign and the army retired into Virginia on the night 18th/19th, almost unmolested.

McClellan was replaced by Burnside on 7th November. His plan was to cross at Fredericksburg and march direct on Richmond. He found Lee already in position south of the river, but mounted a frontal attack on 13th December which was a disastrous failure. Lee would have fought the battle farther south had the President not intervened. So the opportunity of winning a decisive victory was lost and the enemy retired behind the river. Burnside was replaced by Hooker in January, 1863.

In the following April, Lee was still on the south bank of the river on either side of Fredericksburg, his army reduced to six divisions owing to the President's decision to send the remainder on an abortive mission south of Richmond. Hooker began to move on 27th April. Three, later four, corps were to cross the Rappahannock and march round Lee's left, two corps were to cross at Fredericksburg, one corps to remain in the centre. Hooker believed these moves would cause Lee to retire. He was wrong. Leaving Early with one division about Fredericksburg, Lee concentrated five divisions against the enemy's right wing near Chancellorsville in the 'Wilderness' and stopped them. Learning late on 2nd May that the enemy's extreme right was 'in the air', Lee saw his opportunity. Next morning, Jackson with three divisions and the cavalry moved off by a little known route and, after a march of some 15 miles, deployed facing east and attacked the Federal flank and rear with great effect. The operation did not come quite up to expectations mainly because Jackson was mortally wounded. Meanwhile, Hooker had ordered his left wing to move on Lee's rear. Starting on 4th May, the Federals were delayed by Early, and Lee, leaving Jackson's old corps to hold Hooker's right, defeated his left wing and drove it across the Rappahannock. Lee then prepared to launch another attack on Hooker's right wing but, on the night 5th/6th May, the whole Federal Army withdrew behind the Rappahannock.

Early in June, 1863, Lee invaded Pennsylvania from the Shenandoah with his whole army, after thoroughly mystifying his opponent. An encounter battle was fought at Gettysburg on 1st-3rd July, during which Hooker was relieved by Meade. Lee was successful at first but, largely through Longstreet's behaviour and the failure of the cavalry, the battle was lost. Meade made no counter-attack, and on 4th July, Lee began to withdraw into Virginia. Once more there was no real pursuit.

GRANT APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Grant and his subordinate Sherman had emerged from the ruck in the west. Lincoln, who had learned his lesson, appointed Grant commander of all the Federal armies in March, 1864. The new commander determined to make his main effort against Lee's army in Virginia. At the same time he planned a subsidiary offensive to be mounted by Sherman against the Confederate army in the west. Other minor offensives were ordered but they did not achieve their object. Grant, however, owing to his superior numbers, could concentrate 120,000 or more against Lee's 60,000, and 110,000 against Johnston's army of 80,000 in the west.

SHERMAN'S OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST

On 'D' Day, 4th May, Sherman commenced to move on Atlanta, an important railway centre and arsenal. So well did Johnston delay the advance that Sherman did not reach the vicinity of the town until July and could not drive the Confederates out until early September. Having failed to destroy the opposing army, now under Hood, Sherman remained at Atlanta and fortified the place. On 29th September,

however, Hood marched round west of Atlanta into Tennessee and attacked his communications. Hood was eventually badly defeated at Nashville on 21st December, but the remnants of his army escaped.

Meanwhile, Sherman had conceived the idea of marching across Georgia to the sea, and obtained Grant's reluctant consent. Cutting himself off from his communications and leaving two corps to deal with Hood, he set out with 62,000 men on 15th November. Marching 15 miles a day against little or no opposition, living on the country and doing as much damage as possible, the force entered Savannah on 21st December, but the garrison escaped. North Carolina and Virginia were now cut off from the other States on the south coast. On 1st February, Sherman started to move north through the Carolinas, and by 23rd March reached Goldsboro, 150 miles south of Richmond.

GRANT'S OFFENSIVE IN VIRGINIA

In the Spring of 1864, Lee's army, 60,000 strong, in an entrenched position south of the Rapidan, stood between the Federals, concentrated at Culpeper, and Richmond. On 4th May the Army of the Potomac, 130,000 strong, commanded by Meade but accompanied by Grant's headquarters, crossed the river and plunged into the 'Wilderness' with the object of turning Lee's right. But Lee attacked whilst the Federals were still involved in the jungle and inflicted 15,000 casualties. Grant, unlike his predecessors, did not retire towards his base but moved south-east on Spottsylvania only to find Lee barring the way. There followed a series of engagements in which the Federals lost heavily in attacks on hastily entrenched positions.

On 20th May, Grant set out again to turn the Confederate right, but Lee moved south-east and occupied a very strong position behind the North Anna where he was reinforced by three divisions totalling only 8,500 men. Grant would not attack and side-stepped once more. Yet, again Lee's insight into his opponent's intentions proved correct and by 1st June, in position near Coldharbour, he once more blocked the way to Richmond. Grant, whose losses had been replaced, decided to make a supreme effort without delay. The attack went in on 3rd June, but failed to penetrate Lee's position anywhere and broke down with 7,000 casualties. Altogether the Army of the Potomac had lost 64,000 men since 4th May, and its morale had declined. A form of trench warfare now set in.

On 15th June, Grant crossed the James and began his attack on the Petersburg lines south of Richmond, but Lee's troops arrived in time to support the local forces. The offensive stopped on 18th June, again with heavy loss. Early in July came the news that a Confederate force of all arms had crossed the Potomac and was heading for Washington. Lee had struck yet another blow at the North's morale.⁴

So Grant's great offensive declined into a siege. In spite of a shortage of food and forage owing to breakdowns on the railways, Lee held on with his dwindling, half-starved, and ragged army until forced to withdraw on 2nd April, 1865, and to surrender at Appomattox a week later. The war was virtually over. "Why," it may be asked, "did the Confederates attempt to hold out so long and how did they succeed in doing so when the odds against them were so great?"

THE LENGTH OF CONFEDERATE RESISTANCE

The Federal armies after three years of war were no nearer Richmond than at the outset. The invasion of Virginia had failed five times; five generals had been

⁴ See Appendix, Part II.

defeated and removed; there were outbreaks of 'alarm and despondency' in the Federal capital; casualties had been heavy. Continuing failure in the east weakened the North's will to win and affected the morale of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker, on taking command in January, 1863, reported 3,000 officers and 80,000 other ranks absent without leave; there was another setback to morale after Chancellorsville, and in the Summer of 1863 there was resistance to conscription leading to serious riots in New York. There is no doubt that Lee was well aware of all this and though the state of his resources in men and material precluded another offensive, he could and did successfully play for time. During the following Summer the enormous casualties in the Army of the Potomac and the threat to Washington caused the North's morale to sink to its lowest ebb. Victory seemed as far off as ever, and the South was very near to independence in August, 1864. However, Sherman's capture of Atlanta and subsequent march to the sea restored the North's spirit and ensured the re-election of Lincoln.

From the outset the Confederates believed that public opinion in Europe would lead to intervention; this belief was particularly strong as late as December, 1862. Even after the disaster of Vicksburg the South was still determined to resist as defeat would mean loss of independence and economic ruin. They hoped, however, that the North would grow tired of the war and that the failure of Lincoln in the presidential election of 1864, which seemed possible, would mean a negotiated peace. The re-election of Lincoln in November, 1864, was therefore a heavy blow and Davis had more and more difficulty in keeping his team together. As the months went by the internal situation steadily worsened. This affected the army and desertion increased, though Lee's veterans held together better. In the Spring of 1865 the Confederates were in much the same position as the Germans in the Autumn of 1918.

WHY THE LONG CONFEDERATE RESISTANCE WAS POSSIBLE

The Confederate Government made mistakes, though Davis did not interfere with operations to the same extent as Lincoln. Their defensive policy was wrong, and when Lee did persuade them to allow an offensive in 1862 and 1863, his army was not reinforced. This was due to another mistake, namely, that too many troops were kept in garrisons in the States to whom Davis was not in a position to issue orders. Finally, there was no proper co-ordination between east and west and it was too late when Lee was appointed Commander-in-Chief in February, 1865. All these were grievous errors, but the Federals' mistakes modified or delayed their effects.

Lincoln had no knowledge of war and held a low opinion of professional soldiers. He interfered and worried his generals with plans and suggestions, as others have done since. Things were particularly bad in this respect during 1862, when Lincoln and his War Secretary went so far as to issue tactical orders. It was not until Grant assumed command that this interference was modified.

In the early years of the war the Federals were fond of complicated movements which, given modern means of inter-communication, would be risky in such country even with a professional army. Until Grant took command the Federal armies never operated in combination, and he appears to have been the first to realize that his true object was the destruction of his opponent's main armies and not the capture of geographical objectives. There was much boasting and jealousy among the generals of the Army of the Potomac and often disloyalty to their commanders who feared Lee much as Napoleon's marshals feared Wellington. Grant was a man of different calibre to his predecessors, a man of determined character and singleness

of purpose, a good strategist who learned from experience and knew there was no short cut to victory. In the campaign of 1864-1865, he appears to have been inferior to Lee as a tactician, but some of his conceptions were spoiled by his subordinates and Meade was nominally in tactical command of the Army.

The Confederates were on 'interior lines,' but distance, poor communications, and lack of a proper command system were a great handicap. They did succeed in making several switches between east and west, notably that which helped to win the battle of Chickamauga. In the east, Lee made good use of his interior position, aided by the superior mobility of his formations. He was an exponent of daring manœuvre; he took apparent risks but knew his opponents. He had great respect for the moral aspect of war and sought to profit by surprise and his opponents' weaknesses and preoccupations, especially Lincoln's anxiety for the security of Washington. Lee not only made fewer mistakes than the opposing generals, but led them to blunder. Twice he used detachments to cause the Federals to disperse their forces at a critical time, and selected the right men for the task. (See Appendix: "Lee's Detachments.")

Lee believed in the offensive even when forced on to the defensive and right to the end he usually got in the final blow. In the last campaign in Virginia he proved himself a master of defensive tactics, and so long as he retained the power of manœuvre he foiled each successive attempt of an opponent much superior in numbers and resources. Jackson was a great loss to Lee who, after his death, did not risk such audacious manœuvres as had led to the defeat of Pope at Manassas and Hooker at Chancellorsville. Lee is reported to have said after the war: "If I had had Jackson at Gettysburg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory there would have resulted in southern independence."⁵ There seems to be a resemblance between the Lee/Jackson combination and that of Wavell/O'Connor.

Lee was essentially a gentleman and a great commander who retained to the end the complete confidence of his troops and the people of the South. Lee's generalship and personality were surely the predominant factors in the length of their resistance.

APPENDIX: LEE'S DETACHMENTS

PART I.—JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 1862

In March, Jackson, who had been holding the Shenandoah Valley with 4,500 men, withdrew south from Winchester in face of three Federal divisions under Banks. About this time McClellan ordered Banks's Corps, less one division, to move east to the defences of Washington to replace troops embarking. Jackson, learning of this, advanced and, on 23rd March, fought the battle of Kernstown which, though a tactical defeat, was a strategic success. Not only was one of Banks's divisions ordered back to the Valley, but another was taken from McClellan and sent to West Virginia. Lincoln, still not satisfied, retained McDowell's Corps near Washington. Thus, McClellan, at the outset of his campaign, found his force reduced by 46,000. But that was not all. Lincoln relieved him of overall charge in the east and split the remaining Federal forces into three bodies. McDowell became responsible for the approaches to Washington, Banks for the Valley, and Fremont, with 17,000 men, for operations west of it.⁶ The co-ordination of these 'armies' depended on the orders of two civilians, Lincoln and Stanton, the Secretary of War.

⁵ See *Stonewall Jackson, Vol. II.*—Henderson.

⁶ Both Banks and Fremont were politicians.

Jackson withdrew a few miles south after Kernstown, but Banks with 19,000 men did nothing for three weeks. About 19th April, McDowell's Corps began to move to Fredericksburg where he would be joined by a division to be withdrawn from the Valley. Lee now began to discuss future operations with Jackson and placed Ewell's Division in a position to co-operate. At the end of April, Banks was at Harrisonburg; Fremont's troops were widely dispersed west of the Valley with one brigade under Milroy threatening Staunton, held by a weak brigade under Johnson. Jackson was at Elk Run Valley, his strength having been increased to 8,000. He left the place on 30th April, and Ewell with 8,500 moved in.

Having misled Banks into the belief that he was making for Richmond, Jackson suddenly appeared at Staunton on 5th May, and with Johnson defeated Milroy at McDowell on the 8th. After a short pursuit he returned to the Valley. Fremont was neutralized and Banks retired to Strasburg. On 16th May, Lee ordered Jackson to create the impression of a threat to Washington. On 22nd May, Jackson's force now 17,000 strong and organized into two divisions, moved north by the Luray Valley, marching rapidly with as much concealment as possible. The major portion of Banks's force, some 7,000 strong, was entrenched at Strasburg, there was a detachment of 1,000 at Front Royal, and the remainder were on the lines of communication.


At Washington on this 22nd May the Government and people thought the end of the rebellion was in sight. Lincoln had left the capital to review McDowell's Corps, at last about to march south in support of McClellan. Late on the 23rd, however, Lincoln stopped McDowell's move and next day ordered him to the Valley with two divisions and a cavalry brigade.


Early on 23rd May, Jackson had overwhelmed the troops at Front Royal and moved into the main Valley. Banks withdrew from Strasburg on the 24th, made a stand at Winchester next day, was decisively defeated, and driven back over the Potomac. Jackson's troops remained on the south bank for two days. On 29th May, aware of the attempts to cut him off, Jackson slipped away up the main Valley, in face of some 60,000 Federals cautiously converging from the west, north, and east. On 8th and 9th June, he counter-attacked his pursuers at Cross Keys and Port Republic, after which they retired north followed by the cavalry. In the meantime, Lee had warned Jackson to be prepared to march east; nevertheless, a great show was made of sending him reinforcements. Jackson's two divisions left the Valley on 17th June, and joined the main Army on the 25th. The cavalry, left behind to hold the Valley, so imposed on the Federals that McDowell's divisions were retained there for days after Jackson had left.

PART II.—EARLY'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 1864

At the beginning of June a small Confederate force had been driven up the Valley almost to Lynchburg, a vital supply centre, by Hunter's VIIIth Corps of 18,000 men. On 11th June, Lee detached Early's (late Jackson's) Corps from his main army and ordered him to dispose of this Federal detachment and then to move north and demonstrate against Washington. Marching 80 miles in four days from near Richmond, he arrived at Charlottesville on 17th June, then moved by tactical train to Lynchburg which his leading division reached the same day. Hunter had intended to assault Lynchburg the following day, but, hearing that the Confederates had been reinforced, retreated to the west instead of down the Valley. Early pursued for three days, covering 60 miles, then returning to the Valley and, marching rapidly, reached Harper's Ferry on 4th July. Next day he crossed the Potomac, defeated







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a hastily assembled detachment on the 9th, and appeared before the fortifications of Washington on the 11th, while his cavalry threatened Baltimore. Meanwhile, the VIth Corps was arriving by sea from Grant's army and the XIXth Corps from Louisiana, on the way to join Grant, was diverted to the capital.

Early commenced his withdrawal on 12th July, followed by the VIth Corps, and recrossed the Potomac on the 14th. The same day the VIIIth Corps, after wandering in West Virginia, crossed the river in the opposite direction and some miles west of Early who reached Strasburg on 22nd July. Grant now recalled the VIth Corps but Early pounced on the VIIIth Corps at Kernstown, drove them back across the Potomac, and sent his cavalry on another raid into Maryland. Grant left his headquarters in front of Petersburg to restore some sort of order out of the chaos at Washington. As a result a new army was formed under Sheridan, consisting of the VIth, VIIIth, and XIXth Corps with three cavalry divisions, for service in the Valley.

A master of bluff, Early continued, in spite of severe reverses, to hold Sheridan in the Valley until Winter set in. He detained three times his own strength for several critical months. Had these troops been available about Richmond, Grant could possibly have obtained a decision in 1864. This campaign had great moral effect, secured the badly needed harvest from the Valley, protected the Confederate rail communications, and interrupted those of the enemy with the Middle West.

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF THE DIAMOND ROCK, 1804-1805

By COMMANDER W. B. ROWBOTHAM, R.N. (Retd.)

THE general history of the short period of British occupation of that barren and uninhabited islet, known as the Diamond Rock, has been related before; but the earlier writers, who did not have access to the official records, left some blanks in their narratives. These omissions have been rectified as far as possible and the whole story is now retold.

In March, 1794, Martinique—or Martinico, as the British usually called it—was captured from the French by a combined force under General Sir Charles Grey and Vice-Admiral Sir John Jervis, but the island was restored to France under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens. The French always regarded the Diamond Rock as inaccessible and had never troubled to fortify it. Situated as it was in the direct sailing route from Europe to the two principal ports in Martinique—Fort Royal (Fort-de-France) and St. Pierre—and also lying mid-way in the coastwise route round the south and west sides of the island, its tactical position was of some importance; and apart from its value to the British if fortified by them, while it remained unoccupied the enemy coastwise shipping was able to dodge round it when being chased by the cruisers of the British blockading squadron. What was wanted by the British was some means of ensuring the complete command of the channel between the Rock and the main island, thereby forcing the vessels to keep so far outside the islet that, with the prevailing winds and strong westerly current, they would be unable to fetch into Fort Royal Bay. Why not therefore mount a few guns at the summit of the Rock? The increase in range thus obtained would then give the desired command of the coastwise route.


It is not surprising, therefore, that a few months after the outbreak of the Napoleonic War on 16th May, 1803, Commodore Samuel Hood (*Centaur*, 74, Captain Murray Maxwell), the Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward Islands Station, conceived the idea of seizing and fortifying the islet, and thereby tightening up the blockade of Martinique without having always to maintain one or more ships close off the entrances to the French ports. Today, of course, it would be valueless for this purpose, even if an enemy permitted its occupation in the first instance.

Now where exactly is the Diamond Rock and what is it like? The Diamond Rock lies about one and a half miles (one mile from shore to shore) south-eastward of the summit of Diamant Hill, which forms the south-west point of Martinique. It is a remarkable square rock,¹ each side of which is about 400 yards long, and rises almost vertically to a height of 574 feet. The only accessible landing spot is on its western side; the southern and western sides are steep-to, and northward of it a shoal, over which the depth is about six fathoms, extends for a distance of about two cables (400 yards). There is also a coral patch, known as Diamond Bank, about six cables south-east of the Rock with at least four and a half fathoms of water over it. The prevailing current sets to the west, tending to north-west; the strength varies, but increases greatly close inshore, where it may attain a rate of three knots.

The two principal places with which communication was maintained during the period of British occupation were Carlisle Bay, Barbados (S.E., 117 miles), and Port Castries, St. Lucia (S. by E., 26 miles).

¹ A photograph of the Rock will be found on p.230 of the *West Indies Pilot*, Vol. II, 1942.

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It is not known when Commodore Hood first decided to occupy the Diamond Rock, but it must have been towards the end of 1803. There is, however, an account of the earlier days of the occupation in the *United Service Journal*, 1833, Part II, pp. 210-215. This was written by Captain John Donaldson Boswall, who was one of the *Centaur's* midshipmen. (He was then known as Donaldson, the surname of Boswall being assumed some years later.) His story is correct in the main, though some of the details are at variance with the official records. On ~~26th~~ 22nd October, the *Centaur* had, after a chase lasting seven hours, captured the French schooner privateer *Vigilante*, which was promptly commissioned as her tender, the command being given to Lieutenant William Domett. This vessel shortly afterwards came to an untimely end, for on 7th February, 1804, Hood reported that she had blown up whilst exercising small arms off St. Pierre. Domett and 16 of his men perished; the remaining 14 were saved by a sloop he had captured the day before.

The *Vigilante* had been employed cruising to windward of Martinique, in order to signal the approach of all vessels from that quarter or any attempting to pass through Fours Channel—between the Rock and Martinique. Domett had often landed on the Rock, where he found an abundance of thick, broad-leafed grass, well adapted for making sennet hats for the men, and these were in great demand. There was also growing in great profusion an excellent substitute for spinach, called locally *calallo*; it was similar in shape to the large, common dock-leaf and proved a valuable addition to the supply of fresh vegetables. When boiled in large quantities and served out daily it effectively reduced the heavy sick-list of scurvy cases. The foregoing advantages, together with its suitability as an armed observation post, evidently induced the Commodore to take possession of the place.

Hood's first recorded mention of the Diamond Rock is on 22nd January, 1804, a fortnight after the occupation was an accomplished fact, and it is interpolated between other details upon which he was reporting at the time. In a report on the state and condition of the ships on the station he says, "... the squadron is now very tolerably off for men, and [I] hope to be able to man all the schooners purchased agreeable to their Lordships' orders without distressing the larger ships, and also to place men on the Diamond. ..." And in another letter of the same date, reporting his proceedings, after giving an account of a brush with a new enemy battery at Cape Solomon, Martinique, he goes on to say, "and then took possession of the Diamond, which I first examined, within 1,300 yards of Point Diamond, and a post I think will completely blockade the coast in the most perfect security should the Captain-General² draw his force that way. In the weak state of the island he will hazard more than I think he durst, but should he erect batteries we have natural lodgements in the greatest security and have no occasion to return his fire. Thirty riflemen will keep the hill against ten thousand. ... It is a perfect naval post; ropes are necessary to climb the rocks, a great number of vegetables may be raised, and there are some small springs of fine water.³ The *Centaur* is anchored on a patch of coral and soft rock in five fathoms about a mile distant, bearing W. by N. $\frac{3}{4}$ N."

In point of fact, the Rock was seized and occupied on 7th January, and the work of fortifying it then proceeded apace. The *Centaur* had anchored on the patch in the evening of the 6th, and next morning all hands were started in on the job of landing the necessary materials. It is quite easy to give orders for a thing to be done, but the execution is sometimes not quite so easy. As we have already seen, there was only

² Vice-Admiral Louis-Thomas Villaret Joyeuse.

³ Experience proved that this spring water was unfit for drinking.

one spot on the west side where a landing was at all practicable, but since hardly anyone probably had any previous exact knowledge of the place, this fact had to be found out by bitter experience, in the course of which the boats very likely suffered damage from being thrown by the constant surf against semi-submerged rocks. Again, having got safely on shore, ways and means had to be found to ascend to the various coigns of vantage which would have been tentatively chosen during an inspection of the Rock from the ship. And having finally selected these positions, the guns and stores had to be got to these spots.

The next seven days were spent in getting everything on shore and stowed in the desired places. Then the *Centaur* got into trouble. She was anchored on a coral bank, which is not a good holding ground, nor does it conduce to long life in a hemp cable; during the evening of the 14th she drifted off the bank, and on heaving up, a foul anchor was discovered, also the unwelcome fact that the cable was much rubbed. At eight o'clock another anchor was let go and a whole cable veered, but it did not hold and the ship drifted off into deep water. Being then rather too close to the Diamond for safety, and as the process of heaving in a long cable in those days was a lengthy operation, the cable was cut at the splice and the ship remained under way for the night. Next morning she anchored once more on the patch and two 24-prs. were got on shore. These two guns were intended for the lower batteries, which were not far above the water's edge; they were brought in as close as possible and then slipped from the boats, being hauled ashore by ropes. They were plain muzzle-loaders, which came to no harm from a wetting and the inevitable rough treatment they must have been subjected to in the process.

The morning of the 18th saw the arrival of the *Sarah*—one of the schooners taken up locally on the station—from St. Lucia with a cargo of lime for the Rock, and at 1 p.m. the customary Royal Salute was fired by all ships present, as well as by the Queen's Battery on the Diamond, in commemoration of Her Majesty's birthday. The date of firing this salute has been given by some writers as the 18th and by others as the 19th. This discrepancy is owing to the nautical time in the ships' logs having been taken instead of civil time.⁴ Queen Charlotte's birthday was properly on 19th May, "but its celebration as a national festival was always put off until the 18th January following; the 19th of May being too near His Majesty's birthday [4th June] to afford encouragement to the manufacturers, artists, and other people generally employed upon those occasions."⁵

Work on the lower batteries and the provision of the necessary housing places for the officers, men, and stores continued with unabated vigour until the end of the month, but as yet no guns had been hoisted up to the top of the Rock. This latter operation was to prove the most difficult of any that had been attempted up till then. Two long 18-prs. were mounted at the summit, where a platform was made by blasting away the granite and holes were bored in the rock to receive the breechings of the guns. To many people at that time, including the French, the project was doubtless considered to be impracticable, but Commodore Hood's precept was: "No difficulty baffles great zeal." Now let us see how it was done.

The *Centaur*, which had supplied the 24-prs. from her own armament, did not carry 18-prs., so the latter were provided by the Gun Wharf at English Harbour,

⁴ All dates and times here have been adjusted to civil time, i.e., a day beginning at midnight.

⁵ *The Times*, 19th January, 1809.

Antigua. They were brought over in the *Hippomenes* sloop, which arrived at the Rock on 1st February and transferred them to the *Centaur*; and on the following day the *Centaur* weighed from her billet on the patch and moored close in under the Diamond in 54 fathoms. An aerial cableway was then rigged from the ship to the top of the cliffs, which was some distance from the summit. A purchase and an 8-inch hawser, as a jackstay, were got up to the top of the cliffs and secured there, the other end of the hawser being made fast to the ship's mainmast. Along this hawser ran a viol block, as a traveller, and to this the gun was lashed, the fall of the purchase being brought to the *Centaur's* capstan. Whilst the gun was in mid-air and until it was landed at the top, a certain measure of control was maintained over it by two boats, each of which manipulated a steadying line; but, with only the primitive hand-worked appliances that were available, the operation cannot have been easy.

The two 18-prs. were safely landed in a week and, by good luck, shortly before the *Centaur's* small bower cable parted by the clinch—it actually parted at about 8 a.m. on the morning after the landing of the second gun. The hawser had to be let go and the ship swung to her other anchor, and while heaving this up the spindle of the after capstan was found to be much damaged. All this time Lieutenant Maurice (first lieutenant of the *Centaur*) and his men suffered exceedingly from heat and fatigue, being constantly exposed to the sun and frequently obliged to lower themselves over the cliffs to attend the ascent of the guns and bear them off from the innumerable projections against which they swung whenever the ship took a sheer; this often occurred and caused considerable delay. The preparations for this exhausting work were completed in five days. Captain Boswall, when describing this feat, states that the actual landing of these two guns, after all preparations had been made, was accomplished in two days. The first gun left the ship on its perilous aerial trip at 10.30 a.m. and was landed at the top of the cliffs by 5 p.m.; work began next day at 6 a.m., but the wind and sea had got up in the meantime, and it was not until 3 p.m. that the second gun was safely landed. Owing to the motion of the ship on the second day, all hoisting had to be suspended on at least three separate occasions and the jackstay eased right off, to prevent everything from being carried away.

From then until 18th February the *Centaur* remained under way, cruising off the Rock, and on her return a working party was sent ashore to assist in parbuckling the guns up to the summit; but it was not until 6 p.m. on the 23rd that the work was finally completed. Unfortunately, there is no official record extant that gives a detailed account of the operation; the job had to be done, and it was done, and that is all we hear about it. The first supply of ammunition and other stores for the top of the Rock was also landed at the summit by the same process. The cable and purchase were unrigged and got on board again on the 25th, and on 1st March the garrison received 15 tons of water and four months' provisions for 120 men, after which they were in a position to fend for themselves for a time.

Besides mounting the guns, arrangements had to be made for housing the officers and men. The officers lived in tents and the men slung their hammocks in caves on the islet; later, a hospital was built for the reception of any sick they might have to look after, and a tank, of 500 tons capacity, was constructed to catch rain water. The labour expended on the tank, however, was mostly wasted, for no rain fell while the Rock was occupied, or at any rate not in sufficient quantity to be of any practical value; a little, however, was collected from the numerous rills falling from the upper ridges, accumulated by the heavy dews which fall in that climate during the

night. All this work was done in the first place by the ship's staff of the *Centaur*, the garrison themselves being responsible for its completion. At a later date a proper house was built to accommodate Commander Maurice, but there is nothing on record to show where the rest of the officers lived; the probability is that one of the many caves was suitably fitted up for their accommodation.

When the work was well advanced the question of manning the Rock was then decided upon. Hood's report to the Admiralty, dated 7th February, 1804, is as follows :—

"In the singular situation of the Diamond, so close to the enemy's shore, and the indication the Captain-General made of attack, I thought it right a superior command to a Lieutenant should be held, and have, in consequence of the very zealous conduct of Lieutenant Maurice, first of the *Centaur*, in arranging its works since the commencement of hostilities, given him an acting order as Commander and one hundred men for the present establishment of the *Fort Diamond* as a sloop of war, including the Rock, by which warrant officers will be useful for the security of the stores, etc., with a Lieutenant to command the vessel when she might leave the Rock on any service. A Purser will also very much facilitate the arrangement, and the Surgeon will superintend a small hospital for thirty men or, if necessary, a few more, in any casualties of bad fevers from the ships, and which will allow me to do away totally [with] the hospital at Barbados which is not half so healthy. I hope their Lordships will approve this measure which will be executed with little expense and may save thousands to the country, independent of its utility in consequence to the enemy and protection of the trade passing this channel."

The Admiralty minute, dated 1st May, reads :—

"Acquaint him their Lordships have thought proper to order the vessel attached to the service of the Diamond Rock to be registered by the name of the *Diamond Rock* sloop, and that a commission to command her be sent out to Lieut. Maurice. Commission to be prepared accordingly."

Maurice was confirmed in the rank of Commander on 7th May, 1804. In those days letters from the Admiralty usually took about two months to reach the Leeward Islands Station, and meanwhile the tender was known and referred to as the *Fort Diamond*. The date on which the *Diamond Rock* was officially commissioned was 3rd February, 1804, as is shown in the heading of her Muster Book. This states—*"Complement 121 men. Began wages and sea victualling at whole allowance of all species on 3rd February, 1804."* It will thus be seen that a Royal Salute was fired by an Establishment which was not actually in commission at the time.

The composition of the armament of the Rock did not remain fixed all the time, but was partially changed at least once during the period of British occupation. In the beginning there were three 24-prs., two 18-prs. and the launch's 24-pr. carronade. The long 24-prs. were mounted in three batteries, viz. Queen's, Centaur, and Hood's, the first two being *à fleur d'eau* and the last-named about half-way up the Rock; the 18-prs. were in the Diamond Battery at the summit. The launch's carronade was mounted on shore in the cove on the west side of the Rock, where the boat was moored. One more battery (Maurice's) is mentioned once in an official report, but where it was situated or what guns it had is not known. At a later date two of the long 24-prs. were exchanged for long 18-prs., and we know from the *Centaur's* log that, on 13th September, 1804, two 24-prs. were got on board from the Rock; the third 24-pr., in Hood's Battery, appears to have been changed at some

time for a 32-pr. carronade. The *Hippomenes*, referred to above, was a Dutch prize taken at the capitulation of Berbice in the previous September and purchased into the Navy. She seems to have brought over from Antigua at least four guns—their size is not specified in her log—and stores for the Diamond; and from the *Blenheim's* log we learn that, on 1st February, "the launch was sent to transport four 18-prs. from the *Hippomenes* to the Diamond Rock." That entry, however, probably means that the Rock was their ultimate destination, for, as we have already seen, two 18-prs. were sent to the *Centaur* on that day. Details about the precise nature of the armament of the Rock at any given time are scanty, and it is now impossible to say when all these changes of armament took place. On one point, however, there is reliable information. Drawings forwarded by Hood to the Admiralty in August, 1804, show that an almost complete all-round arc of fire was obtained, the only blind arc being between 250° and 281°.

There were two ways of getting up the Rock from the lower lodgements. One was by means of rope ladders up the face of the cliff; the other, which was used for the heavier and more bulky stores, and by those people who were too nervous to negotiate the cliff ladders, was what the sailors called the "Mail Coach." This latter was merely a jackstay with a block, to which was attached a large cask or bucket, running on it, similar to that employed for getting the 18-prs. up to the top of the Rock, but with the advantage that both ends were fixed and stationary.

The principal drawback to the islet was that it was not self-supporting, and therefore supplies of water, provisions, etc. had to be obtained from whichever ship happened to be in the vicinity at the moment. The tender *Fort Diamond* also paid periodical visits to St. Lucia for ammunition, wood, water, and other stores for the Rock; but on several occasions the garrison was reduced to very short allowance before a ship arrived to relieve their distress.

Very little is known about how and where the people lived on the Rock, but there is in Vol. XII of the old and extinct *Naval Chronicle* an interesting pen picture of the early days there; the phraseology is rather sentimental, but that is how people often wrote in those days. This account is dated 17th February, 1804, and was written by Mr. John Eckstein, who was the clerk to Commander Francis Kempt, R.N., the agent for Transports and for Prisoners of War at Barbados. Eckstein had then recently returned from one of his periodical visits to Guadeloupe and Martinique to arrange about the exchange of prisoners, and had been given permission by Hood to live on the Rock for a time and sketch. Warfare in those days was conducted on more gentlemanly lines than it is now, for we learn that while at Martinique, Eckstein attended a state ball given by the Captain-General—one cannot visualize Hitler ever doing anything of this sort! In the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich there are several coloured reproductions of Eckstein's sketches; in some of these, however, a certain amount of artistic licence is evident, for the orientation of places on the Rock does not tally with the sketch plans forwarded by Hood. One of the sketches depicts a farm-yard scene, which probably contains a substratum of fact, as Boswell mentions that a few bullocks and sheep were kept on the Rock for the benefit of the ships on the station; but one would like to know a little more about the central figure—a sun-burnt 'lovely'.

Eckstein's account of life on the Rock, however, does not really tell us very much, and it refers only to the first few weeks of the occupation, being confined almost entirely to that gentleman's own personal experiences whilst he was messing with Commander Maurice. The other officers, we know from the evidence given at a

court-martial, messed in the gunroom, but whereabouts on the Rock it was situated, and whether it was a house built for their accommodation or merely one of the caves, cannot now be ascertained.

The ship's company was made up by drafts from several of the ships on the station, though most of them came from the *Centaur*, and changes were made as and when required. Discipline on the Rock was strictly maintained, and one lieutenant was court-martialled for unofficerlike conduct. How much trouble the ship's company gave is not known, though it is recorded in the Muster Book that three men were sent to prison at different times and that there were 15 cases of desertion; and one able seaman—James Clarke, who came from the *Centaur* on 11th September—is noted as having been discharged (where to is not stated) on 19th November as "a disaffected person and drunken character." The Muster Book, or, as the collection of monthly Muster Tables was also called, the Complete Book, was the only official document saved when the place was captured by the French; this was brought away by Commander Maurice who, on his return to England, forwarded it to the Navy Board.

The officer who was court-martialled for "conduct unbecoming" was Acting Lieutenant Roger Wollocombe. He seems to have been one of the type, not uncommon at that period, who can best be described as 'not having come out of the top drawer.' He was frequently 'on the mat' for various delinquencies and he had no regard for his personal appearance, so much so that his brother officers "desired him to quit the gunroom on account of his being so dirty and filthy, and for not paying his proportion of the mess" (i.e., he did not pay his mess bill). Commander Maurice seems to have made every allowance for him and there is no evidence to show that he treated him at all harshly on this account, he even went so far as to offer him a part of his own house to live in; but Wollocombe did not accept the offer and was finally sent to mess by himself at the top of the Rock, where his action station was. The date of his expulsion from the gunroom is not known, but it must have been before March, 1805, at which date one of the other officers—John Pickering, master's mate, whose name was mentioned during the course of the evidence at the court-martial—deserted. Wollocombe did not take with him any mess utensils nor the wherewithal to cook his food, although a boy was told off to attend on him, and he contented himself with messing with the seamen who lived close to the Diamond Battery. This formed one of the charges against him at his subsequent court-martial. The purser, Mr. Mortley Riordan, was also tried at the same time for certain alleged offences. These two courts-martial will be referred to in greater detail later.

The French reactions to the existence of a British post on their doorstep were singularly ineffective, and they made no practical attempts to hinder Hood's activities. Even a feint attack would have caused considerable annoyance and delay if anything of the sort had been made while the *Centaur's* mainmast was connected to the cliffs by the hawser on which the guns were got to the top of the Rock. All that Villaret did was to repair the road leading from Fort Royal to the south part of the island and to erect some fresh batteries as near to the Diamond Rock as possible. These batteries were not left long undisturbed. The negro population of Martinique had no great love for the French and, besides providing the British ships with fruit and fish, were not above supplying intelligence of a military character.

On 31st January, information was received that an artillery officer and a few men from Fort Royal had arrived that afternoon in the south part of the island to conduct operations against the Diamond. A raiding party from the *Centaur*, comprising Acting Lieutenant George Edmund Byron Bettesworth, Mr. John S. Tracey, the

Commodore's secretary, and about 20 men, therefore landed the same night from the barge, taking one of the negroes as a guide. After wending their way through the plantations, they eventually came on the farmhouse where the French party had their quarters; the enemy were taken completely by surprise, the officer and three canonnières being brought away as prisoners, all without a shot being fired. This was the first check to the French activities, and Commodore Hood concluded his report of the affair with, "The intrepid conduct of this promising young officer [Bettesworth] and those that were with him merits my warmest praises, and I hope their Lordships will deem him deserving the appointment of Lieutenant I shall immediately give him."

After this episode Hood requested Villaret to remove the civilian population of Martinique at least 10 miles away from these posts, in order to obviate risk of damage and loss of life to non-combatants; but, although he received a polite reply from the French Governor, no steps were taken by the latter to do so. In consequence, on the evening of 5th February, Acting Captain William Ferris (*Blenheim*, 74) landed with a strong force and attacked these new positions, driving the enemy inland. In a postscript to his dispatch reporting the affair, Hood adds the pithy comment, "Since the foregoing the Captain-General of Martinique seems not to persist in his operations against the Diamond."

Two days after this last set-back to the French efforts a formal notification of blockade was drawn up in English and French, printed and duly promulgated.

NOTICE

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIPS AT THE WINDWARD AND LEEWARD ISLANDS, having found that notwithstanding the length of the blockade of Martinique, neutral vessels endeavour to make it appear that they are ignorant of the circumstance, and it being impossible to intercept such vessels if permitted to hover on the coast, desires all neutral nations to take notice of this information. The Commander-in-Chief, to prevent any illiberal constructions relative to his conduct in this business by any neutral Power, and for it to be more satisfactory to them and the Captain-General, has relinquished the blockade of Guadeloupe to draw a stronger force for the purpose; having also taken possession of the Diamond and secured it against any force of the enemy, within thirteen hundred yards of his shore, will invest the island in the strictest manner.

The Commander-in-Chief, observing with much concern [that] the great indulgence granted to the inhabitants of Martinique, by permitting their plantations to be supplied and sugar to be stored, has been very much abused, and a trade in those boats carried on from one port to another, and those goods actually shipped in neutrals who have escaped the vigilance of the blockading squadron, is sorry to be under the necessity of rendering the well-disposed people of the island on that account any inconvenience, but he, in future, must forbid all species of produce being carried along [the] shore, or any supplies that may be clandestinely imported in neutrals; and all boats, of whatever description, that coast the island will be seized if they carry any such articles or avoid the search of British ships, and all boats passing the Diamond must call at the Examining Post and take a permit.

The Commander-in-Chief is ready to grant every indulgence to the deserving inhabitants of Martinique [that] the Rules of War and present investiture of the

island will admit, and which he trusts his conduct has already exhibited.

The Captain-General having commenced operations against the Diamond, which must prove futile, the British Commander-in-Chief is, in consequence, determined to leave nothing undone that can aid the reduction of the island to His Britannic Majesty's Government, under which, before, its inhabitants so happily lived.

DATED on board the *Centaur*
at the Diamond, off Martinique.

7th Febr. 1804.

SAM HOOD.

* →
Action to enforce the blockade soon followed; and on 12th March Maurice's tender was requisitioned by Captain James O'Bryen (*Emerald*, 36) to effect the capture of the French schooner privateer *Mosambique*, 14/10, which, being unable to work into St. Pierre, had taken refuge under the battery in Ceron Cove, Martinique. Next day 30 men from the *Emerald*, under the command of her first lieutenant, Thomas Forrest, went away in the *Fort Diamond* for the attack. The frigate at that time was too far to leeward, so her boats were sent away in a different direction, as a diversion, to distract the attention of the battery from the manoeuvres of the *Fort Diamond*, and these were also joined by two boats of the *Pandour*, 44/22 (Captain John Nash), which hove in sight at this time. Having worked to windward to weather the Pearl Rock, Lieutenant Forrest bore down on the privateer, and on his approach Citizen Vallentes, who commanded the *Mosambique*, fired one broadside from his 18-pr. carronades and then jumped overboard and swam ashore, followed by his crew of about 60 men. The prize was brought out, at a cost of two men slightly wounded.

The notations in the *Emerald's* log are brief and to the point. They read:—

"March 12th. A.M. Left Prince Rupert Bay, Dominica. *Fort Diamond* sloop in company.

"March 13th. Anchored in Woodbridge Bay. Weighed; sent the *Fort Diamond* in shore, which returned with a French schooner.

Noon position: Pearl, E.N.E., 5 miles."

The next mention of the Rock's tender is not so creditable. She had been sent by Commander Maurice to Roseau Bay, St. Lucia, to obtain a supply of wood and water for the Rock, under the charge of Acting Lieutenant Benjamin Westcott with a crew of 18 men. The *Fort Diamond* had been lying there for three days when, at 7.30 p.m. on 23rd June, she was boarded and taken possession of by two French row boats from a schooner privateer. Three weeks later Hood, whose broad pendant was then flying in the *Blenheim*, writing from Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on 13th July, reported the feared loss of the vessel as follows:—

"The enemy's privateers are very daring, and I fear have cut out the sloop that attends the Diamond Rock from one of the bays in St. Lucia—the vessel in my former report called the *Fort Diamond*—but I hope with the *Amelia* and *Emerald*, which sail well, we shall soon be able, by attaching [to them] some of the sloops of war, to check them, as they run on larger size vessels lately, though I do not think they have been very successful considering the numerous trade and the many vessels that run without convoy. Seeing the outward-bound trade safe, and the collecting of convoys from the extensive and dispersed

islands and Colonies in the Command, takes up a great number of the ships and leaves few to annoy the enemy in any way. . . ."

He did not, however, get confirmation of the fact until seven days later, when he received Westcott's letter, dated from the *Blenheim* on 20th July, reporting the loss. Westcott stated that "little resistance was made, as most of the crew were asleep and the arms all stowed below in consequence of having no chest on board to keep them in."

The ships on the station were at this time mostly dispersed on trade protection duties, and there were not enough officers immediately available to form a court-martial. This corollary to the loss of one of H.M. ships had therefore to be postponed. The convening order was dated 6th September, but it was not until a month later that the President could collect the minimum number of Captains and Commanders to enable him to comply with the legal requirements of that tribunal.

The Court, which comprised the following officers :—Captain Henry Heathcote, President, Captain James O'Bryen, Captain Kenneth MacKenzie, Commander Josh Charles Woollcombe, Commander Edward Woollcombe, with G. B. Harrison, appointed to officiate as Judge Advocate, assembled on board the *Galatea* in English Harbour, Antigua, on 4th October, 1804, and proceeded to enquire into the conduct of Acting Lieutenant Benjamin Westcott, the petty officers and men under his command, for suffering His Majesty's late sloop *Fort Diamond* to be captured by the enemy in Roseau Bay, St. Lucia.

The subjoined extracts from the minutes show only too clearly that Lieutenant Westcott had taken no precautions against a possible attack, and had made no attempt to repel the enemy when they came alongside. One of the seaman witnesses stated—"Shortly after 7 p.m., when most of the crew who had been ashore watering and cutting bamboo were below, Lieutenant Westcott was fishing on the taffrail. He was the first person to see them approach; he hailed twice and then the boats fired several muskets. Mr. Westcott then called out for the cutlasses to be handed up. Witness went down and was clearing muskets and cutlasses in the locker, when Lieutenant Westcott came down and got a cutlass out; he stood by the hatchway awhile and then turned about and said, 'it was no use, it was too late.' I heard him say no more for a considerable time after; the people were by that time all below. The Frenchmen were on board and had sentries over all the hatches; they cut the cable . . . and got alongside the schooner, when the prisoners were sent on board. . . ."

The evidence of the second seaman witness called was similar.

By the Court :—"Westcott made no attempt to get his men on deck. The crew of the *Fort Diamond* were 18 in all. The sentry was not usually posted till 8 p.m. The *Fort Diamond* was one and a half miles from the shore, having drifted that day. The French boats approached from the shore and not from to seaward. The only arms kept on deck were boarding pikes round the booms. There were seven British on deck when the French boat got alongside. No one was wounded in the defence."

The finding was as follows :—"The Court are of opinion that the charges against Lieutenant Benjamin Westcott are proved and that he falls under the first part of the Xth Article of War. In consequence of which the Court do therefore adjudge him to be dismissed His Majesty's Service and rendered incapable of ever serving in the Naval Service of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors; and he is therefore dismissed His Majesty's Service accordingly. And nothing appearing against the crew of the said sloop the Court do adjudge them to be acquitted, and they are hereby acquitted accordingly."

The minutes of the court-martial were received at the Admiralty early in January, 1805, and the Board minute, dated 10th January, directed "Lieut. B. Westcott of the *F. Diamond* to be struck off the list and name to be put in the Black Book."

The manner in which Westcott and his crew got away from the French is one of those minor items upon which the records are silent. The schooner referred to, whose name is unknown, seems to have been a privateer, and those vessels did not employ the services of a cartel for exchanging prisoners. The reports of British captures on the station contain no reference to recapturing them in any enemy ship or vessel. Westcott's letter is dated from the *Blenheim*, but her Muster Book contains no entry to show that he or any of his crew were ever borne, as supernumeraries, on her books. The Muster Book of the *Diamond Rock* also leaves us in ignorance on this point, the only relevant entry being the date of his discharge—28th September, 1804.

It is sometimes said that the Rock itself was named the *Diamond Rock* sloop. This was not so; the name really belonged to the seagoing tender which was the name-ship of the Establishment. Confirmation of this fact is to be found in the minutes of a later court-martial, when "the Court asked Captain Maurice if there was a sloop called the *Diamond Rock* and if the people employed on the *Diamond Rock* belonged to her, and if they were victualled from her and paid as belonging to her, who answered 'that it was so.'" The origin of this particular tender is obscure and the surviving records are scanty, but in the MS. Lists of the Navy (Surveyor's Books) we find, under the appropriate heading of "Sloops, manner in which they are rigged not known," the following information:—

1804.

" <i>Diamond Rock</i> for the security of Fort Diamond.	A.O. 10th May, 1804, to register her as a sloop and to cause her to be attached to Fort Diamond and establish her with a complement of 100 men."
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And in the following year,
1805.

" <i>Diamond Rock</i>	Lieut. Westcott dismissed the Service for suffering her to be cut out of Roseau Bay. She is called <i>Fort Diamond</i> in the A.O. 12th Jan., 1805, to dispense with the want of officers' books and papers."
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Steel's Navy List (which was not an official publication) is misleading. In July, 1804, the *Diamond Rock* is described as of 16 guns, and in succeeding months as having been taken from the French in 1803; in April, 1805, Commander Maurice is also described as being Governor of Fort Diamond. The true explanation appears to be that, as a 16-gun sloop would have a complement of about 100 men, and as the vessel was registered on this establishment for the purposes of stores, pay, etc., Steel has loosely described the *Diamond Rock* as being a ship mounting 16 guns, saying nothing about the actual composition of the establishment of Rock and tender. There is nothing in Hood's list of captures on his station in 1803 to show that a French 16-gun sloop was ever taken during that period, and the probability is that the Rock's tender was a vessel taken up locally. In the *Blenheim's* log the *Fort Diamond* is described as a cutter, and this is what we would expect her to be, rather than a square-rigged vessel which could not work to windward as well as one with a fore-and-aft rig. The term 'sloop' was very elastic; it had nothing at all to do with the rig of the vessel, but merely denoted a ship of 16-18 guns and having a

complement of 100-120 men, though sometimes the numbers of guns and men were less than this. The Admiralty Order directed her to be registered as a sloop, but this does not prove anything in particular. She was intended to be the name-ship of the Establishment, and as the complement on the Rock itself was of the order of 100 (actually 121) men and as that was also the usual complement for a 16-gun sloop, it was natural to register her as such. The dispatches contain no mention of what vessel was appropriated to take the place of the first tender after her capture. All we know is the bare fact that there was another tender.

Besides being a fortified base for the harassment of the enemy's coastwise and other trade, the Diamond Rock also had another function—that of an advanced reporting station. The height of the Rock enabled observers to sight a sail at a great distance (the distance of the horizon was $27\frac{1}{2}$ miles and a frigate's topgallant sails would have been visible when the ship herself was about 41 miles away), and whenever the intelligence was of sufficient importance the news was despatched by the Rock's tender, or by a vessel hired for the purpose, to the neighbouring British islands where early information of enemy movements was particularly desirable, more especially when a convoy was being assembled and a weak escort was all that could be provided.

Lack of escorts for trade protection has always been a cause for anxiety on the part of naval officers in command of stations, both at home and abroad. The total available force on the Leeward Islands Station in February, 1804, was no more than two 74's, one 50, two frigates, four more frigates *armée en flûte* as transports, eight sloops, and 12 smaller vessels—schooners, etc. Among these last was the *Fort Diamond*, which was shown as carrying eight guns.⁶ Some of these ships were inevitably out of action at any given moment. The dockyard at Antigua was none too well provided with stores, and refits after actions with enemy vessels or after encountering bad weather are necessary whether a ship is built of steel or wood. It will thus be seen that Hood's net force was none too large for the protection of trade or for maintaining the blockade. Fortunately the French regular naval force out there at that time was practically non-existent—the *Badine*, 28, (dismantled) and *Curieuse* and *La Fine*, 8's. The enemy's privateers, however, were numerous and particularly active, and the British dispatches contain frequent reference to the capture of these pests.

Apart from the capture of the *Mosambique*, nothing seems to be known about how the 16 months during which the *Diamond Rock* was in commission were spent. Of one thing we can be certain, and that is that Commander Maurice did not sit there merely admiring the view, but was a constant source of annoyance to the French, not only from the material side but also by proving their military impotence to capture his position. One attempt, and one only, seems to have been made, after which he was left undisturbed until the arrival of Villeneuve⁷ in the West Indies. This can now be briefly described.

In the first week of May, 1804, while all the British ships were away from the immediate vicinity of the Diamond, Villaret gave orders for a night assault on the place. The operation was entrusted to Colonel Mian, who was accompanied by Captain de Jonnès on account of the latter's local knowledge of the route to be followed and of the defences of the Rock. The scheme was for four old and heavy dockyard launches to start from Fort Royal and, after a long pull against the strong inshore current, the attackers were apparently expected to effect a landing and carry

⁶ See Appendix A.

⁷ Vice-Admiral Pierre-Charles-Jean-Baptiste-Silvestre Villeneuve.

the defences before daylight the next morning. By three o'clock in the morning, however, the boats had got no farther than the Anse Mathurin, by Ramiers islet, where they put in for some much-needed rest and refreshment. On the following night the expedition set forth once more, and shortly before dawn landed at the Petite Anse du Diamant, where a second pause was made during the daylight hours.

Darkness being essential for this rash enterprise, the next move was not made until 2 a.m., and this time the full force of the current was encountered, together with a short, confused sea. The boats soon became separated and lost touch with one another; Mian's boat got near enough to make out the glow of the battle lanterns in the lower batteries on the Diamond when it, like the others, was swept away by the current. Daylight found three of the scattered craft several leagues to leeward of the Rock; the fourth was missing. These three boats, with their crews in a state of complete exhaustion, managed to get into the shelter of the Anse d'Arlet; the fourth boat was picked up by an American whaler, which brought the crew in and landed them at the Arlet anchorage. From there the whole party made their way back overland to Fort Royal, to report the total failure of the expedition. No mention of this abortive attempt appears in the British dispatches, and it is doubtful if the garrison on the Rock ever knew that anything of this nature had been contemplated.

Besides proving a veritable thorn in the side of the French in the Leeward Islands, the Diamond Rock also played its part in the campaign of Trafalgar. Napoleon's original plan in January, 1805, had been for Missiessy,⁸ from Rochefort, and Villeneuve, from Toulon, to rendezvous in the West Indies, where they were to recapture the islands in British possession and harass the trade as much as possible. Bad weather in the Mediterranean, however, prevented the Toulon squadron from sailing at the appointed time; but Missiessy got out and appeared at Martinique on 20th February with five sail of the line, three frigates, two brigs, and a schooner, and 3,300 men. The earlier British intelligence reports greatly exaggerated the strength of this force, which was thought to be commanded by Vice-Admiral Honoré Ganteaume and to have on board about 12,000 men; but later and authentic news gleaned from Martinique, which included the report that Villeneuve was to leave Toulon at the same time [as Missiessy] with seven sail of the line and 6,000 men for the West Indies, soon corrected the earlier suppositions.

At this critical time all Sir Samuel Hood's force was to leeward. He himself (he had been made a K.B. on 17th November, 1804) was then dating his letters from one of his small craft, the *Berbice*, at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, and his one remaining ship of the line, the *Centaure* (the *Blenheim* had gone home without relief in the previous September), was held up at Antigua, waiting for a new foremast. The *Centaure* got away from Antigua on 28th February, but with her water casks practically empty, and had to call at Barbados to replenish before she could be considered ready for service; on the passage down she experienced extremely light winds and everyone on board was reduced to very short allowance. Hood collected most of his force to windward of Deseada (Desirade) and Martinique, being joined by the *Beaulieu*, *Amelia*, and *Galatea* frigates on 15th March, and by the *Centaure* four days later.

Although the French force was far superior, Missiessy failed to take advantage of it and contented himself with raiding some of the British islands, burning the shipping and exacting ransoms, and reinforcing the garrison at Guadeloupe. On his return to Fort Royal on 12th March he learned that Villeneuve had failed to get out, that the intended combination was cancelled, and that the Rochefort squadron was to return

⁸ Rear-Admiral Joseph-Marie Burgues, Comte de Missiessy.

to France. He accordingly sailed 10 days later and, disregarding the entreaties of the Captain-General of Martinique to attack the Diamond Rock before finally leaving the West Indies, having disembarked the rest of the troops at Santo Domingo, arrived back at Rochefort on 20th May. Missiessy had not got away from France unobserved, and he seems to have been looking over his shoulder all the time he was in the West Indies; his fear that he would be followed out by a British squadron was justified, and he was probably profoundly thankful to have had an empty horizon during his return passage.

At the time of Missiessy's final departure from Fort Royal the outward-bound Jamaica convoy was slowly making its way past the islands of the Lesser Antilles and, by a stroke of luck, crossed the Frenchman's track less than a couple of days ahead of him. Hood, who was by this time back in the *Centaur* and at sea, 30 miles to windward of Martinique, writing to the Admiralty on 25th March, enclosed Commander Maurice's report, brought to him by the *Unicorn*, 32 (Captain Lucius Hardyman). It runs:—

"Report of Lieut. Wilson, 1st of the *Unicorn*, obtained [Saturday] the 23rd March at the Diamond.

"Captain Maurice states, by information from St. Lucia, that a convoy of 40 sail passed between that island and St. Vincent on Wednesday last, supposed to be the Jamaica trade. That the French fleet—five ships of the line, three frigates, two brigs, and a schooner—were in sight from the Rock at 8 a.m. on Friday and continued so until dark, having light airs from the northward. They made little way, their yards were square, heads then to the southward and appeared to be steering by compass about south. [They] were also in sight at 11.30 a.m. this day, nearly hull down, bearing W.S.W. from the Rock and their heads still to the southward. When the fleet went into Fort Royal Bay they appeared to have received no damage, either in masts or yards. That he had officially informed the Governors of Trinidad, St. Vincent, and Tobago of the enemy's arrival in Fort Royal and of the possibility of their sailing southward after a refit. Dispatches sent the 15th inst. by way of St. Lucia."

We also learn from a local report that at this time the condition of affairs on the Rock was as follows:—"Provisions completed to four months; water completed to three months; people all healthy. The guns were all mounted *en barbette* in the covered way and the launch's carronade in the cove."

Missiessy's disembarkation of his troops and his final departure from the West Indies was reported by Maurice to Hood on 1st April.

"Nothing new has occurred since I communicated with the *Unicorn* until late last evening. The French sloop *Superb*—J. Coarler, the master of her— informs me and speaks very positive[ly], that the enemy's squadron left all the troops on shore at Martinique and Guadeloupe, except 1,300 which they proceeded with to San Domingo, and then return[ed] home. That the French admiral had positive instructions not to risk being blockaded in Fort Royal, but after a certain time to return home, fearful that an English squadron should arrive after him. He says they intended going a little to the southward as a deception and then bear[ing] up. How far the information is to be depended on I shall leave to your superior judgment. If they have not shown themselves to the southward I think their having left those seas to be fully certain; if they have, of course, it will contradict it.

"As you may wish to send home an account of their supposed return, that they may look out for them, I have thought proper to sending my first lieutenant to St. Lucia to hire a vessel and proceed to Barbados with the express, particularly as Sir William Meyers⁹ by letter requested I would send; he would pay every expense.

"We are quite healthy and well at the Diamond and anxiously wait the pleasure of seeing you here. I beg leave to conclude, hoping that my proceedings will meet your approbation.

"P.S. If the information is true of their destination I am very much afraid of the Jamaica convoy, as there was only a day between their passing and the enemy sailing, and the wind westerly."

APPENDIX A

List of ships and vessels on the Leeward Islands Station in February, 1804.

Ships	Guns	Ships	Guns
<i>Centaur</i>	74	<i>Guachapin</i>	16
<i>Blenheim</i>	74	<i>Curieux</i>	16
<i>Romney</i>	50	<i>St. Lucia</i>	16
<i>Ulysses</i>	44/22 (<i>flûte</i>)	<i>Netley</i>	16
<i>Pandour</i>	44/22 (<i>flûte</i>)	<i>Prevost</i>	12
<i>Serapis</i>	44/22 (<i>flûte</i>)	<i>Eclair</i>	10
<i>Alligator</i>	28/22 (<i>flûte</i>)	<i>Unique</i>	10
<i>Emerald</i>	36	<i>Hind</i>	8
<i>Heureux</i>	24	<i>Fort Diamond</i>	8
<i>Osprey</i>	18	<i>Desperate</i>	6
<i>Hornet</i>	18	<i>Berbice</i>	6
<i>Cyane</i>	18	<i>Advice</i>	6
<i>Imogen</i>	18	<i>Express</i>	6
<i>Hippomenes</i>	18	<i>Sarah</i>	5
<i>Drake</i>	16		

[To be concluded.]

⁹ Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands.

THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA, 1943-45¹

PART II. THE RECONQUEST

By BRIGADIER M. R. ROBERTS, D.S.O.

AT the end of June, 1944, the Fourteenth Army had won its decisive battles and was preparing to exploit the victory at Imphal by destroying the Japanese divisions withdrawing east and south-east through Ukhrul towards the Chindwin. At this stage the Japanese commander of the Imphal operation, Lieut-General Mutaguchi, had not yet given up hope and was considering collecting all his forces for a final 'do or die' assault on Imphal. He had not realized that the two divisions that had been at Kohima and north-east of Imphal were incapable of any further offensive effort; nor could he foresee that within a few days they would start to disintegrate under the enveloping thrust about to be delivered on Ukhrul, from south-west, north, and east, while the tracks that led to the Chindwin and safety dissolved into a sea of mud, causing trucks to slither off them down the hillsides where they were to be found later with their occupants still in them, but dead; mud into which the badly wounded fell and never rose.

To the south of Imphal the Japanese forces on the Tamu and Tiddim roads fought into July, desperately, to give their comrades from the north a chance of escape into and down the Kabaw valley. By the end of July they too had their last glimpse of the Imphal plain as they were driven from their strongholds on the southern edge of the plateau, and the pursuit was on.

Already planning was well advanced for the drive across north Burma to the Irrawaddy and then south to Rangoon, and a short account of this planning is necessary before going on with the story of the operations.

PLANNING THE RECONQUEST OF BURMA

On 3rd June, Lord Louis Mountbatten had received a new directive from the Chiefs of Staff which was worded as follows:—

"Develop, maintain, broaden, and protect the air link to China in order to provide the maximum and timely stock of petrol and stores to China in support of Pacific operations.

"So far as is consistent with the above, to press advantages against the enemy by exerting maximum effort, ground and air, particularly during the current monsoon season, and in pressing such advantages to be prepared to exploit the development of overland communications to China. All these operations must be dictated by the forces at present available, or firmly allocated, to South-East Asia Command."

There is, as will be noted, no mention of amphibious operations. The 'Axiom' Mission which had gone to England and America to press for large scale amphibious operations to capture Sumatra, as a first step to the outflanking and cutting off of all the Japanese forces in Malaya and Burma, had been unsuccessful and the final issue of the Kohima/Imphal battle was not yet clear; hence this 'wait and see' directive!

In his subsequent directive to his land and air commanders-in-chief the Supreme Allied Commander gave them certain specific tasks.

In Arakan the Maungdaw-Tunnels area was to be actively defended and

¹ A map of Burma faces page 250 in the JOURNAL for May.

preparations made to capture Akyab by land advance. On the central front the road to Imphal was to be opened, after which the Kohima/Imphal area and the north end of the Kabaw valley was to be cleared of enemy and preparations made to exploit east from there across the Chindwin.

The air C-in-C. was directed to maintain air superiority within the command and particularly on the air route to China; to attack enemy shipping, airfields, communications, ports, and depots; support the ground operations of N.C.A.C. and 11th Army Group; provide the air defence of India and transport for clandestine operations; protect the operations of 20th Bomber Command; and finally support the Eastern Fleet. Comprehensive to say the least!

The directive to 11th Army Group was almost out of date by the time the orders based on it reached divisional level, for by the end of June the Japanese 15th and 31st Divisions, pouring back towards the Chindwin through Ukhrul, were facing disaster under the relentless pressure of the XXXIIIrd Corps. The 20th Indian Division, now switched from the IVth to the XXXIIIrd Corps, advanced against desperate opposition to cut the tracks south and south-east of Ukhrul. Two brigades of the 7th Indian Division struck from north and west and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade closed in from the east.

To the south of Imphal the IVth Corps had begun to push the enemy back along the road to Tiddim and to destroy one by one the Japanese strongholds astride the Tamu road in the Shenam Pass², while bringing up fresh troops to take up the pursuit as soon as the enemy resistance, south of Bishenpur and on the Pass, broke.

On 2nd July, at a conference at Sylhet, attended by Lord Louis Mountbatten, General Slim, and Air Marshal Baldwin, certain points regarding reinforcements, re-habilitation of divisions, and a target date for resumption of a full scale offensive by the Fourteenth Army were discussed. The following day planning began at Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, for the advance into Burma, and S.E.A.C. headquarters undertook the preparation of outline plans for the Autumn, to be laid before the Chiefs of Staff.

The point to note here is that planning was going on at all levels. Thus, when the Chiefs of Staff gave their approval to one of the alternatives put forward by S.E.A.C., there was no delay because in fact the troops on the ground had already carried out the initial stages of the operation and were actually ahead of schedule.

THE THREE ALTERNATIVE PLANS FOR THE RECONQUEST.

By 14th July, General Sir George Giffard at Headquarters, 11th Army Group, had prepared an appreciation and outline plan and the planning staff at Headquarters, S.E.A.C., had prepared three alternatives for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

The 11th Army Group opinion, with which the Fourteenth Army agreed, was that an attack on Akyab was not now necessary. The reasons for such a reversal of thought was that Akyab was no longer required by the R.A.F. as the increased range of their aircraft enabled them to operate from the existing airfields in the Chittagong area, and in view of the restrictions as regards troops available imposed by the Chiefs of Staff directive, it would be an unwarranted dispersal of force to undertake a major offensive there. Instead, all available forces should be concentrated on an air transported and air supplied offensive directed either on the Katha area or the Yeu-Shwebo area, depending on how the operations during

² 35 miles south-east of Imphal.

the monsoon developed. In Arakan, there should be an offensive-defensive in sufficient strength to tie down the enemy forces and prevent their being sent to reinforce the central and northern fronts.

While General Slim at Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, agreed in general with these views, he was less sanguine about the proposals as regards air transported operations. His main concern was to find out where the Japanese strength lay and then to get his armour there to destroy it, a by no means easy problem because between the Kabaw valley, towards which his advanced troops were now pressing, and the plains west of Mandalay, where it was likely that the Japanese would next fight, there was the Chindwin and the steep escarpment of the Zibyu Taungdan, thickly forested and with few passes, all of which would be likely to be strongly held. If the armour could be deployed in the Mandalay plains it could develop its full power: the problem was to get it there.

This 'down to earth' view of Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, was not due to any lack of faith in air transported or airborne operations, but to the fact that they had to have a plan that could be put into effect under the worst conditions and they were not prepared to make its fulfilment dependent on the use of airborne or air transported forces which might quite likely not be (and in fact were not when the time came) available. Moreover, it was felt that our small airborne force would, at the beginning of the invasion, be more useful as a threat, as the Japanese were believed to have accurate information of its strength, and once it was committed, the enemy would be freed from all further fears in regard to airborne operations.

The three alternatives the S.E.A.C. planners put forward were:—

- (i) *Plan X*.—A main thrust by N.C.A.C. with a subsidiary thrust across the Chindwin by the Fourteenth Army, and operations in Arakan to contain enemy forces there.
- (ii) *Plan Y*.—A main thrust by the Fourteenth Army to capture the general line Mandalay-Pakokku, with a subsidiary thrust by N.C.A.C. on Lashio, and operations in Arakan as in plan X.
- (iii) *Plan Z*.—A seaborne assault to capture Rangoon and then a drive north to meet the Fourteenth Army, and capture Mandalay.

Plans Y and Z were the plans that eventually became known as "Capital" and "Dracula." It can be said here that "Capital" was expanded and carried through relentlessly. "Dracula" was at first shelved and then revived in a very much modified form, as will become clear as the story continues.

On 15th July a summary of these plans was delivered to Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, and a few days later 11th Army Group issued an instruction to Fourteenth Army giving details of the forces that would be available and calling for an appreciation and plan to put "Capital" into effect and for comments on "Dracula". On 1st August, Lord Louis Mountbatten left for England to present the plans to the Chiefs of Staff, after which the joint planning staffs, in which there were representatives of S.E.A.C., 11th Army Group, Fourteenth Army, N.C.A.C., and their supporting air forces, moved to Calcutta and set to work, in the air-conditioned underground offices in Fort William, to produce the detailed plan "Capital" by 24th August, in anticipation of Chiefs of Staff sanction.

Lord Louis Mountbatten's representative—General Wedemeyer—who went to Washington to get the American Chiefs of Staff views on "Capital" and "Dracula" soon reported that though they favoured "Dracula" they would not agree to its

being put into operation if by doing so troops would have to be diverted from "Capital." In fact they preferred to see Burma cleared from north to south as that would give the quickest opening of the land route to China. At the same time the planners at Calcutta came to the conclusion that "Dracula" could only be mounted at the expense of "Capital," and so it came about that it was dropped and the reconquest of Burma was undertaken as a land operation by the Fourteenth Army, assisted by XVth Corps operations in Arakan and, in the early stages, by N.C.A.C. which gradually faded out. In the last stages a revived and greatly modified "Dracula" was put on at short notice in order to ensure the capture of Rangoon.

Space does not permit of going into any further detail of the high level planning, but it is necessary to explain the change of policy as regards Arakan. It will be remembered that in all three alternative plans there was only to be an offensive-defensive in Arakan to hold enemy forces there. As time went on it became clear that the Japanese had removed a great proportion of their forces from Arakan during the 1944 monsoon, therefore it should be possible to take Akyab and clear the enemy out of Arakan with the forces available. A major offensive was therefore undertaken in Arakan by the XVth Corps, which was taken out of the Fourteenth Army and placed directly under 11th Army Group, or A.L.F.S.E.A. as it had become by November, 1944.

THE TASK OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS INVOLVED

The task of the Fourteenth Army was to capture the general line Mandalay-Pakokku, while N.C.A.C. and the Chinese Yunnan force extended the line north-eastwards to Lashio and the China border and the XVth Corps cleared Arakan.

The next step was to exploit south towards Rangoon while N.C.A.C. opened the road to China through Myitkyina and Bhamo to connect up with the old 'Burma Road' where it crossed into China some 50 air miles south-east of Bhamo. This would fulfil the directive, quoted earlier, for "the development of overland communications to China", and it could be done in complete security once the Fourteenth Army's drive south from Mandalay got into its stride.

The main problems of the Fourteenth Army were perhaps administrative. The first and greatest was whether it was going to be possible to maintain a large enough force east of the Chindwin to ensure the defeat of the 10 divisions plus several independent brigades which the Japanese could muster, excluding the two I.N.A. divisions. Only two divisions could be contained by operations in Arakan, while N.C.A.C. and the Chinese Salween force might contain three, leaving five Japanese and two I.N.A. divisions plus one or more independent brigades to oppose the Fourteenth Army. It was true that many of the Japanese divisions had been badly beaten, but there was time for them to be reinforced, retrained, and rested, and they might, by the Autumn, be almost up to strength. In the most favourable circumstances it was doubtful whether the Fourteenth Army would be able to maintain more than six divisions and two armoured brigades on the Mandalay-Pakokku line and fewer still to the south of it. It was thus evident that the battle for the Mandalay-Pakokku line would have to be undertaken with nothing like the two to one superiority deemed the minimum necessary to take on prepared defences.

The first essential was therefore to get to the Chindwin as soon as possible, seize bridgeheads, and then build all-weather roads and lay petrol pipe lines to them to carry forward supplies to the Chindwin and the forward airfields yet to be built, in order to make use of the river and shorten the air carry to the forward areas as the

Army moved on. The time factor alone made it essential to press on to the Chindwin during the 1944 monsoon which broke in full fury just as the Battle of Imphal ended on 22nd June.

It was going to take all the engineering resources available to get an all-weather road through to Kalewa, which was to be the main Chindwin bridgehead since it gave access to the now comparatively good track to Yeu and Shwebo which would take heavy traffic in dry weather and would be of great value to the advance to the Irrawaddy. There was never any possibility of the conversion of any track beyond Kalewa to all-weather standards before the 1945 monsoon. Indeed, but for the invention of Bithess³ it would not have been possible in the time available to complete the all-weather road to Kalewa, or to surface the forward airfields needed for large scale air supply to the Fourteenth Army.

The vast amount of traffic that would use the road to the Chindwin will be realized if it is remembered that not only had the Fourteenth Army with its vehicles and armour to be carried forward but also the materials for bridges, road making, and the building of boats and jetties for the Chindwin river supply line. The road as far as Tamu was already an all-weather one, and though the Japanese damaged it they could not completely destroy it. This was fortunate because the rebuilding of a road in the mountains while it was being intensively used would have been a most difficult task. Beyond Tamu, in the flat Kabaw valley, the road trace did not have to follow the existing track which thus remained available for use while the new road was being built.

The ability of the Fourteenth Army to fight its way across the Irrawaddy depended on the build up of the all-weather road to the Chindwin. Even this would not enable it to remain in south Burma during the following monsoon (1945); for that, a port in south Burma, preferably Rangoon, had to be captured because only from there could supplies in large quantities be got on to the all-weather roads and railways of south and central Burma. The fair-weather roads of north Burma would become impassable from May while low cloud and rain would make flying too uncertain to be a reliable main source of supply.

In fact the problem confronting the Fourteenth Army would have been quite formidable even if there had been no Japanese to bar its way to and across the Irrawaddy!

SITUATION ON 1ST AUGUST, 1944


On the northern front the Japanese resistance at Myitkyina was showing signs of weakening after nearly three months of siege. The Chindits had been relieved by the 36th (British) Division⁴ less one brigade and Stilwell was using it to push down what was known as the 'Railway Corridor' from Mogaung to Katha.

In Arakan the situation had not changed since June as all major operations were at a standstill until the floods subsided.

On the Fourteenth Army front a complete re-grouping had just been completed as a result of which Headquarters, IVth Corps, had withdrawn for rest and reorganization and the XXXIIIrd Corps had taken control of all operations. The pursuit down the Tiddim and Tamu roads was being taken up by the 5th Indian and 11th East

³ Bithess was hessian treated with bitumen which could be rolled out on an earth surface, like carpet, to form a waterproof surface.

⁴ The 36th Division had been reorganized as a standard three brigade division, though its third brigade was not yet quite ready to take the field.



African Divisions respectively, the latter backed by the 268th Indian Brigade, an independent brigade formed from recently raised Indian battalions and a Nepalese battalion.⁵

All other divisions and the armour were withdrawn, either into rest in the Imphal and Kohima areas or to India to train for new tasks, or to re-organize in the case of the 17th Division which ceased to be a Light Division and became a standard division. The only special formation now left other than the 3rd Commando Brigade was the 3rd Indian Division (Chindits) which was never used again although plans were prepared to fly it into central Burma ahead of Fourteenth Army's advance.

⁵ The 268th Brigade was originally the mechanized infantry brigade of an armoured division. Its original units were withdrawn to India at the end of the Imphal battle.

One of the noticeable features of the campaign in Burma is the small use that could be made of the special formations that were available, and as has just been shown two divisions on a special establishment were converted to standard organization during the monsoon period of 1944.

THE MONSOON CAMPAIGN ON THE CENTRAL FRONT

Space prohibits going into details of the advance of the XXXIIIrd Corps during August and September, 1944. The advance was pressed steadily, though subjected to periods of delay when the Kabaw valley became so deeply flooded that even air drops could not be carried out and landslides swept away large sections of the Tiddim road. Japanese rearguards of course took full advantage of the conditions. The most noteworthy feature of the operation was the securing by the 5th Division of the Manipur river crossing at mile 126 from Imphal, some 40 miles short of Tiddim, by a wide flank move along a track through the hills which brought a whole brigade in behind the enemy positions covering the crossing. After this the division cut down its transport and artillery to a bare minimum and went on to 100 per cent. air supply, the Tiddim road being abandoned because engineer resources were insufficient to maintain it and at the same time to improve the Kabaw valley road to all-weather standard.

On 13th November the 5th and 11th (E.A.) Divisions met at Kalembo at the junction of the Kabaw valley and Tiddim roads, 25 miles west of Kalewa, where three weeks later a bridgehead was established. Meanwhile, Headquarters, IVth Corps, had returned from India, and rested and reorganized divisions of the IVth and XXXIIIrd Corps, with their armour, had been concentrating in the Imphal plain and Kabaw valley, ready to cross the Chindwin as soon as the bridgeheads were established.

DECISION TO RE-OPEN MAJOR OPERATIONS IN ARAKAN

In Arakan, as briefly mentioned earlier, the discovery that the Japanese had considerably weakened their forces made it probable that the remainder could be destroyed by the XVth Corps with the troops already at its disposal. Planning began, and on 15th November the XVth Corps ceased to belong to the Fourteenth Army and came directly under the newly formed A.L.F.S.E.A., under Lieut-General Sir Oliver Leese, for their major offensive to capture Akyab and then clear south Arakan. At the same time a line of communication command was formed to take over the territory regained by the Fourteenth Army and XVth Corps during their advance.

After this A.L.F.S.E.A. had under its command: Fourteenth Army, N.C.A.C., XVth Corps, and L. of C. Command.

THE FOURTEENTH ARMY CONCENTRATES TO CROSS THE CHINDWIN

During September, plans "Capital" and "Dracula" had been considered at the second Quebec Conference and on 16th September the Chiefs of Staff had given the Supreme Allied Commander a directive ordering him to destroy or expel all Japanese forces from Burma at the earliest possible date. The directive gave as 'approved' operations those stages of operation "Capital" necessary to secure the air and land route to China and, subject to the satisfactory carrying out of these operations, "Dracula" could be undertaken, preferably before the monsoon. If "Dracula" were not possible before the monsoon "Capital" was to be exploited.

The phases of "Capital" envisaged as necessary were :—

- (i) The capture of Kalewa.
- (ii) The capture of Yeu-Shewbo possibly with the help of an airborne assault.
- (iii) The securing of the line Lashio-Maymyo (N.C.A.C.)—Mandalay-Pakokku (Fourteenth Army).

On 2nd October, Lord Louis Mountbatten had issued a directive to his commanders-in-chief land and air forces to carry out phases (i) and (ii) of "Capital" and an offensive-defensive in Arakan. "Dracula" was to be carried out on receipt of a separate directive. The two phases of "Capital" were to be completed by mid-December and mid-February respectively. 11th Army Group issued an operation instruction implementing this directive on 11th October.

By this date phase (i) of "Capital" was well on the way to completion and the concentration of the Fourteenth Army forward on the Chindwin had started. Headquarters, IVth Corps, in the Imphal area had taken the 7th Indian Division and 255th Tank Brigade under command and was, within a few days, allotted the 19th Indian Division as well. Two rehabilitated divisions, the 2nd (British) and 20th Indian of the XXXIIIrd Corps were preparing to leapfrog through the 5th Indian and 11th (E.A.) Divisions, so it will be seen that the preliminary moves for phase (ii) of "Capital" were already being carried out.

At this stage the Fourteenth Army plan, broadly speaking, was an advance east from the Chindwin with the XXXIIIrd Corps on the right and the IVth Corps on the left. The left of the IVth Corps was to link up with the right of N.C.A.C. (36th Division) in the Katha area and then swing south. The concept was a pincer movement with its focal point the Yeu-Shwebo—Mandalay area. N.C.A.C., meanwhile, on the left, was to sweep down to the Mandalay-Lashio road and open up the road to China.

As the pincer closed General Slim hoped to be able to crush the Japanese 15th Army in the base of the 'U' formed by the Irrawaddy and Chindwin.

During November, therefore, the 19th Division of the IVth Corps moved to the Paungbyin area on the Chindwin and established itself astride the river, pushing patrols out eastwards on a wide arc towards Katha. The 2nd and 20th Divisions of the XXXIIIrd Corps concentrated in the south end of the Kabaw valley ready to cross at Kalewa as soon as the bridgehead there was established by the 11th (E.A.) Division.

By mid-December the Japanese were aware that the IVth and XXXIIIrd Corps were probing east from the Chindwin on a wide front from Paungbyin to Kalewa. At Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, it was becoming clear that the Japanese 15th Army was *not* disposed between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy and that it was therefore, probably holding the line of the Irrawaddy from Mandalay to Pakokku. Now General Slim was out to destroy the Japanese forces, not to occupy territory, and he quickly decided that to put the whole of his army across the Chindwin into the Yeu-Shwebo plain would be a waste of time and effort.

CHANGE OF PLAN. THE THRUST ON MEIKTILA

For some time General Slim and his senior staff officers had been thinking of an alternative plan with their eyes on the ideal tank country in the Meiktila area, from where the life-line of the Japanese armies in north Burma, the Rangoon-Mandalay road and rail, could be cut. With the Japanese eyes and those of our own press and public fixed on the drive east from the Chindwin, with the romantic Mandalay as the objective, there was every possibility of the preliminary moves of a stroke at Meiktila

going unobserved. To a general of Slim's calibre such an opportunity was not likely to be allowed to slip away, and he met his two corps commanders, Stopford and Messervy, on 18th December at the latter's headquarters in the jungle near Tamu and explained his new plan.⁶

The IVth Corps was to move south up the Myittha valley by way of Gangaw, headed by an East African brigade to simulate the continued presence of the 11th East African Division, cross the Irrawaddy about Pakokku, and form a bridgehead through which the 17th Division with an armoured brigade would pass and drive hard and fast at Meiktila.

The XXXIIIrd Corps was to keep up the drive east from the Chindwin, taking over the 19th Division from the IVth Corps, but concealing the fact by passing all orders to it through a bogus IVth Corps headquarters, while the 7th Division, headed by Africans leading the IVth Corps advance south down the Gangaw valley, preserved strict wireless silence. This in fact was the only difficult feature of a plan of great simplicity, which involved no counter moves of troops and yet utterly deceived the new Japanese commanders of the 15th Army (Katamura) and Burma Area Army (Kimura). The Japanese failure to meet it caused the Supreme Commander, Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, to have a stroke from which he never properly recovered.

The next step was to put the two divisions which were to carry out the Meiktila operation (5th and 17th) on to a completely mechanized footing with an air-transportable brigade in each, and this was carried out while the 7th Division was moving to the Irrawaddy and establishing the bridgehead through which the thrust was to be made. The two main reasons for the high degree of mechanization of these divisions were, firstly, to give them speed for the drive on Meiktila and later on Rangoon, and, secondly, to eliminate all animals because the prospective theatre of operations was a dry waterless plain from December to May.

SITUATION FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY, 1945

Throughout the second half of December and January, the Fourteenth Army drove forward to the Irrawaddy, destroying or dispersing Japanese rearguards. On the extreme left of the XXXIIIrd Corps the 19th Division made contact with the 36th Division, the right flank of N.C.A.C., near Katha as planned, and then wheeled south and made for Shwebo. Without any armour, and at the outset without guns owing to the lack of tracks fit to take heavy vehicles, the division pushed ahead with such speed and determination that it seized two bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy east of Shwebo, and by threatening to cut the retreat of the garrison, forced it to abandon the town on 9th January, 1945, without a fight. Meanwhile the 2nd Division had seized the vital canal headworks north-west of Shwebo, thus ensuring the control of water in the dry Shwebo plain. On the right of the XXXIIIrd Corps the 20th Division drove south through and round Monywa to the Irrawaddy east of the Chindwin confluence, arriving there by 1st February.

By this date the 7th Division, headed still by an East African brigade, had advanced south, almost unnoticed, through Gangaw and reached Pauk on the track 20 miles west of Pakokku. Behind it the engineers bulldozed and graded the track into shape for the armour and the highly mechanized 17th Division to come up

⁶ The N.C.A.C. operations were not going to be affected by the change of plan, so there was no need to tell General Sultan.

ready to break through to Meiktila the moment the 7th Division established the bridgehead.

By the end of the first week in February the Fourteenth Army was deployed along the Irrawaddy from near Nyaungu to the Kyaukmyaung bridgehead of the 19th Division, some 50 miles north of Mandalay.

On the right the 7th Division, and the 20th Division of the XXXIIIrd Corps on its left, were perfecting their plans to cross the river; in the centre the 2nd Division, drawing as much attention to itself as possible, was pushing into the angle of the Irrawaddy west of Mandalay, where the railway had, in better times, crossed the river by the Ava bridge; on the left the 19th Division was fighting hard to maintain and expand its bridgeheads against fierce counter-attacks. General Slim, visiting each of the forward divisions in turn, was waiting for the correct moment to start the assault crossings.

In Arakan, Lieut.-General Sir Philip Christison's XVth Corps was fighting its fiercest action of the third Arakan campaign at Kangaw, on the mainland north-east of Ramree Island, where a regiment of Japanese fought to the death to prevent the cutting of the northern of the two tracks between south Arakan and the Irrawaddy, by way of the An Pass. There was, after this, still much fighting to be done in Arakan before the XVth Corps was to be able to withdraw the bulk of its troops and prepare the seaborne assault on Rangoon, but Kangaw broke the back of the Japanese resistance in south Arakan.

In north Burma, N.C.A.C. forces were pushing south on a broad front towards Lashio to link up with Chinese Yunnan forces. Its right hand division (36th) was fighting to establish a bridgehead across the Shweli river at Myitson, 100 miles N.N.E. of Mandalay.

General Kimura was assembling the bulk of his armies to dispute the crossings of the Irrawaddy, and had five and two-thirds divisions, including one of the 'Indian National Army', deployed facing the Fourteenth Army. At the same time reserves were being moved into position for counter-attack.

Unfortunately for Kimura, Pakokku, close to which the main Fourteenth Army blow was to fall, marked the junction point of his 15th and 28th Armies.

THE CROSSINGS OF THE IRRAWADDY

The problems facing the 7th and 20th Divisions were very different. The 7th Division's crossing place was fixed by the need for immediate access to the roads leading to Meiktila, while speed in establishing the bridgehead and passing a division through it with a strong armoured component was essential to the plan for a surprise assault on Meiktila. Everything had to be planned in minute detail, and corps and divisional planning teams worked on it for weeks. Deception plans at army level aimed at concealing the fact that there was to be a serious crossing at all; at corps level deception aimed at indicating an advance down the west bank of the Irrawaddy towards Yenangyaung; at divisional level feints were to be made on both flanks some 10 to 12 miles distant from the main crossing at Nyaungu.

The selection of the 20th Division point of crossing was left to the discretion of the divisional commander anywhere on a front of some 30 miles eastwards from the Chindwin confluence. His task was to get across and by threatening to outflank Mandalay from the south attract the Japanese reserves, which it was hoped would be used to oppose what would seem to Kimura to be the right pincer of the advance

on Mandalay, and hold them while the 7th Division established its bridgehead and the 17th went through and captured Meiktila.

Each of these crossings is a study in itself and to describe them would take many pages. Both achieved surprise, both required considerable extemporization as equipment was inadequate, and many of the assault boats and the already too few outboard motors had suffered much damage on the long overland carry to the crossing sites. A limited number of Bailey rafts were available for ferrying tanks and vehicles.

On instructions from General Slim the 20th Division began its crossing on the night of 12th/13th February. The leading battalion at the main crossing got across without opposition: the subsidiary crossing ran into opposition at once, but went forward in spite of it and drew the enemy's attention to itself while the main crossing, made just to the west of Myinmu⁷, was firmly established. The enemy's reaction was quick and violent, the fighting in the Myinmu Bridgehead being some of the fiercest of the whole campaign. The bulk of the enemy's reserve was not only pinned down but much of it was destroyed.

The following night the 7th Division crossing began. Here, at the main crossing a little to the east of Nyaungu, the leading battalion was driven back with considerable loss, but the follow up battalion, although it started in broad daylight, got across almost unscathed under heavy artillery and air bombardments. By evening a whole brigade was across and was mopping up; by the 15th evening the main and subsidiary crossings had made contact and a bridgehead four miles wide and two deep was established. The enemy still held out at Pakokku between the 7th and 20th Divisions' crossing places, but it was not until the 17th that any serious effort was made to attack the 7th Division bridgehead, by which time it was too late as the 17th Division was streaming across the river⁸. After that events moved so fast that the Japanese, by now heavily involved with 20th Division, were unable to take effective action to check the 17th Division's advance.

THE BREAK THROUGH TO MEIKTILA

It was on 21st February that the armoured spearhead of the 17th Division emerged from the Nyaungu bridgehead. Five days later it burst on to the Thabutkon airfield only 13 miles from Meiktila and some 70 miles from its starting point at Nyaungu. Within a few hours the air transportable 99th Brigade began to arrive on the airfield while the rest of the Division struck at Meiktila.


The 26th February must have been a black day for General Katamura, commanding the Japanese 15th Army. Not only had the 17th Division swept aside all opposition, inflicting many hundreds of casualties and destroying his precious dumps of supplies and ammunition along the Nyaungu-Meiktila road, but he would have learned by now that the 2nd Division had effected a crossing a few miles east of the 20th Division bridgehead. He had nothing left with which to check it, as his battered reserves were by now being driven south-east as the 20th Division exploited eastwards to link up with the 2nd Division.

⁷ Myinmu is on the Irrawaddy west of Mandalay at the point where the railway to Monywa begins to diverge from the river.

⁸ The 17th Division was less its air transportable 99th Brigade, but plus the 255th Tank Brigade less one regiment, and an armoured car regiment. The tank regiments were equipped with Sherman tanks and were supported by a motorized infantry regiment and a battery of Priest guns.

Even this was not the full measure of his misfortunes for on this same day, 26th February, on his extreme right flank the 19th Division broke out from its bridgeheads and began its drive south on Mandalay. Seldom has any general inflicted on his opponent such a bewildering succession of perfectly timed blows as did General Slim on the Japanese 15th Army between the 12th and 26th February.

By 1st March, Meiktila had been surrounded and by 3rd March its garrison of about 3,500 had been destroyed. The air transported brigade of the 5th Division



was flown in and, thus reinforced, the 17th Division dug itself in and prepared to beat off the inevitable counter-attack.

THE CAPTURE OF Mandalay

While the 2nd Division moved east to establish a cordon south of Mandalay and the 20th Division struck south-east to link up with the IVth Corps in the Meiktila area, the 19th Division was rapidly approaching Mandalay from the north, clearing enemy delaying forces in a series of hard fought actions in the groups of barren, waterless hills that lie to the north of the city. So fast was the advance that a motorized column with an armoured component, known as 'Stiletto Force,' whose task was to outflank and get behind the Japanese rearguards, actually got into one of their layback positions ahead of the troops withdrawing to occupy it!

By 8th March the forward elements of the 19th Division were on the northern outskirts of Mandalay. The Japanese withdrew inside the moated, 15-foot thick walls of Fort Dufferin and having been exhorted to die gloriously proceeded to do so. The 19th Division's siege of Fort Dufferin was carried out by two brigades while the third moved through the hills and seized Maymyo, scattering the surprised garrison, linked up with the 36th Division of N.C.A.C., and then turned back to Mandalay in time to join in the final assault. On 20th March, Fort Dufferin fell, the remnants of the garrison slipping away through the underground sewers. Few could have escaped, for by then a brigade of the 19th Division from the east had linked up with the 2nd Division to the south of the city, cutting all the escape routes to the south and south-east.

THE FOURTEENTH ARMY REGROUPS

While the XXXIIIrd Corps was closing in on Mandalay, the Japanese had been attacking Meiktila with all the forces they could concentrate in a desperate effort to reopen their line of communication to Mandalay. Headquarters of the 33rd Japanese Army, freed of its original task of opposing N.C.A.C. and the Chinese Yunnan forces by the removal of the bulk of those forces to China at the request of Chiang Kai Shek, took over control of the counter-offensive against Meiktila with the Japanese 18th Division from north-east Burma, the 49th Division less one regiment from south Burma, and elements of the 2nd and 31st Divisions already in the area, under its command. By the time Mandalay fell the counter-offensive had lost all its momentum. The attackers made a last effort to prevent the road from Meiktila back to the Nyaungu bridgehead being reopened, but on 31st March, the 5th Division, less the brigade which had earlier been flown in, reached Meiktila, and the IVth Corps was ready to strike south to Rangoon.

At this stage the IVth Corps was deployed with the 7th Division in the Nyaungu bridgehead and west of the Irrawaddy, where a brigade group was heavily engaged with a strong force anxious to prevent the cutting of the track from An to the Irrawaddy, along which elements of the Japanese 54th Division, driven out of Arakan by the XVth Corps, were retiring. Its brigades east of the Irrawaddy were poised ready to capture the Yenangyaung oilfields. The 5th and 17th Divisions were concentrated in Meiktila, the latter just about to advance south against strong enemy positions at Pyawbwe where the road and railway converge, some 25 miles south-east of Meiktila.

To the north of the IVth Corps the three divisions of the XXXIIIrd Corps were disposed thus: the 19th Division in and south of Mandalay, the 2nd Division south-west of Mandalay, the 20th Division north of Meiktila. The 36th Division was about to relieve the 19th in Mandalay and pass from the command of N.C.A.C. to the Fourteenth Army.

General Slim's plan was now to split the Japanese armies by driving two wedges right through to the Irrawaddy delta; one down the Irrawaddy and one down the Rangoon road. Having taken Rangoon and thus ensured an adequate supply line by sea he could then destroy the disrupted Japanese armies piecemeal.

The highly mechanized IVth Corps, with two divisions concentrated in Meiktila, was ordered to drive south at once down the Rangoon road and the 19th Division was switched to it from the XXXIIIrd Corps as a follow-up division as soon as it was relieved in Mandalay. In exchange, the XXXIIIrd Corps, which was to clear the Irrawaddy valley and advance on Rangoon via Prome, took over the 7th Division. The 20th Division, having disengaged from its area immediately north of Meiktila, was then to move up on the left of the 7th Division, and the XXXIIIrd Corps was to drive south astride the Irrawaddy.

The two British Divisions, 2nd and 36th, were to carry out a second mopping-up of the triangle Mandalay-Meiktila-Kyaukpadaung and then be flown out to India to train for future operations. Apart from the need to train forces for amphibious operations against Malaya, it will be remembered that earlier it was pointed out that once the Fourteenth Army began to advance south from the Pakokku-Mandalay line it would have to be reduced in size owing to maintenance difficulties.

Again, as in the case of the December plan and regrouping, the main point to note is the simplicity of it all: and yet to the Japanese intelligence staff it must have presented a problem not unlike that confronting the gambler trying to 'spot the lady' with the cards in the hands of an expert.

THE DECISION TO ATTACK RANGOON BY SEA

During the last days of March, General Leese began to have doubts whether the Fourteenth Army could reach Rangoon before the monsoon, when the flooding of the lower Sittang valley and the Irrawaddy delta might cause fatal delay. To mount a seaborne attack on Rangoon would mean putting back operations against the coast of Malaya, which was undesirable, and yet if the Fourteenth Army was to stay in south Burma it must be in possession of a sea port for reasons already given.

The operations of the XVth Corps had already been cut down to a minimum, because there were not sufficient aircraft to supply its advance from Arakan into south Burma across the mountains and at the same time supply the needs of the Fourteenth Army in its drive south, so troops of the XVth Corps were available. Even so, time was short, because the idea of a seaborne assault on Rangoon had been dropped and planning had to start from scratch.

The necessity for a seaborne assault was accepted, and it was timed for the first week in May. The Navy accepted the risk of putting troops ashore with the monsoon about to break, and orders were issued for an attack by a division preceded by a parachute landing at the mouth of the Rangoon river to destroy the powerful shore battery commanding the estuary.

In order that adequate air cover could be given to the operation the Fourteenth Army was ordered to capture the Toungoo airfields by 25th April.

The last vital decision of the Burma campaign had been made. Everything went according to plan, including the leading troops of the Fourteenth Army, much to their mortification, being held up by flood almost within sight of Rangoon on 2nd May. The amphibious assault of the XVth Corps forestalled the monsoon by a few hours. Its parachute battalion landed just before the torrential rains descended and mopped up the battery after a short sharp fight—the only one of the operation, for Kimura had moved his headquarters to Moulmein and sent the garrison to fight at Pegu.

Space does not permit of a description of the advance of the IVth and XXXIIIrd Corps. The former had its last really big fight at Pyawbwe which it surrounded and attacked from all sides, nearly 3,000 Japanese dead and 44 guns being left on the battlefields.

On the Irrawaddy front the 7th Division fought its way down the west bank against stubborn opposition in mountainous jungle country; the 20th Division thrust south at speed through the dry and dusty plains of the east bank, keeping pace with the IVth Corps on the other side of the tangled mountain mass of the Pegu Yomas. It reached Prome in time to hold up the Japanese 54th Division, retiring from Arakan along the track from Taungup, and also the forces being driven south by the 7th Division, enabling that division to catch up with and destroy a large part of both forces in actions round Kama.

The advance of the IVth Corps after Pyawbwe was made with the 5th and 17th Divisions leapfrogging through each other. Within divisions, brigades did the same, always with a spearhead of armour followed by the leading brigade in battalion groups, each with a small detachment of tanks, mopping up parties of enemy bypassed or overrun by the leading troops. It is a fine example of the pursuit of a beaten enemy. The IVth Corps covered the 290 miles from Pyawbwe, where the pursuit began, to Hlegu, 32 miles north of Rangoon, where it ended, in 22 days although opposed by an enemy who was trying to fight back the whole time.

By 6th May, as a result of the link up of the IVth Corps with the advanced troops of the XVth Corps moving north from Rangoon, the Japanese 28th Army, together with the military and naval garrisons from south Arakan and the delta, were trapped in the Pegu Yomas where they had taken refuge. The remnants of the 15th and 33rd Armies had been driven across the Sittang into the Shan Hills where they were trying to rally with a view to harassing the Fourteenth Army's left flank along the roads leading to Meiktila and Toungoo from the east, but were steadily pushed back by the 19th Division. Kimura, who had escaped with his headquarters to Moulmein, still hoped to stage an attack across the Sittang to extricate what was left of the 28th Army.

From May to July the IVth Corps cordon between Pegu and Toungoo was continually being 'tapped.' Occasionally parties got through, but from prisoners and captured documents the plans and exact date of the 28th Army's breakout became known, so that when on 20th July the attempt started it was already doomed to fail. Of the 16,000 who took part in the breakout all but 5,000 perished. In torrential rain interspersed with periods of intense damp heat, in rice fields waist deep in water, this grim final act of the Burma campaign was played out to the bitter end. The 33rd Army east of the river made repeated attempts to drive a corridor westwards to help their 28th Army comrades. There was never any thought of surrender and the few hundred prisoners taken were mostly wounded or desperately ill.

It was nearly a month after 'VJ' Day, 15th August, before the troops of General Kimura's Burma Area Army laid down their arms. The majority knew the war was over and stopped fighting, but would not surrender until they had received orders signed by their Commander-in-Chief, often delivered by emissaries escorted by us through our forward defended areas!

All that was left of the 250,000 strong Burma Area Army of May, 1944, was, by May, 1945, assessed at just over 50,000.

PRECEDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT AND CORPS

By MAJOR T. J. EDWARDS, M.B.E., F.R.Hist.S.

IT was stated at the end of the article entitled *Precedence of Regiments and Corps* in the February, 1956, issue of this JOURNAL that to trace the present precedence of the Administrative Corps would have occupied too much space in that article. Therefore, to complete the history of the precedence of *all* regiments and corps the present article has been written.

In view of the fact that from the earliest times the personnel of the Army had to be fed, clothed, armed, and receive medical attention whenever it was formed for active operations, the elements of some of the present day corps existed long before the Standing Army was established in 1661. When wars became almost perpetual, mainly owing to treaty commitments and revolutions or the threat of them at home, these loose, temporary, war-time elements began to take on a permanent shape. Hence the 'Clerk of the Ordnance' of the XVth Century, which evolved into the Board of Ordnance, may be regarded as the ancient forerunner of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps: and similarly, the Commissary-General of pre-Restoration days performed duties much like those later carried out by the Royal Army Service Corps. The Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps grew out of the experience of the Crimean War, 1854-56, but its forerunners, though unorganized and unqualified, were the soldiers' wives of centuries before.

Although the precedence tables appeared in official Regulations, either King's or Queen's, regularly from 1804 onwards, it was not until 1868 that the Departmental Corps are first mentioned therein, where they are placed below the Colonial Corps and above the Militia. But in 1881 they are placed above the Colonial Corps, where they remained in the 1883 Queen's Regulations. However, in 1885, they are once more placed below the Colonial Corps (represented by The West India Regiment and Royal Malta Fencible Artillery, now Royal Malta Artillery—*vide* Army Order 184 of 1889) and as a group this is where they have remained, although individual members of the group were given an independent position on becoming corps.

This achievement of corps status seems to have resulted in a certain amount of confusion. The first Army Service Corps was formed in 1870 and consisted of other ranks only, being commanded by officers of the Supply and Transport Sub-Department of the Control Department. Although this was the first A.S.C. its forerunners were, successively, the Corps of Waggoners (1794), Royal Wagon Train (1796-1833), Ambulance Corps (1854), Land Transport Corps (1855), and Military Train (1856-1870). This 1870 A.S.C. had two branches, viz., The Commissariat and Transport Branch and The Ordnance Store Branch, each of which became independent corps in 1881, being commanded by officers of the relevant Department.

In 1889, however, the officers of the Commissariat and Transport Staff were amalgamated with the other ranks of the Commissariat and Transport Corps to form the second Army Service Corps, under Army Order 3 of that year. It was then given an independent position in the precedence table in Queen's Regulations 1889, where it is placed, oddly enough, between two Colonial Corps, viz, below The West India Regiment and above the Royal Malta Artillery, the group designated 'Departmental Corps' being below the Royal Malta Artillery.

The Royal Army Medical Corps was formed in 1898 by amalgamating the Army Medical Staff (officers) with the Medical Staff Corps (other ranks) under Army Order 93

of that year, and in the precedence table in Q.R. 1898 it is placed immediately after the A.S.C.

The Royal Army Veterinary Corps was also formed by linking the separate organizations for officers and men (A.O. 48 of 1906) and in the precedence table of 1908 it is placed next below the R.A.M.C. The Royal Army Ordnance Corps was formed by a similar process (A.O. 363 of 1918), but in the precedence table of 1923 it is placed immediately above the R.A.V.C., no doubt by reason of the Ordnance Store Corps having been formed in 1881, whereas the A.V.C. was not formed until 1903 (A.O. 180 of 1903).

In K.R. 1923, all of the Administrative Corps are allocated to independent positions in the precedence table and as a consequence there is no group designated 'Departmental Corps' in that and subsequent editions of King's and Queen's Regulations. How they stood in K.R. 1923, in relation to Colonial Corps, is shown below, and the placing does not seem to follow any clearly defined principle, in view of their being 'mixed up with' Colonial Corps, and bears little resemblance to their present positions, due to complete segregation from the Colonial Corps and the formation of new corps.

West India Regiment.
Royal Army Service Corps.
Royal Army Medical Corps.
Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
Royal Army Veterinary Corps.
Army Educational Corps.
Royal Malta Artillery.
West African Regiment.
Royal Army Chaplains' Department.
Royal Army Pay Corps.
Corps of Military Accountants.
Army Dental Corps.
Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service.

To obtain a correct appreciation of the present position of these corps a certain amount of their earlier history must be stated, but only so much will be given to make the point clear. They will be dealt with as they stand in the present table.

ROYAL ARMY CHAPLAINS' DEPARTMENT

This is the only Department that still remains in the Army because all of its personnel are of officer status. If it had other ranks they would be formed into a corps.

Chaplains were on the establishment of all armies that went to war and some of them recorded their experiences in published memoirs, which have been found most useful in filling the gaps left by historians. One prelate that gained notoriety in the early days of the Standing Army was Bishop Mew, who commanded James II's artillery at the Battle of Sedgemoor on 6th July, 1685, during the rebellion led by the Duke of Monmouth. Mew had received military training in his youth and the King recalled him to these duties for this campaign.

Up to 1796 chaplains were on a regimental basis, a system that proved to be very unsatisfactory, owing to the "nearly universal want of personal attendance . . . and of care in providing proper deputies . . . as well as the difficulty of finding clergymen to attend corps serving abroad, upon such a stipend as is usually stopped from the pay of Chaplains for that purpose." (Extract from the Royal Warrant of 23rd September, 1796.) To remedy this situation it was stated in that warrant "that

whenever an army is formed, or a body of troops ordered to be assembled for service abroad, and in all Garrisons and Stations where several Regiments are near together, Chaplains shall be appointed according to the number of the Corps, in the proportion of one to each Brigade, or to every three or four Regiments, which Chaplains shall receive Ten Shillings per diem, each, during the time of their actual continuance on foreign service, whether in the Field or in Garrison. . . . For every Barrack in the British Dominions a neighbouring clergyman is to be employed as a curate to perform Divine Service every Sunday, and to be paid Twenty-five pounds per annum. . . . Lastly, We do hereby subject all Regular Chaplains, desiring to be continued in Our Service, to the Orders of the Person whom We shall hereafter appoint to be Chaplain-General of Our Army, and who is to govern himself by such Instructions as We shall from time to time think fit to give him through Our Secretary at War."

This warrant, therefore, established the Chaplains' Department, with the Chaplain-General at its head, and has been in continuous existence since 1796, and it abolished the former system of regimental chaplains. It is this unbroken continuity of existence that gives the Royal Army Chaplains' Department its right to be at the head of the Administrative Department and Corps.

It must have taken the new system quite a few years to become effective, for 15 years after its introduction we find Wellington, half-way through the Peninsular War, writing from Cartaxo on 6th February, 1811, to General Calvert at the Horse Guards, complaining about the terms under which chaplains were employed, and making suggestions for their improvement. "My reason for making these suggestions," he wrote, "is that really we do not get respectable men for the Service. I have one excellent young man in this army, Mr. Briscall, who is attached to Headquarters, who has never been one moment absent from his duty, but I have not yet seen another who has not applied and made a pitiable case for leave of absence immediately after his arrival; and, excepting Mr. Denis at Lisbon, who was absent all last year, I believe Mr. Briscall is the only Chaplain doing duty. . . . I am very anxious upon this subject, not only from the desire which every man must have, that so many persons as there are in this army should have the advantage of religious instruction, but from a knowledge that it is the greatest support and aid to military discipline and order."

On receipt of Wellington's letter General Calvert got very busy to find the kind of clergymen required for the rough work on active service in the Peninsula. He was not too successful in this for some went out direct from comfortable curacies and quite ignorant of the facts of life and death in their crudest form day after day. However, some of them were a source of amusement occasionally, as in the case of a young chaplain who, when taking his first drum-head service, thought that the big drum, which had been placed as a central mark, was to do duty as a stand, so he promptly put his foot through the upturned head, to his own consternation and the merriment of his congregation.

THE CONTROL DEPARTMENT

As there must be several references to The Control Department, its introduction, organization, etc., it will be briefly explained here to avoid repetition later, and it is hoped that reference to the table at the end of this article will be of some assistance.

It was established in 1870 under a Royal Warrant of 12th November, 1869, "with a view to consolidating the Supply and Transport Services of Our Army, and of introducing a more effectual control over military expenditure, that the various Departments now dealing with those services be consolidated into one Department,

to be entitled The Control Department, solely responsible for the proper performance of all duties connected with Supply and Transport." It was organized into two executive sub-departments, viz., The Supply and Transport Sub-Department and The Pay Sub-Department. The first Army Service Corps was formed under a warrant of the same date.

The Control Department absorbed the Commissariat Department (formed 1858), the Purveyors' Department (formed 1853), the Military Store Department (1861), and the officers of the Military Train (1856) and Barrack Department (1866); in fact, its personnel were all officers on the military side. All of the other ranks of the Commissariat Staff Corps (1859), the Military Train, Barrack Department, and the Military Store Staff Corps (1865) were gathered into the A.S.C.

Under a Royal Warrant of 27th November, 1875, the Control Department was abolished and the Supply and Transport Sub-Department was re-organized into two separate Departments, viz., The Commissariat and Transport Department, and The Ordnance Store Department. Two years later the A.S.C. was re-organized into two branches, to correspond with these departments, viz., the C. & T. Branch and the O.S. Branch.

In 1880 the C. & T. Department was re-designated the Commissariat and Transport Staff, under a Royal Warrant of 31st January, of that year, and in the following year the C. & T. Branch became the Commissariat and Transport Corps and the O.S. Branch became the Ordnance Store Corps, by Royal Warrant of 11th August, 1881, thus abolishing the first A.S.C.

As will be seen later, under their respective headings, these two corps (other ranks) were eventually amalgamated with the officers of the corresponding organizations to become the Royal Army Service Corps and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS

Mention has already been made of the various corps which were the forerunners of the first Army Service Corps, and its pedigree has been traced down to the formation of the Commissariat and Transport Staff (officers) and the Commissariat and Transport Corps (other ranks) in 1880 and 1881, respectively. The C. & T. Staff and the C. & T. Corps were amalgamated in 1889 by Royal Warrant of 11th December, 1888 (A.O. 3 of 1889), to form the second Army Service Corps, which was granted the title 'Royal' under A.O. 362 of 1918.

This was the first of the Administrative Corps to be formed by amalgamating the officers and other ranks, which entitles it to its present precedence. It also illustrates that King William's rules appear to have been applied to corps other than cavalry and infantry.

ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS

Without going back any further than the Crimean War (1854-56), perhaps the earliest element of the R.A.M.C. will be found in the re-establishment of the rank of apothecary by a Royal Warrant of 23rd October, 1854. A Royal Warrant of the following year, dated 11th June, 1855, brought into being the Medical Staff Corps, "to consist of nine companies, each of which is calculated for attendance in a hospital for 500 patients." Each company was divided into two departments, viz, the purveyor's and the surgeon's. The purveyor's consisted of a steward and four assistant-stewards (ranking as sergeant-major and sergeant respectively), six issuers (privates), two washermen (corporals), one cook (sergeant), and three assistant-cooks

(privates). The surgeon's department consisted of a wardmaster (colour-sergeant), eight assistant-wardmasters (corporals), two barbers (privates), and 50 orderlies (privates). The purveyor was appointed paymaster of the Corps and its general management was allocated to an officer at the Depot, whose duties corresponded to those of an adjutant and quartermaster of a regiment.

It is well-known that the medical arrangements of the Army during the Crimean War came under searching review soon after the cessation of hostilities, the result of which was expressed in the opening words of a Royal Warrant of 1st August, 1857, thus :—"Whereas we have deemed it necessary to constitute a new Corps of Attendants at Our Military Hospitals, for the better care of the sick and wounded soldiers of Our Army; Our Will and Pleasure is that a Corps shall be forthwith raised for this purpose, which shall be called the Army Hospital Corps. . . . The Army Hospital Corps is to consist of the following ranks :—Sergeant-Major, Company-Sergeant, Sergeant, and Private." The warrant details the duties of the A.H.C., how the personnel will be obtained, and other administrative items.

The next step in the evolution of the R.A.M.C. was the establishment of the Army Medical Department under a Royal Warrant of 1st March, 1873. The relative ranks of the officers of the A.M.D. ranged from surgeon-general as brigadier-general down to surgeon as lieutenant. This warrant did not change the system of promotion of the medical officers of Household troops.

Under another Royal Warrant of 1st March, 1873, officers were appointed to the Army Hospital Corps with the ranks of captain of orderlies and lieutenant of orderlies. The warrant gave instructions, *inter alia*, on matters of discipline and command, and stated :—"The officers and n.c.o.'s of Our Army Hospital Corps shall have authority to command not only the men of their own Corps but also patients in Military Hospitals, and such n.c.o.'s and men as may be attached thereto, without their own officers, for hospital duty." Apothecaries could volunteer to become officers in the A.H.C.

Officers and men were brought nearer together in 1884, by a Royal Warrant of 20th September of that year, under which the officers of the Army Medical Department were formed into the Army Medical Staff and the Army Hospital Corps was re-designated the Medical Staff Corps. The complete fusion of the organizations of officers and other ranks did not take place until 14 years later, when, under Army Order 93 of 1898, the Army Medical Staff and the Medical Staff Corps were amalgamated to form the present Royal Army Medical Corps.

ROYAL ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS

Next to the R.A.M.C. is the R.A.O.C. in the precedence table. Elements of this Corps may be found in the Corps of Armourer-Sergeants formed by Royal Warrant of 24th June, 1858, for establishing "a more perfect system of obtaining duly qualified Armourer-Sergeants for service in Regiments, Battalions, and Corps of Our Regular Army and Regiments of Embodied Militia." In 1895, as the Corps of Armourers, it was incorporated into the Ordnance Store Corps, under Army Order 96 of that year.

A Military Store Department was formed under a Royal Warrant of 23rd April, 1861, which was absorbed by the Control Department in 1870 'see above under 'Control Department'). A Military Store Staff Corps was formed under a Royal Warrant of 18th November, 1865, which went into the first Army Service Corps in 1870 also.

As already shown, the Control Department was abolished in 1875 and in its

place two departments were formed, viz, the Commissariat and Transport Department and the Ordnance Store Department, and that two years later the first A.S.C. was re-organized into two corresponding branches, viz, the C. & T. Branch and the O.S. Branch. In 1881 the O.S. Branch became the Ordnance Store Corps, under a Royal Warrant of 11th August of that year.

In a Royal Warrant of 16th June, 1896, it was stated that it was "expedient to re-arrange and re-organize the Ordnance Services of Our Army", and "that a general Department for Army Ordnance Services be established to be designated the Army Ordnance Department; that Our Ordnance Store Corps shall be designated the Army Ordnance Corps." Thus the officers and other ranks of army ordnance were brought a stage nearer together.

Under General Order 225 of 1st August, 1882, a Corps of Ordnance Artificers had been established to provide qualified artificers for the repair of War Department material, particularly that of the Garrison Artillery and the Siege Train. This Corps was abolished in 1893 by A.O. 89 of that year, and its personnel transferred to the Royal Artillery as 'armament artificers, R.A.'. But this title had a very brief existence, for under the abovementioned Royal Warrant of 16th June, 1896, the armament artificers, R.A. were absorbed by the new Army Ordnance Corps.

The final welding of the officers of the Department and the other ranks of the Corps did not come until 1918, under A.O. 363 of that year, which also stated "that in recognition of the splendid work which it has performed during the present war, Our Army Ordnance Corps shall be styled Our Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and shall take precedence in Our Army immediately before Our Royal Army Veterinary Corps."

In K.R. 1908 the A.V.C. followed the R.A.M.C.: and the Army Ordnance Department and the Army Ordnance Corps were still grouped under 'Departmental Corps' and following the Colonial Corps. A.O. 363 of 1918, however, gave the R.A.O.C. precedence above the R.A.V.C., i.e. next below the R.A.M.C. where it has since remained.

CORPS OF ROYAL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS

The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers were formed under A.O. 70 of 1942 and were given precedence next below the R.A.O.C. Here we see the 'rule of inheritance' in operation, i.e., the offspring following immediately after the parent, as was the case of the Royal Signals following the Royal Engineers, who 'gave birth' to it. (See page 68 of the previous article). When the R.E.M.E. was formed a considerable number of R.A.O.C. personnel was transferred to it. Some personnel also came from the R.E. and R.A.S.C. but not in such numbers as from the R.A.O.C., hence the R.E.M.E.'s position in the precedence table.

Under A.O. 148 of 1949 its full designation was changed to its present form—Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

CORPS OF ROYAL MILITARY POLICE

In 1855, some non-commissioned officers of cavalry regiments were employed on mounted police duties, but this number was substantially increased during the next 20 years, which led to the formation of the Military Mounted Police. The Military Foot Police were formed in 1885, and in 1926 the mounted and foot elements were amalgamated to form the Corps of Military Police, being granted 'Royal' under A.O. 167 of 1946.

The C.M.P. did not appear in the precedence tables until after the late war, when it was placed in its present position, no doubt by reason of its formations in the latter half of the last century.

ROYAL ARMY PAY CORPS

As already seen, there was a pay sub-department of the Control Department when it was formed in 1870. In 1877 the pay sub-department became the Army Pay Department, under a Royal Warrant of 22nd October, of that year, which also abolished the hitherto system of regimental and corps paymasters. Officers of the pay sub-department were eligible for appointment to the new Army Pay Department.

Paragraph 11 of the warrant stated that "Officers who may be appointed to the Army Pay Department from Our Regular Forces shall resign their commissions as combatant officers upon receiving commissions in the Department."

The ranks of officers of the A.P.D. were staff paymaster and paymaster, their honorary rank being, respectively, major and captain. Under a Royal Warrant of 25th December, 1880, a chief paymaster was added, with the honorary and relative rank of lieutenant-colonel.

The opening words of Army Order 86 of 1905, publishing a Royal Warrant of 28th April, 1905, are—"Whereas We deem it expedient to rearrange and consolidate the accounting and pay services of Our Army and to provide for the performance locally in Commands of certain financial duties performed hitherto in the War Office Our Will and Pleasure is that a Department for the above-named services shall be established and be designated the Army Accounts Department" and "that no further appointments be made to the Army Pay Department." The Army Accounts Department was, however, short lived, for by Royal Warrant of 26th October, 1909 (A.O. 294 of 1909), the warrant of 28th April, 1905, was cancelled and the Army Pay Department re-instituted.

Not only had the officers of the pay service been subjected to organization and re-organization, but the soldiers employed as clerks in pay offices had been gathered together into a corps under a Royal Warrant of 19th July, 1893 (A.O. 134 of 1893), designated the Army Pay Corps.

By A.O. 146 of 1920 both the Army Pay Department and the Army Pay Corps were made 'Royal,' and under Army Order 498 of 1920 the Department and the Corps were amalgamated to form the present Royal Army Pay Corps.

The R.A.P.C. is first mentioned separately in the precedence table in K.R. 1923 where it is placed after the Colonial Corps and the Royal Army Chaplains' Department. Here it remained until about 1930 when it was elevated to follow the R.A.O.C. and above the R.A.V.C., to which it had previously been junior. After the late war the Corps of Royal Military Police was placed immediately above it, and that is the position today.

CORPS OF MILITARY ACCOUNTANTS

The Corps of Military Accountants was formed by Royal Warrant of 19th November, 1919 (A.O. 405/1919) and took precedence next below the R.A.P.C. It had a brief existence, being disbanded in 1927 under Army Order 137 of that year.

ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS

There were veterinary surgeons in the Army before 1859, but in that year they were accorded relative military ranks under a Royal Warrant of 1st July. Similarly

a number of non-commissioned officers and men were employed on army veterinary services before 1903, but it was not until the signing of a Royal Warrant of 5th October, of that year that they were all brought together into one Corps, called the Army Veterinary Corps (A.O. 180/1903).

Under a Royal Warrant of 15th February, 1906 (A.O. 48/1906) the colonels of the Army Veterinary Department were designated the Army Veterinary Staff, and the officers below that rank were amalgamated with the Army Veterinary Corps. The honour title of 'Royal' was granted to the Corps in Army Order 362 of 1918.

As already shown at the commencement of this article, the A.V.C. was placed next below the R.A.M.C. in the K.R. 1908 precedence table, but since then the R.A.O.C., R.E.M.E., Royal Military Police, and R.A.P.C. have been placed above it, for reasons that have been given.

SMALL ARMS SCHOOL CORPS

A School of Musketry was formed in 1854 and this became the Small Arms School, Hythe, in 1919. In 1926 it was amalgamated with the Machine Gun School, Netheravon, and in 1929 the amalgamated schools were formed into a Corps and designated the Small Arms School Corps.

It would seem that by reason of the School of Musketry having been formed in 1854 the Corps was given precedence next below the R.A.V.C.

MILITARY PROVOST STAFF CORPS

The Military Prison Staff Corps was formed under Army Order 241 of 1901 being re-designated Military Provost Staff Corps in 1906. It did not appear in the precedence tables until after the late war.

ROYAL ARMY EDUCATIONAL CORPS

Elements of a system of army education can be traced to the XVIIIth Century and in the next century, under a Royal Warrant of 31st May, 1854, schoolmasters were graded as 1st, 2nd, or 3rd Class, and assistant. Army education was put on a firmer basis with the formation of the Corps of Army Schoolmasters in 1881. The Army Educational Corps was established by Army Order 231 of 1920, and the Corps of Army Schoolmasters was disbanded by the same Order. The A.E.C. was granted 'Royal' by Army Order 167 of 1946.

The A.E.C. first appeared in the precedence tables in K.R. 1923, where it follows immediately after the R.A.V.C. Since the late war the Small Arms School Corps and the Military Provost Staff Corps have been inserted between the R.A.V.C. and the R.A.E.C.

ROYAL ARMY DENTAL CORPS.

Dental Officers had been on the establishment of medical units long before the publication of Army Order 4 of 1921, which authorized the formation of the Army Dental Corps. Being the most recently formed of the Departmental Corps, and therefore junior of the group, it is placed in that position, below the Corps of Military Accountants, in K.R. 1923. Under Army Order 167 of 1946 it was granted 'Royal.'

The R.A.D.C. was the last of the Departmental Corps to be formed before the outbreak of the 1939-45 War in September, 1939.

CORPS FORMED SINCE SEPTEMBER, 1939

The history of the Administrative Corps formed since 1939, not having 'grown out of' departments, is more straightforward than that of the senior corps in the

group, although, as will be seen from the following brief notes, elements of some of them existed before 1939. They are listed in their present order of precedence, which corresponds to their date of formation and therefore conforms to William III's rules.

ROYAL PIONEER CORPS

There was a Labour Corps in the 1914-18 War, whose existence then might have prompted the raising of a somewhat similar corps, with greater responsibilities, for the late war.

By a Royal Warrant of 17th October, 1939 (A.O. 200/1939) the formation of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps was authorized. This cumbersome title did not last long, for under Army Order 200 of 1940 it was shortened to Pioneer Corps, the honour title 'Royal' being granted under Army Order 167 of 1946.

INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Before the outbreak of the late war there were Intelligence officers on various army staffs, but the Intelligence Corps was not formed until 1940, under a Royal Warrant of 15th July (A.O. 112/1940), and was given precedence therein next below the Pioneer Corps (then called the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps).

ARMY PHYSICAL TRAINING CORPS

This corps has its roots in the Army Physical Training Staff of the second half of the last century. The Corps was not formed, however, until 1940, under a Royal Warrant of 16th September (A.O. 165/1940). It was given precedence next below the Intelligence Corps.

ARMY CATERING CORPS

The Army School of Cookery at Aldershot had been in existence at least from the early days of the present century, but the Army Catering Corps, into which was gathered all unit cooks, was not formed until the publication of the Royal Warrant of 22nd March, 1941 (A.O. 35/1941). It was given precedence next below the Army Physical Training Corps.

GENERAL SERVICE CORPS

This corps was formed under a Royal Warrant of 13th February, 1942 (A.O. 19/1942), and was given precedence therein next below the Army Catering Corps.

HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES CORPS

This corps was formed under a Royal Warrant of 8th June, 1942 (A.O. 87/1942), as the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps, but this title was changed to African Pioneer Corps by Army Order 116 of 1944. A further change in designation took place in 1946 when it became the High Commission Territories Corps by Army Order 74 of that year.

Personnel for the Corps were recruited from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, and these names are incorporated into the corps badge according to the country to which the personnel belong.

In Army Order 87 of 1942, it was given precedence next below the Army Catering Corps and above the General Service Corps, but now it is placed below the General Service Corps.

QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S ROYAL ARMY NURSING CORPS

The first time a Women's Service was shown in the precedence tables was in K.R. 1923, where the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service is placed immediately after the Regular Corps and above the Militia. Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps was formed under a Royal Warrant of 31st January, 1949 (A.O. 5/1949), and was given precedence therein next below the General Service Corps.

WOMEN'S ROYAL ARMY CORPS

The Auxiliary Territorial Service (A.T.S.) was formed under a Royal Warrant of 9th September, 1938 (A.O. 199/1938), and in *The Army List* for January, 1939, it follows immediately after the Q.A.I.M.N.S. The A.T.S. was disbanded in November, 1954 (A.O. 128/1954). The Women's Royal Army Corps was formed by Royal Warrant of 31st January, 1949 (A.O. 6/1949), and was given precedence therein immediately after the Q.A.R.A.N.C.

GENERAL

To enable a comparison to be made between the 1923 position, as given earlier in this article, with the present precedence of the Administrative department and Corps, the current order is given below. It will be noted that the changes are due, mainly, to some corps being brought into the precedence table for the first time (Royal Military Police, Small Arms School Corps, and Military Provost Staff Corps) and others being formed since the outbreak of the late war.

Royal Army Chaplains' Department.
 Royal Army Service Corps.
 Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
 Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.
 Corps of Royal Military Police.
 Royal Army Pay Corps.
 Royal Army Veterinary Corps.
 Small Arms School Corps.
 Military Provost Staff Corps.
 Royal Army Educational Corps.
 Royal Army Dental Corps.
 Royal Pioneer Corps.
 Intelligence Corps.
 Army Physical Training Corps.
 Army Catering Corps.
 General Service Corps.
 High Commission Territories Corps.
 Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps.
 Women's Royal Army Corps.

* TABLE

Formation and abolition of the CONTROL DEPARTMENT and the evolution of some Corps connected with it. To be read in conjunction with the article.

Year of formation of Department, etc.	PRESENT-DAY CORPS CONCERNED		
	Royal Army Service Corps	Royal Army Ordnance Corps	Royal Army Pay Corps
1794	Corps of Waggoners		
1796	Royal Wagon Train		
1853	Purveyors' Dept.		
1854	Ambulance Corps		
1855	Land Transport Corps		
1856	Military Train		
1858	Commissariat Dept.	Corps of Armourer-Sergeants Military Store Dept. Military Store Staff Corps	
1859	Commissariat Staff Corps		
1861			
1865			
1866	Barrack Department		
1870	ARMY SERVICE CORPS <i>Absorbed the other ranks of :</i> Military Train Commissariat Staff Corps Military Store Staff Corps Barrack Dept.	CONTROL DEPARTMENT <i>Absorbed the officers of :</i> Military Train Commissariat Dept. Military Store Dept. Barrack Dept.	
		Supply and Transport Sub-Dept.	Pay Sub-Dept.
1875	Comm. & Trans. Dept.	Ordnance Store Dept.	Army Pay Dept.
1877	Comm. & Trans. Branch	Ordnance Store Branch	
1880	Comm. & Trans. Staff		
1881	Comm. & Trans. Corps	Ordnance Store Corps	
1882		Corps of Ordnance Artificers	
1889	ARMY SERVICE CORPS		
1893		Armament Artificers, R.A.	Army Pay Corps
1896		Army Ordnance Dept. Army Ordnance Corps	
1905			Army Accounts Dept.
1909			Army Pay Dept.
1918	Royal Army Service Corps	Royal Army Ordnance Corps	Royal Army Pay Corps
1920			

THE SIEGE OF JERUSALEM, A.D. 70

By MAJOR E. O'BALLANCE

JERUSALEM, since earliest times and throughout the ages, has been a focal point of strife and some of the fiercest battles in the history of warfare have been fought there. Perhaps the bitterest of these took place between the Romans and the Jews in A.D. 70.

DESCRIPTION OF JERUSALEM IN A.D. 70

Briefly, Jerusalem in A.D. 70 consisted of what today is the old city area, but enlarged and elongated southwards to include the Mount Zion feature.

Physically, it is situated on a flat projection from the high rocky plateau of central Judea, and was surrounded on three sides, the east, the south, and the west, by deep ravines. There are four peaks, or hills, on this portion of the plateau; one is the site of the Temple (now the Dome of the Rock); the second is a mound just to the south of the Temple and more properly part of the same ridge, then called Ophel, partly on and close to which was then the lower city; while the third height was that of Mount Zion, in the vicinity of which was the upper city. All these three points were enclosed by the city wall. Outside, and to the north, was the fourth hill, or range, the Mount of Olives.

After many vicissitudes the fortifications of the city were rebuilt and improved by King Herod I, who died in 4 B.C. and who constructed a stout fort to cover the Temple from the north, known as Antonia, which was occupied by troops of the garrison. He also commenced building the second wall as an extra shield from the vulnerable north. The third wall was commenced by King Agrippa I (A.D. 37-44) to protect the suburb of Bezetha, thus making three separate walls covering the city from that direction. The building of the latter wall was still partly incomplete in A.D. 70. The Temple was a walled strong point with its own system of fortification, and consisted of a number of walled courtyards, or cloisters, with the Temple building set in the centre of the innermost one. To the west was the palace of Herod, protected by three forts, or large bastions, named Hippicus, Phaesal, and Mariamme.

Figures vary considerably and are not too reliable, but the population of Jerusalem would, perhaps, be between 250,000 and 500,000. The normal garrison consisted of Royal troops of King Agrippa II, who were partly Roman and partly Jewish.

BACKGROUND TO REVOLT

After a period of Jewish independence, Rome achieved supremacy over Palestine in about 63 B.C., when the country was conquered by Pompey. Then followed over a century of alternate direct and indirect rule by Proconsul, vassal king, or by Procurator with a Jewish king nominally governing. In A.D. 66, Herod Agrippa II was the nominal ruler, while Gessius Flores, Procurator of Judea, wielded the real power.

The Sadducees, who were the aristocratic ruling class, co-operated with the Romans and thus monopolized all the higher positions, but they were very much out of touch with the majority of the people. The contrast between rich and poor was great and much of the countryside was in the hands of a few Jewish landlords who were protected and encouraged by the Romans. Consequently there was considerable ill-feeling between the upper and the lower classes. The country was

extremely poor and it had never recovered from the extensive building programme launched by King Herod I. Taxes were out of all proportion to the yield of the countryside.

Anti-Jewish feeling in the Roman Empire was started by the Emperor Tiberius, and in A.D. 19 all Jews were expelled from Rome. This mood quickly spread to Palestine and the taxes on Jews were increased and other restrictions were imposed. True, they were allowed religious freedom, but this was interpreted thoughtlessly, causing friction with the religious leaders and the distinct lack of sympathy between the Romans and the Jews seemed to outweigh the former's natural aptitude for administration.

Famine was a frequent spectre and armed bands of malcontents roamed the country, being harried from time to time by Roman soldiers. The poorer classes were seething with discontent and the upper classes were at loggerheads with their Roman masters. If ever a country was ripe for armed rebellion it was Palestine in A.D. 66. There had been several previous attempts to rebel, but they had been firmly suppressed.

THE JEWISH REBELLION OF A.D. 66

The war can properly be said to have begun in May, A.D. 66, when the Procurator, Gessius Flores, demanded 17 talents of silver from the Temple Treasury, which he alleged were arrears of tribute, and with a party of soldiers he forced his way to the Temple to seize it. To add insult to injury, his soldiers ran wild and plundered the market place, which caused the mob to rise up against them, and the Procurator was forced to retire from the city.

This incident was a general signal for the refusal to pay taxes throughout the country, and the affront to the sacred Temple upset even the most conservative of the ruling classes. King Agrippa hurried to the scene to try to calm things down, but he was unsuccessful and had to leave the city. By September, rebellion was openly spreading throughout the land.

To restore order, Cestius Gallius, the Proconsul of Syria, was sent into the country with the 12th Legion, and by November he reached the gates of Jerusalem, where he was given a hostile reception. He decided that the city was too strong to risk an immediate assault, especially as he feared that his flanks might be attacked, so he began to withdraw his force. As he did so the Jews made several well-timed sorties and his retreat was turned into a rout, one authority reporting that the Romans lost 5,300 foot soldiers and 480 horsemen, as well as most of their baggage train and some siege engines.

The whole country erupted, the impetus of the rising being partly religious, partly nationalistic, and partly social. The Sadducees were swept along with the movement, as were the religious leaders and elders, who could be described as the 'peace party'. The pattern of revolt soon determined itself and the rebels seized and held the various strongholds throughout the country, the meagre Roman garrisons being unable to hold back the tide.

On hearing of the setback of Cestius Gallius, the Emperor, Nero, took a serious view of the situation and in February, A.D. 67, appointed Vespasian, who had made a military reputation for himself in Britain, to restore order. Vespasian started off at once and picking up the 5th and 10th Legions at Antioch, he marched them to Ptolemais (Acre), where he met his son, Titus, who had brought the 15th Legion from Egypt. In addition to these three legions, Vespasian had six squadrons of

horse and 23 cohorts of auxiliaries, as well as the militia of the subject kings, of whom Agrippa was one, making a total of about 60,000 men, of whom the large majority was trained and disciplined.

Vespasian's policy was to reduce the rebel fortresses one by one by conventional sieges, and he made a start in Galilee where the Jewish commander was one Josephus, who afterwards made a name for himself as a historian. But the war effort of Josephus was only half-hearted and his energies were turned as much against John of Gischalla, the leader of the Zealots, as they were against the Romans. Under dubious circumstances, he surrendered and before long was openly attached to the Roman staff in the field.

Vespasian kept his force together and in general there was little fighting as the rebels melted before him. He was in no great hurry to finish matters off, and indeed, it suited him to remain in command of such a powerful army for as long as possible. He wintered in Caesarea, and then leisurely resumed operations in the Spring of A.D. 68, beginning an encircling movement aimed at reducing the rebel strongholds around the capital. Active dissension within Jerusalem led him to hope that the rebels would exhaust themselves and that eventually it would fall into his hands like a ripe plum. By June, most of the countryside had been cleared with a few exceptions, notably the remote Massada, and he was preparing for the final assault on Jerusalem when news reached him of Nero's suicide. Immediately, he suspended operations and remained inactive until June, A.D. 69.

Meanwhile, what was happening inside Jerusalem?

INTERNAL STRIFE

Even before surrendering to the Romans, Josephus had clashed with the Zealots. These Zealots were at first mainly middle-class patriots, Galileans, led by John of Gischalla, one of the leading personalities of the war. As the country was systematically cleared by Vespasian, so the scope of the various bands that roamed the countryside was curtailed, and gradually they concentrated in Jerusalem. By the end of A.D. 67, the Zealots were forced to follow suit, and John came to Jerusalem with a large body of them, where many young men were attracted to his banner. He occupied Ophel and then set out to make himself master of the capital, choosing the Temple as his first objective, but although he succeeded in gaining a portion of it, the city elders and priests, or the 'peace party', organized some of the citizens to defend it, and he was unable to make any headway against them.

However, John managed to enlist the aid of a number of Idumeans (Edomites) to help him. These he secretly let into the city by night and with their help he made good the whole of the Outer Temple area. After satiating themselves with slaughter and pillage, John was able to persuade most of the Idumeans to return home and so he was left with the strongest force in the city.

The Zealots were about to resume operations to gain control over the whole of Jerusalem, when another large armed body of men arrived in the capital, led by Simon Bar Giorah. These followers of Simon had strong socialist tendencies and were as much against the upper classes of the Jews as they were against the Romans. They established themselves in the upper city and at once got to blows with John's men. Hoping that they might get some relief from the dictatorship of the Zealots, the inhabitants supported Simon, but they soon realized that there was little to choose between the two.

Next, the Zealots split into two factions as a powerful section under Eleazar, consisting of about 2,400 fighting men, broke away from John and barricaded themselves in the Inner Temple buildings. So far the sacredness of this part of the Temple had been respected. Thus there were, at one and the same time, three separate armed bodies of Jews fighting each other inside Jerusalem while the Romans steadily closed in on the city. During this internecine fighting, the stocks of corn were destroyed and much other damage was done. Willy-nilly the majority of the inhabitants were, of a necessity, dragged into one or other of the groups, and the smaller gangs quickly attached themselves either to John or to Simon. Those trying to remain aloof or neutral were pillaged by one and all.

For a particular feast, Eleazar allowed the citizens to enter the inner courtyard of the Temple, as was the custom, and some of John's followers, disguising themselves, got in this way and in the resultant fighting Eleazar was defeated. By this stratagem, John recovered the leadership of all the Zealots, now perhaps about 8,500 strong, and he turned to face Simon, who had about 10,000 or so under his control. But by this time the Romans were at the gates.

THE SIEGE

Meanwhile, Vespasian took the field again against the Jews, but in July, A.D. 69, he was proclaimed Emperor by his troops and he hurried off to Rome to consolidate his position. He gave the command of his army to his son, Titus, an astute and capable general of great courage. Titus surrounded himself with renegade Jews, of whom Josephus was the chief, and thus gained a good insight into their methods and movements. Little more campaigning was done that year, and he devoted his time to assembling his army and to preparing for an assault on Jerusalem. He still had the bulk of the three legions left by his father, the 5th, 10th, and 15th, and in addition he had the 12th Legion, part of which had been with Gessius Flores in his abortive trip to Jerusalem in May, A.D. 66, and which was anxious to recover its lost honour. These four legions, together with his cavalry and the soldiers of the vassal kings and other allies, brought his total up to about 60,000 men.

Early in A.D. 70, Titus closed on Jerusalem, and with a small body of horse he himself went on ahead of the main body to reconnoitre the city defences. While he was doing this, a party of Jews suddenly debouched from the walls and cut him off from his escort. His great courage saved his life, as he set his horse at the enemy and charged through them back to his own troops. Titus encamped his legions on the Mount of Olives feature, making his own headquarters on Mount Scopus, which gave him an excellent view of Jerusalem.

Before commencing operations he sent Josephus to talk to the Jews to try to persuade them to surrender, which he did by speaking to them through a sort of megaphone. But Josephus was unsuccessful. The defenders' morale was high, and in spite of internal strife, there was a general belief that God was on their side. The war had been going on for three years and as yet the capital had not been attacked, and this was the first time it had been found necessary to shut the city gates.

Inside Jerusalem, the approach of the Romans only caused John and Simon to fight each other more fiercely in an attempt to gain supremacy, and it was only when Titus began to line up his war machines opposite the third wall that a truce was patched up between the two Jewish leaders. It was agreed that John would defend the Temple and Ophel, while Simon looked after Herod's palace and the lower and upper Cities, both combining to man the third wall.

At the feast of the Passover (May, A.D. 70) the Romans opened the siege, but they made little progress as they were handicapped in their operations by constant raids by the defenders, and for several days there was intense fighting along the length of the third wall. When it seemed that the attackers were held, the Jews became slack, and as they tired they neglected to keep a good watch throughout the nights. The Romans took full advantage of this as soon as they learned about it and, as a result of the footholds they gained during the hours of darkness, on the 15th day of the siege they took the wall and drove the Jews back on to their second line of defence.

Next, Titus moved his legions against the second wall, concentrating in the centre of it, and five days later a breach was made through which about a thousand men entered. But the area taken was a crowded one of narrow streets, and a series of counter-attacks by those who knew the district well drove the Romans out again. This victory gave another boost to their morale. It took Titus another four days of desperate fighting to force the wall again. This time as he advanced he levelled all the buildings and drove the Jews back behind their main wall.

This done, Titus gave his attention to Antonia, the key to the Temple area, which was his next objective. He moved up his catapults and battering rams and started building a bank, and the 5th and 12th Legions began pounding away at the tower. Partly by sapping and partly by using secret underground passages, John on two occasions led his men out to attack the besieging Romans, destroying and burning their war machines, but each time they were repaired or rebuilt and the pressure was renewed. Farther to the east, the other two legions were concentrating on Herod's palace where Simon Bar Giorah was holding out successfully.

By now severe hunger was being felt by the inhabitants and numbers were slipping away from the city by night, until the two leaders prevented them from doing so. The rivalry between the two factions was as bitter as ever, and as there was no strong central authority to keep order a state of anarchy began to creep in. Realizing this, and hoping that the internal disorder, plus the acute hunger, might hasten the end of the siege, Titus built a wall round the outside of the city which prevented supplies from being smuggled in.

Simon discovered a movement afoot to surrender amongst his followers and singling out the ringleaders, he executed them on the wall in full view of the Romans.

Antonia was a tough nut to crack, and did not fall to Titus until the end of June, being desperately defended by the fanatical Zealots. However, a party of the 5th Legion managed to overpower the guard one night and thus an entrance was gained for the waiting Roman soldiers. The taking of Antonia gave Titus a foothold on a corner of the Temple courtyards, but he had now come up against a closer and more elaborate system of defence. This was sacred ground to the Jews and the defenders determinedly disputed every inch of it.

A final offer to surrender was made by Josephus but was rejected, and the Zealots withdrew into the fortified portions of the Temple area. Famine now laid a more deadly grip on the city, and 11 days after the fall of Antonia, the 'daily sacrifice' in the Temple had to be suspended. This was a great spiritual and moral setback and was the beginning of the end, but still the Jews fought on, there being no thought of surrender.

THE FALL

Titus now concentrated against the Temple, the symbol of Jewish resistance, and he threw his legions against it. Each of the several courtyards and cloisters

surrounding the Temple was walled and fortified. As a first move the Romans took the northern cloisters, which adjoined the Tower of Antonia, and then step by step they pushed on to the western cloisters, or the 'Courtyard of the Gentiles.' The stubborn resistance of the Zealots delayed but did not stop the attackers.

At last, on the 105th day of the siege (August) the Romans reached the gate of the Inner Temple courtyard. Two last-minute 'forlorn hopes' were made by the Zealots led by John himself, but they made little impression against the weight of the Roman legions. The gate was fired and the attackers poured through into the inner courtyard. According to the Jewish calendar, this occurred on the 9th day of Ab, and this is regarded as the traditional date of the destruction of the Temple. But in fact, it was not until the next day, when the attack was renewed with more vigour by Titus, that the Temple building itself was set on fire on his order. Amid the flames, the Zealots still fought back valiantly until they were overwhelmed, and they were either killed or perished in the fire. The Temple and its treasure was looted, and in triumph the Roman 'Eagles' were marched on to the sacred site. Only John with a small number of his followers escaped by secret tunnels to the upper city.

After this, Titus turned to Ophel and the lower city, which he systematically cleared before him, setting fire to the houses and putting the inhabitants to the sword. But still the Jews fought back and the Romans had no easy walk-over.

The upper city, where Simon made his last stand, and which was itself surrounded by a smaller wall, held out a little longer, but the defenders were weak from hunger and could hardly stand. Even so, when it came to Simon's ears that five of his men were plotting to surrender, he had them executed as a warning to the remainder. There was little or nothing to be had to eat, and it is estimated that over 110,000 died owing to the famine during the siege.

The smaller wall surrounding the upper city was breached in several places, and in September, A.D. 70, after a total of 134 days' siege, the upper city fell to Titus. At first there was great slaughter by the Romans, and much looting, burning, and pillaging, as was the custom in those days when a city was taken by storm, but soon the victors became sated with killing and then numbers of Jews were taken prisoner either to be sold into slavery or taken in triumph to Rome. Small, isolated groups still held out, fighting to the bitter end, and it was the proud boast of the Jews that the only men who gave up the fight were those who could no longer stand.

THE AFTERMATH

In the vicinity of the upper city, parties and individuals, including John and Simon, hid in the many underground passages and cisterns. Eventually the two leaders were forced by hunger to give themselves up. Both were taken off to Rome where Simon was killed at a victory celebration, and it is believed that John was kept in prison until he died.

In Jerusalem, Titus ordered the total destruction of the Temple and the city, excluding only the Towers of Antonia, Hippicus, Phaesal, and Mariamme, and part of the western wall, all of which he wanted to house the 10th Legion, which he left behind as a garrison. Much of the Temple was destroyed, as was much of the upper and lower cities, but opinions and accounts differ as to the degree to which this order was enforced. Many buildings were certainly left standing. Of the Jews taken prisoner, it is estimated that about 60,000 or so were marched off to Rome, and of this number at least 17,000 died en route.

As regards the rest of Palestine, three fortresses still held out, Machaerus, Herodium, and Massada, but Titus moved against them one at a time. Massada held out the longest, but finally fell in April, A.D. 73, when the Jewish defenders, seeing that all was hopeless, killed themselves rather than surrender.

COMMENT ON THE SIEGE AND FALL

In comment upon this famous siege, one can only remark that it was an epic of courage in military history that deserves more publicity than it usually gets. Some 20,000 men, divided amongst themselves and racked by famine, held at bay four Roman legions and their supporting troops for over four months. True, the whole population of Jerusalem joined in the fight towards the end, but their military value cannot have been very great.

Much admiration is expressed for the bravery of the methodical Roman legions, and in particular of the courage and personality of Titus, but it should also be noted that throughout the fighting the Jews displayed remarkable heroism and determination, and were undaunted by successive defeats or internecine warfare.

Both John of Gischalla and Simon Bar Giorah were able leaders, and had either one of them alone come to the fore and united all factions in the city together, the outcome of the tale might have been very different. Titus would probably have been held off indefinitely, and the Roman prestige so lost might have had far-reaching effects on the eastern part of their Empire.

Apart from being of general interest, especially as attention is increasingly being focused on Palestine, it affords a glimpse of the Jewish martial heritage, the traditions of which the new Israeli Army is re-discovering. .

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

"PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE"

THE new dispensation, which bears the beguiling name of "peaceful co-existence," has been established with remarkable speed and thoroughness. Soviet delegations from all branches of activity are roaming about the world as though they were the inheritors of the ages. A detachment of smartly-uniformed members of the Red Army has even been on show in London. Fair exchange being no robbery, a mass delegation of 2,000 British teenagers has been invited to visit Moscow next year to participate in a sports festival, while travel agencies are busy popularizing the idea of the Soviet Union as an ideal holiday resort for Britons.

What the Russians have to gain from all this going and coming is clear enough: the restoration of Trotsky to the Soviet's Pantheon shows that communism's internationalizing mission—as distinct from the Stalin policy of using foreign Communists as mere agents—has again been recognized as the best means of subverting the West.

MOSCOW'S STAGE-MANAGEMENT

What the West has to gain from all the trafficking is by no means so clear. Communism, in making its bid for the hearts and minds of Westerners, has discovered that it must first have access to those hearts and minds. But does anybody seriously suppose that the Kremlin is willing for Soviet hearts and minds to be thus biddable? The answer, amazing though it be, is "yes"—that is what most people do contrive to think. They are helped by the very clever act which Moscow has staged at home and in the world at large—an act which depicts Communists, and Communist Parties abroad, boldly tweaking the ears of the Soviet leadership, as though the old tyranny and terror had given place to a genuine liberal democracy. If the Communist Party in each of the non-communist countries has become self-supporting, and able to meet the heavy loss involved in such enterprises as the publication of its own daily newspaper, then, and not otherwise, it may be that the criticism is genuine and not stage-managed. The strong probability, amounting to a certainty, is that it is bogus.

CHASMS UNBRIDGED

"Peaceful co-existence" has a number of implications which politicians and political commentators habitually leave out of account. One, which I discuss later, is that to give effect to it the communist world must either abandon its part in subverting European power overseas or European power must be voluntarily surrendered. During the last 10 years the Western nations have sought to lessen the impact by their policies of withdrawal, but there are regions where the present decision is to stand firm. Should Moscow and Peking continue the work of subversion, as undoubtedly they will, the phrase "peaceful co-existence" will thus remain a mockery.

Another implication of nations living at peace is that there shall be outstanding no grievous conflict of view between them. Yet—unless the conscience of the West be stilled—the anguish of the Eastern European nations incorporated in the Communist Empire must command a sympathy that cannot dispose the Western nations in favour of that Empire. What is more, the frontier which runs through the

¹ As deduced from reports up to 23rd July.

heart of Germany marks a division between East and West that talk of "peaceful co-existence" conceals only from the thoughtless. In other words, while the lessening of the tensions of the cold war may be to the general advantage, the struggle for the souls of nations will continue with no less ferocity because it now takes place behind a façade.

N.A.T.O.'s FUTURE

The easing of tensions—more accurately the screening of tensions—in international affairs is recognized as likely to have the effect of diminishing the interest of member States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Hence the move to develop within its framework an economic integration along the general lines of its military set-up. The scheme is often presented as a device to ensure economic backing for the military effort, but the real motive is more likely to be the ultimate transformation of N.A.T.O. into Federal Union—a motive frankly admitted by Canadian leaders, who have long been advocates of a North Atlantic Federation.

Canada's special interest was stressed by Mr. St. Laurent on the eve of the Commonwealth Conference. He said that his country's main external commitments were to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Commonwealth he referred to as a "useful second string." Whether or not it is wise to place more reliance on an artificial construction such as N.A.T.O. than on a world system based on organic growth and a shared tradition offers scope for a legitimate difference of opinion. What seems to be certain is that the drive towards a North Atlantic Federation will be much more sustained and vigorous than any effort to reinvigorate the Commonwealth concept.

ASIA

EAST AGAINST WEST

Whatever reassurance the Soviet Union's Western neighbours may find in the supposed switch from cold war to peaceful co-existence, it is improbable that those among them who follow Far Eastern affairs are able to take much comfort from such aspects of the 'new look' as Red China chooses to assume. Mr. Chou En-lai has not been swept off his feet by thoughts of peaceful co-existence, as this statement of his makes clear :—

"We formally support the just struggle of Indonesian people for the recovery of West New Guinea, of the Indian people for the recovery of Goa, of the Arab peoples to win and defend their national rights, and of all Asian-African and other peoples to oppose colonialism."

Such co-existence might seem to offer a prospect about as peaceful as the propinquity of a lighted brand, a fuse, and a stick of dynamite.

What few people realize—despite the frank statements of the Russian and Chinese leaders—is that communism provides much of the driving force in the campaign to align East against West. Indeed, the campaign is an integral part of the world revolution which it is continuously promoting. The motive is not a concern to secure for "all Asian-African and other peoples" political independence—Russia has no intention of withdrawing from its European satellites, let alone from its vast colonial territories beyond the Urals—but simply to supplant the Western nations in the colonies and spheres of influence whence they are being driven.

DELHI-PEKIN AXIS

In as far as Delhi forms a united front with Peking in opposing Western influence in Asia and Africa, the Indian Government accepts the classic Menshevik role. It does so, not with the intention of helping to extend the Bolshevik revolution, but in the hope that it will itself succeed to the power and authority abandoned by the West. The hope would appear to be forlorn, as even a momentary glance at the map must show. India's ability to resist communist pressures is weakened by every defeat suffered by the West in the Asian and African continents.

That the Indian Government should be unable to accept this view is understandable. What cannot as readily be understood is the refusal of the West to accept it. The Western assumption has been that a Menshevik regime in Southern Viet-nam is a greater bulwark against communism than were French Union forces; that a Menshevik regime in Malaya, or Singapore, or Ceylon presents a firmer obstacle to communist expansion than British rule can supply. Communism would not address itself to the task of eliminating 'colonialism' if it believed in the validity of that assumption. Had the Western nations supported each other, as their interests so clearly demanded, they could have stayed in Asia as they can still stay in Africa. Unfortunately there has been no such cohesion, and the interpenetrating forces of finance and commerce have all too frequently undermined what political resolution there was through their pursuit of short-term economic advantages. He is indeed an optimist who now sees beyond the defeat of the Western nations in Asia the impending defeat of the Communist Empire.

FORMOSA AND WORLD PEACE

The Chinese Prime Minister, in addition to his "formal support" of colonial peoples alleged to be struggling for freedom, has produced a specific plan which is advertised as being in line with the new policy of peaceful co-existence. This is nothing less than a scheme for the "peaceful take-over" of Formosa by the Peking Government. The *Daily Mail* may be correct in reporting Indian sympathy for the plan, but the newspaper must surely be wide of the mark when it declares that "some Dominion leaders and Sir Anthony Eden consider it a hopeful sign for the relief of Far Eastern tension." Anything more likely to spark off the third world war would be difficult to conceive.

United States policy for very many years past has revealed a disposition to come to terms with communism. Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam attest that fact, while last year's 'Summit Conference,' despite the general belief to the contrary, was the direct result of American pressure. The same disposition is very much in evidence at the present time, but it has to be weighed in the scales against the equally strong tendency of American public opinion to rebel whenever the policy is considered to have been carried too far. The 'liberalization' of trade with China may be carried a considerable distance without provoking any such rebellion, but a horse-deal over Formosa would have immediate repercussions of a kind Washington would be unwilling to face. In that fact may lie the present peace of the world.

MALAYA AND SINGAPORE

Although little publicized, preparations for Malayan independence next year are being made with a thoroughness not usually associated with that part of the world. At the same time there is being pursued a no less careful search for some formula which will enable a campaign to be launched for the federation of Malaya with other

territories to form a United States of South-East Asia. Advocates of this union claim among other things that it would lessen the friction arising from the conflict of interests between the disparate elements of Malaya's population: whatever these advocates lack it certainly is not optimism.

The breakdown of the London talks on independence for Singapore, although it led to the resignation of Mr. David Marshall, did not result in the riots and bloodshed which had been predicted. There is reason to think that when next the question of Singapore's internal security is broached it may be in a wider context—if not that of the United States of South-East Asia, then beyond doubt that of the future Singapore-Malaya relationship. Should this prove to be accurate it might explain the relative calm in Singapore. It would mean that the agitators are playing for higher stakes than before.

CEYLON

The new Prime Minister of Ceylon announced during his recent visit to London that his country would become a "republic within the Commonwealth" and that Britain's bases at Trincomalee and Katunayaka would be surrendered in return for certain "facilities." Neither move was unexpected and the second has now been confirmed in a joint statement embodying the terms of the agreement. Explaining his republican ideal, Mr. Bandaranaike said that Ceylon was too distant for her people to entertain feelings of personal loyalty towards Her Majesty the Queen—a statement that will surprise many who served the British Raj in former times. Veneration for the British Crown was once a living reality among the peoples of the East. If it is so no longer the reason is that it has been eliminated, not by distance, but by propaganda.

Great Britain has as little cause for delight in the agreement to surrender her bases. The "facilities" offered are of no great importance, as they would almost certainly be withdrawn on the first hint of an international crisis. Moreover, although Mombasa may serve the Royal Navy well enough in place of Trincomalee, Africa can offer the R.A.F. nothing that could replace Katunayaka. It becomes increasingly difficult to follow the reasoning of those who urge that such surrenders of strategical points strengthen the common front against communism. Is that why communism agitates so unceasingly for the surrenders to be made?

MIDDLE EAST

ARABS *v.* ISRAELIS

Since the dismissal of Glubb Pasha, Jordan has become increasingly active as a generator of Middle Eastern tensions. Israeli eyes are now reported to be more firmly fixed on the Jordan border than on the Syrian border. Nor are Israeli hearts comforted by news of the goings and comings between Amman and Cairo as Colonel Nasser expands and deepens his influence with Jordanian officers and officials.

On the other hand the Israelis are not allowing the generation of tensions to become an Arab monopoly. Troop movements and political alarms and excursions inside Israel keep the Arabs in a frenzy of apprehension. The statement of her Foreign Minister that Israel now feels free to continue work on the unilateral diversion of the waters of the Jordan north of Lake Tiberias has had a particularly unsettling effect, because if this decision is acted upon the Arabs will have no alternative but to prevent the diversion at all costs, which can only mean open war. Now that the Soviet Union has become a contender for influence in the Middle East, an Israeli-Arab war today might have the very gravest consequences.

EVACUATION OF SUEZ

The Egyptian Government held special celebrations to mark the departure of the last British troops from Suez. Although a distinguished British officer was present as a guest, no particular pains seem to have been taken to spare his national sensibilities. Official speeches, radio broadcasts, and newspaper cartoons, reflecting the cock-a-hoop spirit, presented the occasion as though it were not so much a voluntary withdrawal by the British as a glorious military victory won by Egyptian valour. This idea was reinforced by a not unimpressive military and air force parade, in which communist equipment played a conspicuous part.

Of more lasting significance, it may be, were the visits to Cairo at this time of the Soviet Foreign Minister, who brought the offer of a huge loan on easy terms for the construction of the Aswan Dam, and of Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, which—in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United States—has long been negotiating for the privilege of financing this project. The real battle thus seems to be between foreign contenders for the role of moneylender-in-chief to the Egyptian Government. The fact that offers have since been withdrawn does not necessarily invalidate this view.

CYPRUS

British policy in Cyprus seems to be more opportunist than Government statements would suggest. In June the Prime Minister announced that there was no question of Great Britain abandoning her responsibility for the island: the transference of that responsibility to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he added, would not meet the British case. There was nothing equivocal about that. Soon afterwards, however, the British Government was reported to have drawn up a set of proposals which included a declaration of its willingness to surrender responsibility within a period of years. The Government did not deny the report, which was confirmed in its essentials by the strong official reaction in Turkey against the proposal to settle the question by self-determination. Thereupon the Government apparently reverted to its previous position, because early in July the Foreign Minister repeated what the Prime Minister had said early in June.

However willing the Government may be to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, the situation seems to demand a recognition of the fact that it has no hope of escape from its difficulties other than to stay and govern. There is no certainty that this recognition will be forthcoming or that a N.A.T.O. solution has been finally rejected.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

While Franco-Moroccan and Franco-Tunisian negotiations were being conducted in Paris with a view to reaching a final settlement, the Moroccan and Tunisian leaders acted on the assumption that they retained full liberty of action in North Africa to harass the French Government and the local authorities. Their object was clearly to bring pressure to bear in the conference-chamber by increasing the tension in the field. They were also much concerned to show their "solidarity" with their "dear Algerian brothers." The lesson for the French would seem to be that they have on their hands in North Africa not three struggles but one struggle—in other words that they have to treat the anti-French forces as being single and indivisible. Should this reading of the situation be the correct one, Paris will have to

brood upon the truth that negotiated settlements with Morocco and Tunisia, so far from lightening its burden, will afford its enemies assured bases from which to carry on the campaign in support of the Algerian rebels.

Nor is this the only French anxiety. M. Pineau protested to the Libyan Prime Minister about the arms traffic between Libya and the Algerian insurrectionaries and on the same day told the Senate that the United States is giving economic aid to Libya while large stocks of arms are being moved across the country to South Tunisia and Algeria—a matter which he had taken up with Mr. Foster Dulles.

WEST INDIES

THE BATTLE FOR OIL

Sir Anthony Eden has placed on record his view that the successor to the cold war will be a trade war of unprecedented dimensions. As Great Britain is already fully extended in her effort to meet trade competition from the United States, Germany, and Italy, the additional menace of an aggressive economic drive for world markets by the Soviet Union should surely make her prize the more dearly her own capital assets—particularly oil. Yet a large British oil enterprise in Trinidad has been sold to America for cash, and another such deal in the same island may soon be negotiated. This follows the success of an American company in elbowing a British oil firm out of its rightful position in Barbados, and calls to mind the lurid picture of what happened at Abadan.

Dollar capital is reported to be assembling to move into the British West Indies in overwhelming strength. The political moves towards federation and independence have both encouraged and been encouraged by the prospect of a dollar invasion. If five years hence the West Indies remain in the sterling area, that will be a major miracle. These Caribbean developments are only one of many indications that Great Britain's economic future is gravely menaced. Only by taking the most vigorous steps to safeguard her own interests will it be possible for her to avert a catastrophic defeat.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

PRECEDENCE OF REGIMENTS AND CORPS

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—With reference to the letters from (1) Lieut.-Colonel Donovan Jackson and (2) Brigadier C. McI. Delf¹, my comments are as follows:—

(1) The Marine Corps did not reach stability until 1755 (not 1775 as in Colonel Jackson's letter) when 50 companies were raised. The present Corps' unbroken existence dates from then.

It is true that the first Marine Corps, "The Admiral's Maritime Regiment" (it was known by various titles), was raised by Order in Council of 26th (not 28th) October, 1664, but this was merged into the regiment now designated the Coldstream Guards in 1689. Two Marine regiments were raised in 1690 and were disbanded in 1698–99: six more were raised in 1702 by Royal Warrant of 1st June of that year, three of which still exist in the Army as The East Lancashire Regiment, The East Surrey Regiment, and The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the other three were disbanded in 1713. After a lapse of 26 years, six more Marine Regiments were raised in 1739 and four more in 1740. By a Royal Warrant of 28th February, 1746/7, all Marine regiments then existing were transferred from the administration of the War Office to the Admiralty, who promptly disbanded them in 1748. After a hiatus of seven years the 50 companies mentioned above were raised in 1755, since when the Marines have ceased to 'come and go' after brief periods of service.

Whilst their existence was somewhat evanescent in character, being 'called up' for specific service and on its conclusion being disbanded, their precedence was related to regiments having a co-existence with them. Thus, in the Royal Warrant of 1666 (see p. 73 last para.²) the Admiral's Regiment was placed next below the Coldstream Guards, where it remained in the Royal Warrant of 1st September, 1675, as The Duke of Yorke's Regiment. (For some reason The Royal Scots and The Queen's are not mentioned in these two warrants, although senior to The Duke of Yorke's Regiment.) But in the Royal Warrant of 1684 (see p. 74, first para.²) it is placed after The Tangier Regiment (now The Queen's) where it remained in the Royal Warrant of 3rd August, 1685. The 10 Marine Regiments raised in 1739–40 were numbered 44th to 53rd.

In Horse Guards letter of 30th March, 1820, it was stated that:—"His Majesty has been graciously pleased to command that the Royal Marines, when acting with Troops of the Line, shall take their station next to the Forty-ninth Regiment" (now The Royal Berkshire Regiment), and this was embodied in King's Regulations of 1822 thus:—"The Royal Marines, when acting with Troops of the Line, take Rank next to the 49th Regiment."

It is hoped that the foregoing explanation substantiates the brief reference to the precedence of the Royal Marines on p. 75 of last February's issue.

As regards the Royal Marine Artillery: in Q.R. 1883, section 1, it is stated:—"The R.M.A. will take precedence as artillery, and when paraded with other troops will take the left of the R.A." I have not discovered why, when the R.M.A. and R.M.L.I. were amalgamated in 1923, the Royal Marines were not given precedence after the R.A.

¹ See JOURNAL for May, 1956, pp. 277–78.

² Of the JOURNAL for February, 1956.

Referring to the third para. of Lieut.-Colonel Jackson's letter, the present Q.R., para. 931 footnote (c), supports what I stated in the last sentence, second para. of p. 75, regarding the precedence of the Royal Marines when serving under the Naval Discipline Act.

(2) Precedence of Corps which were the forerunners of the R.A.S.C. It was not until the issue of Q.R. 1892 that *The Army List* was made the authority for the precedence of regiments and corps, for in that issue it was stated that precedence is to be "*As laid down in The Army List.*" Previous to 1892, *Army Lists* were, presumably, a record of regiments and corps, but not arranged strictly in accordance with their precedence. All the corps mentioned by Brigadier Delf 'lived' before 1892.

In a follow-up article entitled *Precedence of Administrative Department and Corps* [see this number], I have mentioned all forerunners of the R.A.S.C., viz., Corps of Waggoners (1794), Royal Wagon Train (1796-1833), Ambulance Corps (1854), Land Transport Corps (1855), and Military Train (1856-70), and all the subsequent mergings of officers and other ranks down to the formation of the present Corps in 1889.

T. J. EDWARDS,

2nd May, 1956.

Major.

V.L.R. AIRCRAFT AND THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

SIR,—In the February issue of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL appears an article entitled, *A Matter of Fact—The Student's View*, by Lieutenant-Commander Waters.³ Considerable emphasis is placed on the necessity to study references and present facts in an impartial manner in order to resolve certain differences of opinion which arise as between Rear-Admiral Murray's article (JOURNAL for May, 1955, pp. 280-285) and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor's letter (JOURNAL for August, 1955, pp. 466-468). Unfortunately, in some cases the 'student' has classed statements lifted from war memoirs and other unofficial publications as facts. While he has no doubt carried out this form of research conscientiously, some of the 'facts' which he appears to establish—and which are of considerable importance to his conclusions—are anything but facts.

A major point at issue appears to be whether V.L.R. maritime aircraft could have been provided for Coastal Command earlier than they were and whether failure to provide them was the result of Air Ministry obstruction or indifference. The aircraft type principally concerned were V.L.R. Liberators. I was directly concerned with the supply and modification of these aircraft for the R.A.F. from July, 1941, until December, 1942. What follows may clarify the picture and indicate that Sir John Slessor's research was not as superficial as has been suggested.

The original squadron of Liberators Mk. I became operational in Coastal Command about September, 1941, but this was a wasting asset as American production of the Mark was short-lived. It was superseded by the Mk. II version, of which 140 were built. These were designed from the start as bombers and all of them were originally intended to come to the U.K. for the Royal Air Force. Only a small proportion of them had crossed the 48th parallel when the President of the United States suspended all deliveries in December, 1941. Some of our losses were replaced later, but largely by the next Mark—best described (by the American designation) as the B24D. The range of the early B24Ds was well below that of the Mk. I and Mk. II. This Mark was also designed initially as a bomber.

Any increase in the supply of V.L.R. Liberators to Coastal Command in 1942 and early 1943, therefore, involved two problems—first, an allocation from U.S.A. at a time when their commitments in the Pacific made them reluctant to release any long-range aircraft at all and, secondly, conversion of these aircraft from the bomber to the maritime role. In recording what transpired in 1942, the 'student' has been sadly misled as

³ Page 105.

regards the date when this conversion work started, the responsibility for carrying it out, and the manner in which it was tackled.

With regard to the date, the 'student' writes as follows (JOURNAL, February, 1956, p. 108) :—

"On verifying his references the student finds that it was not *until 'December, 1942,'* that 'the conversion of more Liberators for very long range convoy work was commenced.'" (My italics.)

Just how facts can be so incorrectly recorded is, to say the least, remarkable. It was well before this date that I was ordered to cancel the Prestwick programme for the preparation of the few available Liberators for bombing operations and re-orientate the future programme around A.S.V. installation and other maritime requirements. I will never forget the upheaval and hard toil to which this led in the Ministry of Aircraft Production (M.A.P.) and in the factories. I can be quite emphatic about the timing because 1st December, 1942, happens to be the date on which I ceased to be connected with American supplies. For some months before my departure, I and the associated M.A.P. staff, the concerned firms, and their many subcontractors did little else but progress modification drawings, chase materials, and manufacture parts for the conversion of Liberators to the anti-submarine role.

And what was happening in the U.K. was only a small part of the story. British policy at that time was to reduce the load on U.K. industry by establishing modification centres in the U.S.A. My pilot's log book reminds me that in *late October, 1942*, I spent nine days in the U.S.A. vigorously pursuing the delivery and modification (to Coastal Command requirements) of Liberators B24D. The immense modification centres at Fort Worth/Tucson were then fitting extra tanks and centimetric A.S.V. to *our* aircraft—a programme of work which was surely much more important ultimately to the Battle of the Atlantic than anything at Prestwick. But even the immense resources of the U.S.A. could not overcome without delay the shortages of materials and of men trained in the new problems of S band radar. At 0815 hours on my last day in the U.S.A. I was quizzed very thoroughly in Washington on progress by a very pressing man whom I had never met before—by name Slessor.

The second point on which the 'student' has been misled is the allocation of responsibility for this conversion work. Lieutenant-Commander Waters writes (JOURNAL, February, 1956, pp. 108-9) :—

"Conversion was indeed the crux of the V.L.R. problem . . . *This was an Air Ministry responsibility.*" (My italics.)

On the contrary, responsibility rested with (a) the Ministry of Aircraft Production for modification work in the U.K., and (b) various U.K. and U.S. agencies for the larger and more important modification centres in the U.S.A. Within the Ministry of Aircraft Production responsibility lay with the Controller of North American Aviation Supplies—an appointment usually filled by a prominent civilian.

Returning to Lieutenant-Commander Waters's article, the third statement which I must challenge is on page 109, viz :—

"... the student finds that critical months slipped by after Liberators IIIA began to be received from the U.S. authorities before their conversion was put in hand."

The handling of American aircraft in 1940-1 was perhaps open to some criticism—but this was 1942. It was easy, however, to infer that nothing was being done because the aircraft themselves were not being visibly worked upon all the time. The problem was to design all the modifications, draw each new component, obtain the material to make it, and produce complete modification sets. It was only when all these steps were largely completed that the modification centres in the U.K. and U.S.A. could show much activity on the aircraft themselves. As a result, much ill-informed criticism was rife at the time.

If additional V.L.R. aircraft were a 'must' for Coastal Command in the Spring, Summer, and early Autumn of 1942, the requirement could have been met in useful numbers only from the Liberator II contract. Despite constant pressure in Washington, the Americans diverted for operations in the Pacific some 70 of these aircraft which were due to us in the six months following Pearl Harbour. As stated above, these were in any case designed as bombers and it would have been necessary to plan a conversion programme for them about December, 1941, or perhaps earlier. In the event, those Mk. II aircraft which we did receive were used partly to provide a small bomber force in the Middle East and partly to establish an air transport service from the U.K. to that theatre⁴. It is not for me to say whether these allocations were right, but the manner in which the decisions were taken will scarcely justify Lieutenant-Commander Waters's quotation on page 109 that :—

"... other priorities inside the R.A.F., over which the Admiralty had little influence, made it impossible for Coastal Command to obtain these essential V.L.R. aircraft, in the numbers necessary for the Battle of the Atlantic, until March, 1943." (My italics.)

The decision to convert certain Liberators II to the transport role was taken by a sub-committee of the War Cabinet at a meeting to which the Minister for Aircraft Production took me. At that meeting the Admiralty had an equal voice with the Secretary of State for Air, the Secretary of State for War, the Postmaster-General, and the others present.

'Student' also advances the theory that British Lancaster bombers could also have been converted to V.L.R. maritime aircraft to meet the requirement. My knowledge of Lancaster development is only second hand, but I understand that on 1st January, 1942, there were only 18 in the R.A.F., and these in an untried and non-operational state. Apart from the fact that their range at that time was well below the Liberator I/II figure, I understand it was the considered policy of the War Cabinet at that time (not merely of the Air Staff) to ensure the earliest possible readiness of the Lancaster as a bomber. The adaptation of 29 Lancaster IIIs about three years later (in November, 1944) to carry out a single out and back high level sortie, even of 2,000 miles, is very different from undertaking the conversion of a brand new type at the end of 1941 for very long-range sea patrols with A.S.V. or convoy escorts at 2,000 feet.

While I may, perhaps, be pessimistic in my comments on the Lancaster, I hope I have convinced your readers that the Air Ministry was not blithely allocating large numbers of V.L.R. Liberators to its own parochial tasks without due regard to the Battle of the Atlantic. There are numerous civilians who can testify with me to the fact that intense pressure was applied to the Ministry of Aircraft Production, to the British industry, and especially to the concerned authorities in the U.S.A. to get more of these aircraft for Coastal Command—and at times well in advance of the date given in *The Student's View*. The real cause of our problem was not Air Ministry indifference, but a desperate Allied shortage of long-range aircraft in 1942, following the debacle in the Pacific, coupled with the fact that the U.S.A. controlled the supply at source. There were at least six important Allied tasks for which the Liberator I/II alone could be used and, apart from the problems of conversion, serious shortages were inevitable.

E. A. WHITELEY,

Group Captain (Retd.).

19th May, 1956.

FIRST USE OF AIR OBSERVATION OF ARTILLERY FIRE

SIR,—Mr. N. T. P. Murphy's letter under this heading in the February issue⁵ makes reference to the use of balloons as artillery observation posts in the American Civil War Peninsular Campaign of 1862. No less an authority than Colonel G. F. R. Henderson,

⁴ The Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East had strong views on this, as well as the Americans. Our design staff and modification plants were, in any case, heavily committed to this plan by November, 1941.

⁵ Page 115.

confirms their use as observation posts in his *Stonewall Jackson* (1936 edition) p. 653 footnote, although not specifically in connection with artillery. Moreover, a contemporary British observer, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, who visited McClellan's headquarters during April and May, 1862, states that three balloons were attached to the Federal Army in the Peninsula (ref. his book *The American War*, Volume I, p. 428), and comments disparagingly on their effectiveness. He also mentions that their ascents provoked fire from the Confederate batteries. Could one add anti-aircraft fire to Mr. Murphy's list of Civil War military innovations?

For a reference to the use of balloons in Hooker's Wilderness Campaign of April and May, 1863, see D. S. Freeman's *Lee's Lieutenants*, Volume II, p. 609. This American author also makes reference to the book *Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies* by F. Stansbury Haydon. I have been unsuccessful in tracing this book although the first volume of the work was published in Boston as recently as 1941.

A. J. NIMMO-SMITH.

19th May, 1956.

DETERRING AGGRESSION

SIR,—The H-bomb is a deterrent; it has bought time; but it must never be used and to abolish it presents us with the same old problem.

The failure of one more disarmament conference should make us face the real difficulty, which has wrecked every disarmament conference since the First World War.

Security must precede disarmament. There can be no disarmament until we can first establish a strong world authority with force behind it, a really effective system of international control, a universal collective security system, or an international police force.

Between the two world wars, France and some of the European Powers repeatedly advocated the creation of an international force to support the League of Nations. General A. M. Gruenther has expressed the opinion that the creation of a military alliance (similar to N.A.T.O.) even as late as 1939 would have prevented the Second World War.

Great Britain has been reluctant to support any such plan to organize military forces in support of world authority. This reluctance seems to be due to her traditional support of a 'balance of power' policy, which has been successful for nearly 400 years.

My study of this problem during the past 30 years leads me to the conclusion that there will be no disarmament or security from aggression unless we can return to the United Nations security plan envisaged by the late President Roosevelt and embodied in the United Nations Charter. N.A.T.O. could well form the cornerstone of such a universal security plan.

R. FULLJAMES,

Group Captain, R.A.F. (Retd.).

7th June, 1956.

SIR,—Ever since Hiroshima, certain airmen and others have been telling us that the terrific power of the A bomb (or later the H bomb) should be sufficient to prevent any future major war. But Air Chief Marshal Sir R. A. Cochrane's letter in your May number⁶ states a very different view. He says that the communications of the large Chinese army which operated in Korea were attacked with H.E. and other conventional bombs: he then continues "It is exceedingly doubtful whether attack with A bombs could have caused any greater interference with their communications, nor . . . would such attack have caused any greater casualties than were inflicted . . . There might have been some moral effect, but materially it is hard to see how the results could have been other than slight."

⁶ Page 278.

That surely is a heavy come-down for the A bomb. !

He is, of course, right in saying that an enemy retaliating with A bombs might do much damage to our landing ports in the area of conflict. But equally they could attack our ports of departure, perhaps with greater effect. Surely, however, if the A bombs are as effective as we have been led to suppose, they should be able to hold up local aggression without our having to send an expeditionary force as well? One would like to ask the R.A.F. a direct question:—"In the event of future aggression by a hostile army, such as the large Chinese army that invaded North Korea, could you stop them and force them to retreat if you were allowed to make air attacks with all conventional bombs and A bombs as well?" Would they not probably say Yes? And if so, it should be feasible to carry out effectively the various suggestions that have been made for Graduated Deterrents.

But if they were to say No, it would seem to indicate that we cannot rely on the tactical A bomb to give effective results in the many places where aggression might occur. Among them we think at once of Indo China, the Formosa Straits, Western Germany, and the Middle East. And if this is so, must we not put down the A bomb as just "one more weapon" that differs from its predecessors only in degree? Further, if the Air Chief Marshal tells us it could not have stopped a minor war, how can we continue to rely on it as a weapon for preventing major wars?

R. P. ERNLE-ERLE-DRAX,

Admiral.

14th June, 1956.

THE BRITISH TRANSPORT SYSTEM

SIR,—General Sir Brian Robertson, in his lecture which is reported in the May number of the JOURNAL⁷, said, in reply to a question, that although the Road Transport did pay taxes, it did not pay for some of the facilities which it enjoys. He instanced the pay of the traffic police.

The motorist pays about £400 million a year to the road fund of which only about £40 million is used on the roads.

There seems to be about £360 million yearly which should be, and is not, used on the roads. If half of this was spent on new roads we would soon see the railways relieved of much of the traffic with which they are unable to compete economically.

Set this £360 million against the police used on the roads (I believe the whole police force of the Country only costs about £30 million), and against any other 'facilities' and the motorist is still paying for considerably more than he gets. His tax no doubt goes towards paying for the deficit of the railways.

D. A. CAMPBELL,

Major.

27th June, 1956.

NILE GUNBOATS

SIR,—Referring to the article entitled *Nile Gunboats 1884-85* by Commander W. Rowbotham, R.N., in the February JOURNAL⁸, it may be of interest to readers to know something of the difficulties experienced in surmounting the cataracts when the waters of the Nile were low. The Nile Flotilla was originally organized and commanded by my father, the late Admiral Sir Frederick Bedford, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., then Captain Bedford of H.M.S. *Monarch*.

The first steamer taken up the Cataract by Captain Bedford was the Government ship *Nile*. The early part necessitated very hard steaming and at times the vessel could only just hold its own against the current. When the principal rapid was reached, hawsers were sent ashore and about 200 men from neighbouring villages were assembled to haul on them. There was a tremendous rush of water through the Bab, or gate, as it is called, and the first time the attempt was made to get over the rapid the current caught the vessel,

⁷ Page 183.

⁸ Page 80.

the ropes were dragged out of the men's hands, and away she went out of control, until a convenient backwater provided shelter; here preparations were made for a second attempt.

At the second attempt, after a regular struggle to get over the very bad part, a hawser that had been let go got round the paddle wheel, and whilst going ahead to save the ship from going on the rocks, smash went something in the engine-room. The main frame of the engines had broken and the ship was utterly helpless. The anchors were let go, but the cables immediately parted and she drifted down helplessly among rocks and rapids at great speed. The natives on board took off their outer garments and prepared to swim, as at any moment the ship might have drifted broadside on to a rock and capsized.

Fortunately, a number of heavy coils of telegraph wire had been taken on board before sailing and Captain Bedford ordered a large rope to be made fast to these which were then thrown overboard; after a number of hair-breadth escapes and having drifted two miles down the rapids, the temporary anchor at last held and the vessel came to a stand-still and all was well.

The following day the *Mahmondieh* arrived and Captain Bedford arranged to take her over the Cataract together with the *Bussoniff*, one of the steamers belonging to the Egyptian Army Department and carrying the General and a number of officials. On this occasion everything went right and, although at times it seemed doubtful whether the steamers could hold their own, they were eventually triumphant and were soon assembled with others at Philae.

With the rising of the Nile there was perceptibly more water over the rocks and in consequence it was smoother and only one hawser and half the number of natives were required to haul on it. A few days later ships could go up without any help from the shore.

D. M. T. BEDFORD.

Rear-Admiral (Retd.).

3rd July, 1956.

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE.—It was announced by the North Atlantic Council on 13th April that General Alfred M. Gruenther was relinquishing, at his own request, the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe and would be succeeded by Lieut.-General Lauris Norstad, U.S. Air Force, hitherto Air Deputy to the Supreme Commander. The change will take place towards the end of this year, probably about November.

C-IN-C., ALLIED FORCES, SOUTHERN EUROPE.—Vice-Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, U.S. Navy, has become C-in-C., Allied Forces, Southern Europe, in succession to Admiral Fechteler, who relinquished his command on 1st July.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

The second annual meeting of the Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization was held in Karachi on 6th, 7th, and 8th March under the chairmanship of Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The other Foreign Ministers present were Mr. Casey (Australia), M. Pineau (France), Mr. MacDonald (New Zealand), Senor Carlos Garcia (Philippines), Prince Wan Waithayakon (Siam), Mr. Selwyn Lloyd (United Kingdom), and Mr. John Foster Dulles (United States). A communiqué issued at the close of the meeting included the following points of interest :—

(a) The Council found that the defence forces of the member nations in Asia have been appreciably improved since the signing of the treaty and are better equipped and deployed to act in an emergency. Member-Governments have assisted one another on an increasing scale in the training and equipping of these forces.

(b) Through its military advisers, S.E.A.T.O. has made a good beginning in planning for the co-ordinated use of forces in collective self-defence. During the year, a number of joint military exercises by some of the S.E.A.T.O. Powers were held, including combined land, sea, and air exercises in and around Bangkok from 15th–18th February.

(c) . . . the Council noted that the members concerned have significantly improved the quality of their security forces and have moved ahead with other measures to reduce threats to domestic government and social progress.

(d) The Council considered the . . . conclusions of the military advisers as to the defensive forces that would be required to meet aggression, and agreed on the desirability of maintaining certain of their military forces at levels of mobility and combat effectiveness which would be an effective deterrent to aggression.

The Organization's committees of military advisers and of economic experts had met during January in Melbourne and Bangkok to draft reports and recommendations which were considered at the Karachi meeting.

In the first annual report of the Organization, which was issued on 2nd March, it was stated that . . . there had been definite progress in the combat effectiveness of the forces of member countries in the S.E.A.T.O. area, in which connection "extensive military aid programmes under the treaty's mutual aid provisions have played an important role"; and that, on the military side, the principal emphasis had been placed on "modernization, re-equipment, more efficient disposition, and more intensive training of forces."

It was pointed out that there had been a considerable increase in U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, the Philippines, and Siam under bilateral agreements; that almost 11,000 officers and non-commissioned officers from the S.E.A.T.O. area had completed courses in, or were attending, American-operated Service schools in the first nine months of 1955; that Siamese and Pakistani officer cadets were also attending military schools in France; and that Australian, New Zealand, Pakistani, and Siamese naval, army, and air force personnel had received training in Britain.

BAGHDAD PACT

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held their second annual meeting in Teheran from 16th-19th April under the chairmanship of M. Hussein Ala, Prime Minister of Persia. Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey were represented by their Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, and Great Britain was represented by Sir Walter Monckton, Minister of Defence. The U.S. observers, including senior officers of the three armed Services, were headed by Mr. Loy Henderson, chief administrative officer at the State Department.

Mr. Henderson stated during the meeting that the United States would extend its co-operation with the Baghdad Pact countries as follows :—

(i) Full membership of the Economic Committee and the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

(ii) The establishment of a U.S. military liaison office in Baghdad, headed by a general or flag officer.

(iii) A contribution to the cost of the permanent General Secretariat to be set up by the member countries.

(iv) Continuation of bilateral economic and technical aid to member countries.

(v) Continuation of military aid programmes on a basis that will take into consideration the aims of the Pact.

In the communiqué issued at the end of the proceedings, it was stated that the Council welcomed the active participation of the United States in the work of the pact organization and pointed out that, in connection with the full U.S. membership of the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees, the terms of reference of these two committees provided for an extension of membership to non-signatory governments at the discretion of the Council.

GREAT BRITAIN

VICTORIA CROSS CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS

REVIEW BY H.M. THE QUEEN.—On 26th June, The Queen, accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh, and escorted by a Captain's Escort of the Household Cavalry with Standard, drove to Hyde Park to review the holders of the Victoria Cross.

On arrival a Guard of Honour of the three Services received The Queen with a Royal Salute, after which Her Majesty inspected the Parade.

Having spoken with the relatives of posthumous V.Cs., The Queen returned to the dais and was graciously pleased to address the Parade. Her Majesty said :

" On 29th January, 1856, Queen Victoria created the Victoria Cross. It was to be awarded to those fighting men who, in the presence of the enemy, performed some signal act of valour or devotion to their country. In her Royal Warrant the Queen directed that neither rank nor long service nor wounds nor any other circumstance or condition whatsoever, save the merit of conspicuous bravery, should be held to establish sufficient claim to the honour.

" It was the first award to be open to officers and men alike, and it was the Queen's desire that, in her own words, ' it should be highly prized and eagerly sought after by the officers and men of our naval and military Services.'

" We are not a warlike nation, but whenever war has come our fighting men have shown a standard of courage which has inspired the respect of all nations and the dread of the aggressor. In all the changes of these 100 years that courage has not changed. No one in 1856 foresaw how, in our time, the citizen would take his equal place in war beside the professional fighting man. The tradition of courage has in this century become the common inheritance of all citizens of the Commonwealth.

"In the past century 1,344 men have won the Victoria Cross, three of them more than once. They were men of all ranks, and they came from all walks of life. They were of different colours and creeds. They fought in many lands and with many different weapons. If the Queen had been able to see into the future she would have known that a third Service would arise to seek this supreme award in the air.

"Ninety-nine years ago today, here in Hyde Park, the Queen presented the Cross to 62 officers and men honoured for their bravery in the Crimean War and the Baltic Sea.

"Today I am proud to stand here, with men and women from all parts of the Commonwealth, to do honour to the successors of that first gallant band, to the 300 brave men who are present and to those others who can be with us only in spirit, or in the memory of family and friends. But their stories are linked by a golden thread of extraordinary courage. Each man of them all gave the best that a man can give, and all too many gave their lives. All met with honour those demands of war which urge the valiant spirit to the limits of human endeavour and endurance. They dared mightily, and 'turned their necessity to glorious gain.' Today, in honouring them for what they did, we pay tribute to an ideal of courage which all in our fighting Services have done their best to attain.

"But on this proud occasion let us not forget that courage in battle is only one side of war's account. Do not let us think that it cancels out the suffering and misery which man has inflicted on man. We must all pray, and strive to secure, that the account may now be closed. But should the need arise, which God forbid, we can be sure of this: that there will not be wanting other brave spirits to uphold the record of those whose deeds, during the past eventful century, we proudly commemorate today."

The Queen then took the Salute at a March Past.

VICTORIA CROSS CENTENARY EXHIBITION.—An exhibition to mark the centenary of the Victoria Cross was opened in Marlborough House by the Prime Minister on 15th June and remained open to the public until 28th July, except on the afternoon of 26th June when it was open to holders of the V.C. only. The exhibits numbered more than 1,000, drawn from all over the British Commonwealth.

ATOMIC TESTS

A third series of atomic tests in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia took place in May and June.

A fourth series, which will be observed by some 200 Service men from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, will take place later in the year at the new atomic weapons proving ground at Maralinga, South Australia.

DEMONSTRATION "RUN AGROUND VII"

"Run Aground VII," the annual demonstration of amphibious warfare techniques, took place on 11th, 14th, and 16th May at Eastney, Portsmouth, and Culver Cliff, Isle of Wight.

Taking part were Special Boat Sections of the Royal Marines, including canoeists launched by seaward defence boat and parachutists dropped from aircraft; 42 Commando; 1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's); detachments from the Royal Tank Regiment; Field and Light A.A. Regiments, R.A.; the Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit; a Support Flight of R.A.F. Transport Command; Naval Air Squadrons; and ships of the Royal Navy.

CIVIL DEFENCE

COMMANDANT, CIVIL DEFENCE STAFF COLLEGE.—It was announced on 1st May that Major-General F. R. G. Matthews, C.B., D.S.O., has been appointed Commandant of the Civil Defence Staff College as from 7th May, in place of Major-General J. G. Bruce, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., resigned.

RECRUITMENT.—The United Kingdom Civil Defence authorities report that the strength of the Civil Defence and allied services in Great Britain on 31st March, 1956, was as follows :—

Civil Defence Corps	362,336
Auxiliary Fire Service	20,799
National Hospital Service Reserve	51,340
Special Constabulary	66,680

CANADA

INCREASED PAY FOR THE ARMED FORCES.—It was announced from Ottawa on 6th April that revised scales increasing the pay of officers and men had been authorized to take effect from 1st April, 1956. These revised pay schedules will, in particular, improve the income of men in the forces as their service increases.

DETACHMENTS TO OBSERVE ATOMIC TESTS IN AUSTRALIA.—A detachment of No. 1 Radiation Detection Unit, Canadian Army, with a small R.C.A.F. component will be part of the Canadian Services contingent which will participate in the atomic trials to be held at Maralinga, South Australia, later in the year.

FOREIGN

RUSSIA

REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES

On 14th May, it was announced by the Soviet Union that the following decisions in connection with the reduction of the armed forces had been taken, to be implemented by 1st May, 1957 :—

(1) The demobilization of a further 1,200,000 men, additional to the earlier reduction of 640,000 carried out in 1955.

(2) The consequent disbanding of 63 divisions and independent brigades, three air divisions, and other units, including 30,000 Soviet troops at present stationed in Eastern Germany.

(3) The relegation into reserve of 375 warships of the Soviet Navy, which would be taken out of the active fleet.

(4) Reductions in the Soviet military budget resulting from the foregoing measures.

NAVY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

VISIT TO SWEDEN.—A naval escort of three ships accompanied H.M. Yacht *Britannia* when The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh left Teesport, near Middlesbrough, on 4th June for a State visit to Sweden. They were the *Defender* and *Delight*, of the "Daring" class, and the destroyer escort *St. Laurent*, of the Royal Canadian Navy. Later in the month Her Majesty returned to the United Kingdom by air and H.M. Ships were positioned along the route of the Royal aircraft.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—The following have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen: Captain L. S. Bennett, C.B.E., in succession to Captain J. D. Crossman, C.B.E. (7th May, 1956); Captain E. Hewitt, R.D., R.N.R., as Royal Naval Reserve Aide-de-Camp, in succession to Captain E. J. R. Pollitt, R.D., R.N.R. (14th June, 1956).

HONORARY SURGEON.—Surgeon Captain E. B. Pollard has been appointed an Honorary Surgeon to The Queen, in succession to Surgeon Captain J. V. Williams (22nd March, 1956).

HONORARY PHYSICIAN.—Surgeon Captain D. M. Beaton, O.B.E., has been appointed an Honorary Physician to The Queen, in succession to Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Ingleby-Mackenzie, K.B.E., C.B. (4th May, 1956).

HONORARY CHAPLAIN.—The Rev. H. J. N. Purves, O.B.E., R.N., has been appointed an Honorary Chaplain to The Queen, in succession to the Rev. O. Roebuck, C.B.E., R.N. (1st June, 1956).

QUEEN MOTHER AT DEAL.—Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother on 23rd May opened a new three-storied barrack block at the Royal Marines Depot, Deal. Her Majesty arrived by helicopter. The First Lord of the Admiralty was among those present.

DUKE OF EDINBURGH.—The Duke of Edinburgh visited the Home Air Command in May. On the 16th, he went to Lee-on-Solent, the headquarters of the Command, and on the 17th and 18th visited five bases of the Fleet Air Arm, at Yeovilton, Somerset; Culdrose, Cornwall; Stretton, Lancashire; Arbroath, Angus; and Lossiemouth, Morayshire. (See also Royal Marines.)

FLAG APPOINTMENTS

WASHINGTON.—Vice-Admiral R. F. Elkins, C.B., C.V.O., O.B.E., to be Admiral, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, in succession to Vice-Admiral G. Barnard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (September, 1956).

NAVAL SECRETARY.—Captain R. A. Ewing, D.S.C., to be Naval Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty, in succession to Rear-Admiral J. D. Luce, D.S.O., O.B.E., serving in the acting rank of Rear-Admiral (August, 1956).

MEDITERRANEAN.—Rear-Admiral L. F. Durnford-Slater, C.B., to be Flag Officer (Air), Mediterranean, and Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Mediterranean, in succession to Vice-Admiral M. Richmond, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (October, 1956).

HOME FLEET.—Rear-Admiral J. D. Luce, D.S.O., O.B.E., to be Flag Officer (Flotillas), Home Fleet, in succession to Vice-Admiral R. G. Onslow, C.B., D.S.O. (August, 1956).

MEDICAL DIRECTOR-GENERAL.—Surgeon Rear-Admiral R. C. May, C.B., O.B.E., M.C., promoted Surgeon Vice-Admiral and appointed Medical Director-General of the Navy, in succession to Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Ingleby-Mackenzie, K.B.E., C.B. (30th April, 1956).

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following were included in the Birthday Honours List on 31st May :—

G.C.B.—Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, *K.C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, *D.S.O.*

K.C.B.—Vice-Admiral Eric G. A. Clifford, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*; Vice-Admiral Caspar John, *C.B.*

C.B.—Rear-Admiral R. A. Braine; Rear-Admiral P. W. Brock, *D.S.O.*; Rear-Admiral B. Bryant, *D.S.O.*, *D.S.C.*; Rear-Admiral J. Dent, *O.B.E.*; Rear-Admiral W. K. Edden, *O.B.E.*; Rear-Admiral H. J. B. Grylls; Surgeon Rear-Admiral (D) L. B. Osborne; Rear-Admiral G. Thistleton-Smith, *G.M.*; Rear-Admiral R. D. Watson, *C.B.E.*; Rear-Admiral W. K. Weston, *O.B.E.*

K.B.E.—Vice-Admiral John W. M. Eaton, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*, *D.S.C.*; Vice-Admiral William G. A. Robson, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*, *D.S.C.*

ADMIRALTY CIVIL STAFF :—

K.B.E.—C. G. Jarrett, *C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, Deputy Secretary.

C.B.—J. Anderson, *C.B.E.*, Chief Scientist, Admiralty Signal and Radar Establishment, Portsmouth.

RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

The following changes on the Flag List were announced to date 30th June, 1956 :—

Vice-Admiral Sir Alan K. Scott-Moncrieff, *K.C.B.*, *C.B.E.*, *D.S.O.*, to be promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

Rear-Admiral H. W. Biggs, *C.B.*, *D.S.O.*, to be promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

Rear-Admiral E. H. Shattock, *C.B.*, *O.B.E.*, to be placed on the Retired List.

The following was announced to date 30th April, 1956 :—

Surgeon Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Ingleby-Mackenzie, *K.B.E.*, *C.B.*, placed on the Retired List.

The following was announced in *The London Gazette* on 4th May :—

Surgeon Captain S. G. Weldon, *C.B.E.*, promoted to Surgeon Rear-Admiral (16th January, 1956).

HALF-YEARLY LISTS

The following promotions to Rear-Admiral in H.M. Fleet were announced to date 7th July, 1956 :—

Captain P. D. H. R. Pelly, *D.S.O.*; Captain T. V. Briggs, *O.B.E.*; Captain A. S. Bolt, *D.S.O.*, *D.S.C.*; Captain (acting Rear-Admiral) W. G. Crawford, *D.S.C.*; Captain M. S. Townsend, *D.S.O.*, *O.B.E.*, *D.S.C.*; Captain (acting Rear-Admiral) N. A. Copeman, *D.S.C.*

The following promotions have been made to date 30th June, 1956 :—

Commander to Captain.—E. W. Briggs, *D.S.C.*; J. C. Cartwright, *D.S.C.*; M. A. Hemans, *D.S.C.*; S. A. G. St. John; G. O. Symonds, *D.S.C.*; A. H. Abrams, *D.S.C.*; A. E. M. Raynsford; R. H. P. Carver, *D.S.C.*; P. G. Sharp, *D.S.C.*; A. R. E. Evans; R. N. Hankey, *D.S.C.*; H. C. J. Shand, *D.S.C.*; D. H. Mason; R. G. Dreyer, *M.B.E.*; O. H. M. St. J. Steiner; A. H. Rowlandson; H. L. Lloyd, *D.S.C.*

Engineering Branch—Commander to Captain.—T. G. B. Pearce; J. G. Cannon; J. F. Lewin; M. A. L. Cooper, *M.B.E.* (acting Captain); A. F. Turner, *D.S.C.*

Electrical Branch—Commander to Captain.—A. W. L. Humphry-Salwey; P. P. M. Green.

Instructor Branch—Instructor Commander to Instructor Captain.—J. A. Burnett (acting Instructor Captain); C. R. Darlington (acting Instructor Captain).

Medical Branch—Surgeon Commander to Surgeon Captain.—A. E. Flannery, O.B.E. ; J. A. Page.

Supply and Secretariat Branch—Commander to Captain.—H. L. Cryer ; W. R. Michell ; C. K. T. Wheen.

EXERCISES AND CRUISES

HOME FLEET SUMMER CRUISE.—Ships of the Home Fleet assembled at Portland early in May for their Summer cruise and training programme, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir John Eccles, flying his flag in H.M.S. *Tyne*. Some ships visited ports in France, the flagship and two "Daring" class ships proceeding to Brest. The *Corunna* visited her name port of La Coruna, Spain. Subsequently the Fleet went to Invergordon for weapon training, where it was visited by the First Sea Lord. During July the ships carried out a programme of visits to seaside towns in the United Kingdom.

N.A.T.O. CHANNEL EXERCISE.—A N.A.T.O. anti-submarine and convoy exercise took place in the English Channel and adjoining waters from 27th to 30th May. The exercise, conducted by the Commander, Brest Sub-area, was designed to test the co-operation of naval and maritime air forces in convoy protection, and elements of the forces of Britain, France, and the Netherlands took part.

RESERVE FLEET.—From 11th to 23rd June the third in the series of "Sleeping Beauty" exercises, in which ships are brought forward from reserve and prepared for operational service in the shortest possible time, took place at Portsmouth. An inshore minesweeper was selected, and for the first time the commissioning party was made up of reserve officers and ratings under the command of Lieutenant-Commander G. J. Y. Thorpe, of the London Division, R.N.V.R. The minesweeper afterwards made a shake-down cruise in the Channel.

MEDITERRANEAN.—Exercise "Medflex Dragon" took place in the Mediterranean between 11th and 20th April, when naval and air forces from France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and the United States took part, under the overall direction of Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean. From 6th to 11th June, a British naval force visited Istanbul under the command of Admiral Grantham, in the cruiser *Birmingham*. The surveying ship *Dalrymple* paid a formal visit to Monaca from 17th to 20th April for the wedding of Prince Rainier and Miss Grace Kelly.

FAR EAST.—After taking part in "Monsoon," the largest Commonwealth maritime exercise ever held in Far Eastern waters, ships of the Royal Navy and the Australian and New Zealand Navies arrived at Singapore and Hong Kong in April. The forces taking part included the French aircraft carrier *Lafayette*, United States jet aircraft from the Philippines, two destroyers and three frigates from the R.A.N., and two frigates from the R.N.Z.N. Vice-Admiral R. F. Elkins, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East, was in tactical command of the naval forces.

AUSTRALIA, ATOMIC TEST.—For the third test of British atomic weapons in the Monte Bello Islands in May, the Navy provided a special squadron under Commodore Hugh Martell in the tank landing ship *Narvik*. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, visited the squadron at the Monte Bello Islands and saw the various preparations being made ashore.

SOUTH ATLANTIC.—While on passage from Rio de Janeiro to the Mediterranean via the Cape, H.M.S. *Kenya* visited the lonely Commonwealth outpost of Tristan da Cunha, situated midway between the American and African continents, in May. She was the first British cruiser to do so since 1937. While in the area the *Kenya* made radio contact with the British Scientific Survey Expedition which is establishing a pilot meteorological station on uninhabited Gough Island, 250 miles south-east of Tristan.

WESTERN ATLANTIC.—From 1st to 6th May, United States, Canadian, and United Kingdom naval and air units took part in a N.A.T.O. anti-submarine exercise, "New

Broom V." Overall control was exercised by Admiral Jerauld Wright, U.S.N., Commander-in-Chief, Western Atlantic Area. Convoys sailing from Norfolk, Virginia, to Gibraltar came under individual and co-ordinated attacks by "enemy" submarines.

PERSONNEL

SCHOLARSHIP GRANTS INCREASED.—The tax-free grants payable under the scholarship schemes maintained by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were increased from 1st May. They are intended to help boys of 16 to remain at their own schools until they are old enough and educationally qualified for entry into the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, or the R.A.F. College, Cranwell. In future, the parents or guardians of all scholarship holders, regardless of the size of their income, will be eligible for the refund of 100 per cent. of school tuition fees (subject to an annual maximum of £100), and in addition maintenance awards will now be made to those whose net income is £1,700 or below. The Admiralty will award up to 90 scholarships each year.

MECHANICAL TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT.—The former R.N. Air Station at Gosport, known as H.M.S. *Siskin*, changed its function on 1st June when it was recommissioned as H.M.S. *Sultan* for use as the Navy's training establishment for all ratings of the Engineering Mechanical Branch. H.M.S. *Sultan* takes its name from an old ironclad which was moored off Portsmouth Dockyard for many years, and with the monitor *Marshal Soult* was the headquarters for mechanical training in the Navy until 1943, when the establishment was moved to shore premises at Flathouse, Portsmouth.

V.C. MEMORIAL.—On 4th July, the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Creasy, opened a Memorial in the grounds of the Royal Naval Hospital, Portland, to the late Leading Seaman Jack Mantle, V.C., of H.M.S. *Foylebank*, which was sunk in Portland Harbour in 1940. The memorial takes the form of a sun lodge erected by public subscription in the grounds of the hospital.

MATERIEL

LAUNCHES.—H.M.S. *Porpoise*, first of the post-war operational type submarines, was launched at Barrow-in-Furness on 25th April. She has an extreme length of 295 ft. 3 in., and extreme breadth of 26 ft. 6 in. Her complement is six officers and 65 men. H.M.S. *Palliser*, anti-submarine frigate of the "Blackwood" class, was launched at Govan, Glasgow, on 10th May. She has an extreme length of 310 ft. and a beam of 33 ft., and will be armed with three Bofors guns and two three-barrelled anti-submarine mortars. The first of seven new diesel-electric paddle tugs ordered by the Admiralty, H.M. tug *Director*, was launched on 11th June at Scotstoun, Glasgow.

TRIALS CRUISER.—H.M.S. *Cumberland*, trials cruiser, sailed for the Mediterranean in May to carry out a further series of tests of new equipment, including new 3-in. and 6-in. turrets. Television has been installed in the engine-rooms to indicate the water level in boilers, while automatic temperature control of lubricating and fuel oil is also to be tested. New cabins for officers have been constructed for trial, and several experimental boats are being carried.

SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS TO CLOSE.—The R.N. Armament Depot at Woolwich is to be closed down gradually during the next two or three years. Naval establishments at Scapa Flow are to close except an oil depot and the services to maintain it. The Admiralty no longer foresee sufficient use for the installations, either in peace or war, to justify their retention.

FLEET AIR ARM

CARRIERS IN FAR EAST.—The light fleet carriers *Albion* and *Centaur*, which left the United Kingdom in January, returned to Portsmouth and Devonport respectively on 15th May. The *Albion* had proceeded to Bombay, headquarters of the Indian Navy; and the *Centaur* to Karachi, headquarters of the Pakistan Navy. Flying demonstrations were given before entering these ports, and later, in company, the ships gave a similar

demonstration off Ceylon before proceeding to Colombo, headquarters of the Royal Ceylon Navy. Going on to Singapore and Hong Kong, exercises with ships of the Far East Fleet and of the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies took place.

RESERVE PILOTS' JET LANDINGS.—Between 23rd June and 7th July, the first landings by reserve pilots of R.N.V.R. Air Squadrons with jet aircraft on an aircraft carrier took place during the annual training of the three squadrons of the Southern Air Division, Nos. 1832, 1835, and 1836. Flying Attacker and Sea Hawk fighters, the squadrons carried out their training from the R.N. Air Station, Ford, and made the landings on the aircraft carrier *Bulwark*.

NEW BANNER TARGET.—A new banner (target) streaming device known as Excelsior has been developed for the Royal Navy and cleared for use in Sea Hawk F.G.A., Mark 4, aircraft. The conventional method of banner towing is to lay out a banner on a runway and tow it off. This has disadvantages at busy air stations. The new device enables a banner to be towed in a squadron aircraft taking off at the same time and from the same airfield as the firing aircraft, the banner being paid out while in the air.

ROYAL TOURNAMENT SUCCESS.—The Fleet Air Arm won all three trophies in the R.N. inter-port field gun competition at the Royal Tournament, which ended at Earl's Court on 23rd June.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

PROMOTIONS.—The following were announced to date 30th June, 1956 :—

Commander to Captain.—L. J. Sharman, R.D. ; H. N. Lawson, R.D.

Supply and Secretariat Branch—Commander to Captain.—J. G. Greig, R.D.

ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

MEDITERRANEAN EXERCISE

Communication ratings from General Service Divisions of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and units of the R.N.V.R. (Wireless) Reserve flew to the Mediterranean to help to operate wireless stations and signal establishments during a N.A.T.O. fleet exercise. Two drafts, one for Gibraltar and one for Malta, left Britain on 11th April for 10 days' duty overseas. Included in the Gibraltar draft were two officers and 25 ratings of the Women's R.N.V.R. under the command of Second Officer Jean McCormick, W.R.N.V.R., who during the last war controlled a combined staff of W.R.N.S., A.T.S. and W.A.A.F. telephonists at Portsmouth and Fort Southwick.

WOMEN'S ROYAL NAVAL SERVICE

CHIEF COMMANDANT'S VISITS

The Duchess of Kent, Chief Commandant of the W.R.N.S., visited Malta from 9th to 14th May and inspected units of the Service stationed there. On 12th June, the Duchess inspected units at the R.N. Signal School, H.M.S. *Mercury*, at Petersfield.

QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S R.N. NURSING SERVICE

NEW MATRON-IN-CHIEF

Miss B. Nockolds, R.R.C., assumed the appointment of Matron-in-Chief of the Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service on 14th July, in succession to Miss K. V. Chapman, R.R.C., Q.H.N.S., who is retiring. Miss Nockolds joined the Service in 1934, and in 1953 was promoted to Principal Matron at the R.N. Hospital, Chatham.

ROYAL MARINES

NEW COLOURS.—The Duke of Edinburgh, who is Captain General of the Royal Marines, presented new Colours to the Royal Marines Barracks, Eastney, on 23rd April. He flew to Portsmouth by helicopter, landing on the south lawn of the barracks. The old Colours were presented by the late Duke of Kent on 3rd December, 1931.

PROMOTIONS.—The following were included in the half-yearly list to date 30th June, 1956 :—

Lieutenant-Colonel to Colonel.—N. C. Ries, O.B.E.

Major to Lieutenant-Colonel.—J. L. A. Macafee ; F. C. Barton (acting Lieutenant-Colonel).

RESERVE TRAINING IN GERMANY.—Twelve officers and 80 other ranks of the R.M. Forces Volunteer Reserve left Harwich on 3rd June for Krefeld for 14 days' training under active service conditions in Germany. This was the first time that so large a number of reservists had taken part in a planned exercise alongside Regular Royal Marine forces in Germany.

NEW RESERVE HEADQUARTERS.—A new Headquarters for the City of London Centre of the R.M.F.V.R. was opened in May by Lieutenant-General C. R. Hardy, Commandant General, Royal Marines. The new Headquarters are in Wood Lane, W.12, adjoining the White City Stadium, in drill hall premises formerly occupied by a Territorial Army unit.

CANADA

H.M.C.S. ST. LAURENT

Canada's most modern anti-submarine destroyer escort, H.M.C.S. *St. Laurent*, completed earlier this year, formed part of the escort of the Royal Yacht *Britannia* during the Queen's State visit to Stockholm in June, and afterwards visited London, berthing at Battle Bridge Tier, opposite the Tower, on 19th June. She was the largest Canadian warship to berth in the Pool of London. The *St. Laurent* was wholly designed and built in Canada by a new engineering technique known as "unit construction."

AUSTRALIA

APPOINTMENT

Captain A. J. T. Roe, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.N., has been lent to the Royal Australian Navy as 4th Naval Member of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, to serve in the rank of Commodore 2nd Class while holding the appointment.

NEW ZEALAND

CRUISER COMMISSIONED

The cruiser *Royalist* was commissioned for the Royal New Zealand Navy at Devonport on 17th April to replace the *Bellona*. The New Zealand Naval Board sent a message to Captain P. Phipps, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N., in command, welcoming the delivery of a modern cruiser, which "marks the commencement of a new era in our history."

INDIA

VISIT OF FORMER D.C.N.S.

Rear-Admiral R. D. Katari, late Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy, arrived in the United Kingdom in mid-April for a visit of over three months to study naval developments. On his return he is due to relieve Rear-Admiral Sir St. John R. J. Tyrwhitt as the first Indian Flag Officer (Flotillas), Indian Fleet.

FOREIGN

CHILE

NEW DESTROYER

The keel of the first of two destroyers to be built for the Chilean Navy was laid at the shipyard of Vickers-Armstrongs, Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness, on 20th June.

ISRAEL

DESTROYERS FROM BRITAIN

The destroyers *Eilat* and *Jaffo*, formerly the *Zealous* and *Zodiac* in the Royal Navy, arrived at Haifa on 20th June. The new Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Myerson, conveyed her thanks to the British Ambassador, Sir John Nicolls, for the great help extended by the Admiralty in refitting these ships which, she said, represented an important addition to the Israel Navy.

NETHERLANDS

WOMEN'S NAVAL SERVICE

The Director of the Women's Royal Netherlands Naval Service, Mrs. E. G. Van Diemen, arrived in England on 14th May to meet the Director of the Women's Royal Naval Service, Commandant Nancy M. Robertson, and to visit establishments connected with the training and other aspects of the W.R.N.S.

RUSSIA

STRENGTH.—In a written reply in the House of Commons on 18th April the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Defence, said that according to latest estimates the Soviet Navy is about 600,000 strong. The Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty, in another reply on the same date, said that the Soviet Navy has approximately 475 submarines in service.

VISIT TO PORTSMOUTH.—For their visit to Britain in April, Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev travelled in the Russian cruiser *Ordzhonikidze*, escorted by the destroyers *Sovershenny* and *Smotryashchi*, the force being under the command of Rear-Admiral Kotov in the first-named. The squadron arrived on 18th April and left on the 27th. The ships were open to visitors on three days. A dinner for the Russian leaders was given on behalf of the three Armed Services on 20th April in the Painted Hall of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, at which the First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Cileennin, presided.

UNITED STATES

SHIPS COMMISSIONED

The 60,000-ton aircraft carrier *Saratoga*, described as the biggest and most powerful warship in the world, was commissioned on 14th April at the New York Navy Yard, Brooklyn, in the presence of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Charles S. Thomas, Governor Harriman, and 6,000 other guests. According to *The Times*, the *Saratoga*, built at a cost of 207m. dollars (£74m.), is three feet longer than the *Forrestal*, the first of the class to have been put into service, but has much more powerful engines, developing over 250,000 h.p. and giving an estimated average speed of 34 knots. She can carry and launch 100 aircraft from her angled decks.

The cruiser *Canberra*, converted for the carrying of supersonic, anti-aircraft guided missiles, was commissioned at the Philadelphia naval base in June. She and her sister-ship the *Boston* are said to be the only two in the world equipped for their particular purpose.

ARMY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen attended the dedication and opened the Household Brigade Memorial Cloister in Wellington Barracks on 28th May.

The Queen, accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh (Colonel, Welsh Guards) and the Duke of Gloucester (Colonel, Scots Guards), was present at The Queen's Birthday Parade on the Horse Guards Parade on 31st May.

The Queen inspected the 1st Battalion, The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire), at Stockton racecourse on 4th June.

The Queen reviewed the Grenadier Guards in Windsor Great Park on 23rd June, on the occasion of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Regiment.

The Queen presented a Guidon to The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons) in the Garden of the Palace of Holyrood-house on 5th July.

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Army Medical Corps, visited the Depot and Training Establishment at Crookham on 13th July.

The Duke of Gloucester inspected the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards, at Wellington Barracks on 1st May.

The Duke of Gloucester, as President of the Imperial War Graves Commission, unveiled the Groesbeck Memorial to officers and men of the British Commonwealth who fell during the advance from the River Seine into Germany but who have no known graves, in Holland on 2nd June.

The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Corps of Signals, presented a Pipe Banner to Lieut.-Colonel L. H. M. Gregory, who received it on behalf of the Gurkha Signals, at St. James's Palace on 21st April.

The Princess Royal, Controller Commandant of the Women's Royal Army Corps, visited the W.R.A.C. Depot at Guildford on 22nd April, and 305 Battalion, W.R.A.C., T.A., at Blackfell Camp, Washington, Co. Durham, on 2nd July.

The Princess Royal, on behalf of The Queen, presented new Colours to the 7th Battalion, T.A., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, in Greenhead Park, Huddersfield, on 7th July.

The Duchess of Kent, on behalf of The Queen, presented new Colours to the 4th Battalion, The Dorset Regiment, of which Her Royal Highness is Colonel-in-Chief, at Dorchester on 7th June.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments:—

TO BE COLONEL-IN-CHIEF.—Of The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), H.M. King Gustav of Sweden.

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE QUEEN.—Brigadier G. A. Thomas, O.B.E. (19th April, 1956), vice Brigadier H. E. Fernyhough, D.S.O., retired; Colonel A. S. Pearson, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., T.D., D.L. (16th May, 1956); Colonel W. Q. Roberts, D.S.O., M.V.O., O.B.E., T.D., J.P. (16th May, 1956); Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. A. Marshall, O.B.E., B.Sc.(Eng.), M.I.Mech.E. (9th July, 1956), vice Brigadier L. G. Smith, C.B.E., M.I.Mech.E., retired.

TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP (ADDITIONAL) TO THE QUEEN.—Colonel G. W. Fenton, O.B.E., T.D., D.L. (5th February, 1956), vice Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) C. B. S. Morley, C.B.E., T.D., D.L., tenure expired.

TO BE HONORARY SURGEON TO THE QUEEN.—Lieut.-General W. A. D. Drummond, C.B., C.B.E., F.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. (2nd May, 1956), vice Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Harris, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., LL.D., M.B., D.P.H., retired.

TO BE MASTER GUNNER, St. JAMES'S PARK.—General Sir Cameron G. G. Nicholson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. (1st December, 1956), vice Field-Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., who will relinquish the appointment on that date.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Horse Artillery, General Sir Cameron G. G. Nicholson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. (3rd May, 1956), vice Lieut.-General Sir Otto M. Lund, K.C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired; of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Brigadier A. J. Daniell, C.B.E., D.S.O. (3rd May, 1956), vice Lieut.-General Sir Otto M. Lund, K.C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired; of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Major-General N. A. Coxwell-Rogers, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (13th May, 1956), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) Sir Gordon N. Macready, Bart., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., tenure expired, and Lieut.-General Sir Kenneth G. McLean, K.C.B., K.B.E. (26th June, 1956), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) Sir Charles J. S. King, K.B.E., C.B., M.Inst.C.E., tenure expired; of Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps, Brigadier Dame Helen S. Gillespie, D.B.E., R.R.C., Q.H.N.S. (July, 1956), vice Brigadier Dame Anne Thomson, D.B.E., R.R.C., who has relinquished the appointment.

TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.—Of The Durham Light Infantry, Major-General J. H. N. Poett, C.B., D.S.O. (1st July, 1956), vice Lieut.-General Sir Terence S. Airey, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E., resigned; of the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles), Brigadier (temporary Major-General) L. H. O. Pugh, C.B.E., D.S.O. (20th March, 1956), vice Lieut.-General Sir Francis I. S. Tucker, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., tenure expired; of the 7th Gurkha Rifles, General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O. (25th May, 1956), vice H.E. Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., resigned.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following were included in The Queen's Birthday Honours List :—

G.C.B.—General Sir E. C. Robert Mansergh, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C.

K.C.B.—Lieut.-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E.; Lieut.-General W. P. Oliver, C.B., O.B.E.

C.B.—Major-General G. A. Bond, C.B.E.; Brigadier A. E. Brocklehurst, D.S.O.; Major-General G. O. Crawford, C.B.E.; Major-General W. G. Fryer, C.B.E.; Major-General C. E. R. Hirsch, C.B.E.; Major-General A. E. Morrison, O.B.E.; Major-General W. G. H. Pike, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Colonel (acting) (Honorary Brigadier) G. R. P. Roupell, V.C., D.L.; Major-General T. P. D. Scott, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major-General N. P. H. Tapp, C.B.E., D.S.O.

G.B.E.—General Sir John F. M. Whiteley, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.C.

D.B.E.—Brigadier Mary Railton, C.B.E., A.D.C. (Hon.).

K.B.E.—Major-General A. D. Campbell, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.; Major-General (temporary) W. R. N. Hinde, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.; Major-General (Honorary) H. Williams, C.B., C.B.E.

R.R.C. (First Class).—Lieut.-Colonel Phyllis E. Wilkins, A.R.R.C., Q.A.R.A.N.C.

ARMY COUNCIL

The Queen has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal bearing date the 14th day of May, 1956, to appoint the following to be Her Majesty's Army Council :—

Brigadier the Rt. Hon. A. H. Head, C.B.E., M.C.—*President*.

Brigadier F. H. R. Maclean, C.B.E.—*Vice-President*.

General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O.

General Sir Cameron G. G. Nicholson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

Lieut.-General Sir Maurice S. Chilton, K.B.E., C.B.
 Lieut.-General W. P. Oliver, C.B., O.B.E.
 Lieut.-General Sir A. Dudley Ward, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
 E. W. Playfair, Esq., C.B.

APPOINTMENTS

WAR OFFICE.—Colonel C. M. Johnson, R.R.C., Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps, appointed Matron-in-Chief and Director of Army Nursing Services, with the temporary rank of Brigadier (25th June, 1956).

Major-General G. E. R. Bastin, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Director of Weapons and Development (September, 1956).

Lieut.-General Sir Hugh C. Stockwell, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War (December, 1956).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Brigadier R. B. F. K. Goldsmith, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Western Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1956).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) W. F. R. Turner, D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 44th Infantry Division, T.A., and Home Counties District, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1956).

Lieut.-General Sir E. Otway Herbert, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Western Command (January, 1957).

GERMANY.—Brigadier H. C. W. King, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief Engineer, Headquarters, Northern Army Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (September, 1956).

Major-General H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., I Corps, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (November, 1956).

Lieut.-General Sir A. Dudley Ward, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed C-in-C., British Army of the Rhine, and N.A.T.O. Commander, Northern Army Group (January, 1957).

MALTA.—Major-General C. H. Colquhoun, C.B., O.B.E., appointed G.O.C. Troops, Malta (November, 1956).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Lieut.-General Sir Geoffrey K. Bourne, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., appointed Commander-in-Chief (October, 1956).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General F. H. Brooke, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Federation Army (Malaya) (June, 1956).

Brigadier A. E. Brocklehurst, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Malaya Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (October, 1956).

S.H.A.P.E.—Major-General J. R. Cochrane, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Principal Staff Officer to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (7th June, 1956).

ALLIED LAND FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE.—Major-General C. E. R. Hirsch, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (5th June, 1956).

PROMOTIONS

Lieut.-Generals.—Temporary Lieut.-General to be Lieut.-General:—W. A. D. Drummond, C.B., C.B.E., F.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. (2nd May, 1956).

Major-Generals to be temporary Lieut.-Generals:—C. F. C. Coleman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E. (15th May, 1956); R. H. Bower, C.B., C.B.E. (19th May, 1956).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals or Brigadiers to be Major-Generals:—R. N. Anderson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (12th April, 1956); C. L. Richardson, C.B.E., D.S.O., B.A. (24th April, 1956); D. Bluett, O.B.E., M.B. (2nd May, 1956).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals :—G. E. Butler, C.B.E., B.Sc.(Eng.), M.I.Mech.E. (28th April, 1956) ; C. A. R. Nevill, C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st May, 1956) ; C. R. Price, C.B., C.B.E., A.D.C., B.A., B.Sc. (1st June, 1956).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired :—Major-General G. H. Inglis, C.B., C.B.E. (24th April, 1956) ; Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Harris, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., Q.H.S., LL.D., M.B., D.P.H. (2nd May, 1956) ; Major-General F. M. Hext, C.B., O.B.E., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.E.E. (26th May, 1956) ; Major-General A. C. Shortt, C.B., O.B.E. (20th June, 1956).

MILITARY COMMAND IN WEST AFRICA

As a prelude to the attainment of self-government by the Gold Coast, the War Office has announced that with effect from 1st July, 1956, the Governor assumed responsibility for the control and administration of the Gold Coast Military Forces. From that date the following adjustments took place :—

- (a) The War Office relinquished control of the Gold Coast Military Forces.
- (b) Headquarters West Africa Command was abolished.
- (c) Nigeria and Sierra Leone/Gambia became separate military organizations, each with its own commander and staff, working under the War Office.

In order that some form of defence co-ordination between the four West African Governments should continue, the existing West African Army Advisory Council is being retained.

EXERCISE "TRYOUT"

Eastern Command held a Civil Defence exercise from 1st–6th May. Named "Try Out," this exercise was the culmination of exercises and study periods, held by the Army in all Home Commands during the Winter, to consider the ways in which the Army could best co-operate with the Civil Defence organizations in the event of a nuclear attack on this Country.

The main purpose of "Try Out" was to exercise headquarters and staffs. The Territorial Army played a large part together with the newly-formed Mobile Defence Corps and, in some areas, the Home Guard. The main activities occurred during the week-end 5th/6th May so that members of the Reserve Army could take part.

The many lessons drawn from the exercise were discussed at a press conference on 7th May.

ARMoured BASIC TRAINING REGIMENTS

The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons) and the 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) are to replace the 65th and 67th Training Regiments, R.A.C., respectively. Both Training Regiments will be disbanded and the Royal Scots Greys and 11th Hussars will be reorganized as Armoured Basic Training Units, taking over the Training Regiments' commitments. The Greys will be engaged in tank training, and the 11th Hussars will concentrate on armoured car training. The handover and disbandment are due to be completed in January, 1957.

REORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE ARMY

On 8th May, at a press conference, Major-General M. M. A. R. West, Director-General of the Territorial Army, gave details of the reorganization of the Territorial Army which has been completed.

No Territorial units have been abolished and those which have been amalgamated or converted to new roles will retain their territorial affiliations. By increasing the strength of individual units the manpower of the Territorial Army will be maintained. Cuts will be borne by the Army Emergency Reserve.

The Territorial Army will be reduced to 10 infantry divisions, two of which, earmarked for N.A.T.O., will have tanks and medium guns. Otherwise, all will have the same organization and training.

The 34 existing regiments of the R.A.C., T.A., will be reduced, by amalgamation or conversion, to 20. Those converted will be three Royal Tank regiments and one Yeomanry regiment which become infantry. Of the 20 regiments retained, 11 will be reconnaissance regiments, three are allotted to each of the N.A.T.O. divisions, two are allotted to the Regular Strategic Reserve, and one will be a delivery regiment.

The 16th Airborne Division, as already announced, is being reduced to a parachute brigade group, the Beach Landing Brigade is being converted to infantry, and the artillery regiments are being reduced from 57 to 48.

REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for May show that the total number of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,548 men and 295 boys compared with 2,811 and 105 in March and 3,083 and 165 in April. The figures for re-enlistments were 4 from Short Service (March, 4; April, 6) and 423 from National Service (March, 487; April, 504).

MISCELLANEOUS

REVIEW TO CELEBRATE THE RAISING OF THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.—On 26th May, the whole of the Royal Artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division was reviewed at Woolwich by General Sir Robert Mansergh, C.-in-C. United Kingdom Land Forces, in celebration of the raising of the Royal Regiment of Artillery at Woolwich on 26th May, 1716.

R.E. ANNIVERSARIES.—The 10th Transport Squadron, R.E., and the 8th Railway Squadron, R.E., both of which were among the original 10 companies of the Corps of Royal Engineers numbered by Royal Warrant in 1806, celebrated their 150th anniversary on 15th May at the Transportation Centre, R.E., Longmoor Camp, Hampshire.

VISIT TO BRUGES BY 1ST BATTALION, GRENADIER GUARDS.—To mark the tercentenary of the Regiment, first formed in Bruges in 1656 by King Charles II when in exile, the 1st Battalion, Grenadier Guards, accompanied by the Regimental Band, visited Bruges on 5th, 6th, and 7th June by the hospitality of the Belgian and Bruges authorities. The Battalion was inspected by and marched past the Burgomaster in the market place on 6th June, and in the evening a drill display was given by the Queen's Company, followed by the beating of Tattoo by the Band of the Regiment and Drums of the Battalion.

FREEDOM OF WELLS FOR THE SOMERSET LIGHT INFANTRY.—The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's) received the freedom of entry into the city of Wells at a ceremony in the city on 25th April.

LAST BRITISH TROOPS LEAVE SUEZ BASE.—The last British troops, consisting of 11 officers and 68 other ranks, left Egypt on 13th June, *en route* to Cyprus.

SOLDIERS CAN GRADUATE BY POST.—Under an extension of the forces correspondence scheme, soldiers can now graduate by postal tuition. Degree courses for the B.A., B.Sc., B.Sc.(Economics), and B.L. have been added to the list of subjects.

BISLEY.—The Regular Army won the United Service Challenge Cup; Sergeant D. W. Kingdon, R.E.M.E., Armourer, 1st Battalion, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, won The Queen's Medal and Regular Army Championship; and Sapper J. Northcliffe, 106th Field Regiment, R.E., T.A., won The Queen's Medal and Territorial Army Championship.

CANADA

H.M. THE QUEEN.—The Queen has recently conferred the honour of the title 'Royal' on The New Brunswick Regiment and has graciously consented to assume the Colonelcy-in-Chief of the Regiment.

APPOINTMENTS.—Brigadier J. E. C. Pangman, D.S.O., E.D., C.D., has been appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

Brigadier H. E. T. Doucet, O.B.E., E.D., has been appointed a Director of the National Defence College.

Brigadier R. W. Moncel, D.S.O., O.B.E., has been appointed Senior Military Adviser, Canadian Delegation, Vietnam.

Brigadier W. A. B. Anderson, O.B.E., C.D., is to become Vice Adjutant-General.

Brigadier A. F. B. Knight, O.B.E., is to become Army Member, Canadian Joint Staff, in London.

Brigadier J. W. Bishop, O.B.E., is to become Commander, British Columbia Area.

Brigadier J. V. Allard, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., is to become Commander, Eastern Quebec Area.

Colonel D. Menard, D.S.O., C.D., is to become Commander, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, with the acting rank of Brigadier.

Colonel P. S. Cooper, O.B.E., C.D., has been appointed Military Adviser to the Canadian Commissioner in Laos, with the acting rank of Brigadier.

Colonel E. D. Danby, D.S.O., O.B.E., has been appointed Director of Military Training at Army Headquarters.

Colonel R. L. Houston, C.D., has been appointed Director of Military Operations and Plans.

EXERCISE "MORNING STAR."—This, the second peace-time divisional-scale exercise in the history of the Canadian Army, is taking place under simulated conditions of nuclear warfare between 26th July and 3rd August at Camp Gagetown, and culminates a six-week training concentration of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.

SENIOR OFFICERS' SCHOOL.—A new school for senior officers of the Regular Army, located at Kingston, will start its first eight-week course on 10th September. The aim of the school will be to instruct selected majors and lieutenant-colonels in the latest tactical doctrines, administrative procedures, and command responsibilities.

SOLDIER APPRENTICES.—Enrolment of the 1956 intake of 360 soldier apprentices began on 1st June. The new group brings the total number who have joined the Army under this programme since it started in 1952 to almost 1,500. Of these, some 325 are now completely qualified and are serving in Regular units.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES.—Equipment shipped to N.A.T.O. countries since 1st April has included guns and ammunition, sub-machine guns, field artillery tractors, military trucks and ambulances with spare parts, and spare parts for self-propelled guns.

AUSTRALIA

BIRTHDAY HONOURS.—The following was included in The Queen's Birthday Honours List :—

C.B.—Lieut.-General E. W. Woodward, C.B.E., D.S.O.

APPOINTMENTS.—Brigadier L. G. Canet, C.B.E., has been appointed Deputy Master-General of the Ordnance in succession to Brigadier G. H. O'Brien, C.B.E., who has retired.

Colonel M. F. Brogan, O.B.E., has been appointed Brigadier General Staff (B), and has been promoted to Brigadier.

Colonel T. Fogarty has been appointed Commander, 2nd Armoured Brigade, with the temporary rank of Brigadier.

Colonel P. P. Jackson has been appointed Director of Maintenance.

Colonel S. J. Blechmore has been appointed Chief Engineer, Southern Command.

Lieut.-Colonel C. A. E. Fraser, M.B.E., has been appointed Director of Military Training at Army Headquarters.

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARMoured CORPS REORGANIZATION.—Plans for the reorganization of a number of units of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps have been approved by the Federal Cabinet. The changes are reported to be consequent upon the planning that has been carried out to fit Australian forces for operations in tropical terrain in the event of emergency.

Briefly, the new plans provide for the following changes :—

The 7/21st Australian Horse to be reformed into two units: the 7/21st Australian Horse as an anti-tank regiment and a new unit, the 56th Battalion (Riverina Regiment), as a reconnaissance regiment. The 2/14th Queensland Mounted Infantry and the 3/9th South Australian Mounted Rifles to be reorganized and equipped as anti-tank regiments. The new anti-tank regiments are to remain part of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and will retain their present titles.

The 6th New South Wales Mounted Rifles to be reorganized as an infantry battalion and to form part of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps, retaining its present title.

FOREIGN

THE VATICAN

The Swiss Guard at the Vatican, probably the world's smallest Regular Army as well as its oldest, celebrated its 450th anniversary on 6th May by military ceremonies with pipes and drums and a parade. Later, the Guard was received in audience by the Pope, who conferred on members a special medal commemorating this anniversary.

The origins of the Guard go back to the XIVth Century when a number of Swiss and other foreign mercenaries took service with the reigning Pope, but the foundation of the Regular Guard dates from 1506, when 150 Swiss soldiers arrived in Rome to establish a permanent Swiss Corps for the protection of the Pope and the papal palaces, and were given the blessing of the Pope in St. Peter's Square. Including the new recruits, who take their traditional oath on this anniversary, the present strength of the Guard is 83.

AIR NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

BIRTHDAY SALUTE.—Eighteen four-engined Shackleton aircraft of Coastal Command flew in formation over Buckingham Palace on 31st May to mark Her Majesty's official birthday.

R.A.F. ESCORT TO ROYAL YACHT BRITANNIA.—Two Shackleton four-engined, long-range, maritime reconnaissance aircraft escorted the Royal Yacht *Britannia* when The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh sailed from Middlesbrough on 4th June for the State Visit to Sweden.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The honours conferred by The Queen on the occasion of Her Majesty's official birthday included the following:—

K.C.B.—Air Marshal R. B. Jordan, C.B., D.F.C.; Air Marshal T. N. McEvoy, C.B., C.B.E.

C.B.—Air Vice-Marshal R. H. Stanbridge, O.B.E., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.P.M., D.I.H. (Retd.); Air Vice-Marshal J. N. T. Stephenson, C.B.E.; acting Air Vice-Marshal F. G. S. Mitchell, C.B.E.; Air Commodore H. Eeles, C.B.E.; Air Commodore J. Grandy, D.S.O.; Air Commodore D. W. R. Ryley, C.B.E.; acting Air Commodore P. H. Dunn, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.D.C.; Group Captain J. D. Melvin, O.B.E.

K.B.E.—Air Marshal R. L. R. Atcherley, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C.; Air Marshal G. E. Nicholletts, C.B., A.F.C.; Air Vice-Marshal J. R. Whitley, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.

APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Vice-Marshal G. W. Tuttle, C.B., O.B.E., D.F.C., appointed acting Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (July, 1956).

INSPECTOR-GENERAL.—Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter L. Dawson, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Inspector-General (31st July, 1956).

COASTAL COMMAND.—Air Marshal Sir Bryan V. Reynolds, K.C.B., C.B.E., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (5th April, 1956).

FLYING TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal H. H. Brookes, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 25 Group instead of No. 61 Group (April, 1956).

MAINTENANCE COMMAND.—Air Commodore F. W. Felgate, C.B.E., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (1st June, 1956).

MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Marshal H. L. Patch, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (September, 1956).

Air Commodore J. F. Hobler, C.B.E., appointed Air Officer in charge of Administration with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (July, 1956).

PROMOTIONS

Air Marshals to be Air Chief Marshals.—Sir Walter L. Dawson, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.; Sir George H. Mills, K.C.B., D.F.C. (acting Air Chief Marshal) (5th June, 1956).

Air Vice-M Marshals to be Air Marshals.—G. E. Nicholletts, C.B., A.F.C. (acting Air Marshal); T. N. McEvoy, C.B., C.B.E.; R. L. R. Atcherley, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C. (acting Air Marshal); R. B. Jordan, C.B., D.F.C. (acting Air Marshal) (1st May, 1956).

Air Vice-Marshal to be acting Air Marshal.—H. A. Constantine (24th May, 1956).

Air Commodores (acting Air Vice-Marshals) to be Air Vice-Marshals.—G. Bearne, C.B. ; V. S. Bowling, C.B.E. ; H. A. V. Hogan, C.B., D.F.C. ; H. R. Graham, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C. ; G. B. Beardsworth, C.B., M.I.Mech.E., A.F.R.Ae.S. ; F. G. S. Mitchell, C.B., C.B.E. ; F. W. Felgate, C.B.E. (1st July, 1956).

Air Commodore to be Air Vice-Marshal.—C. G. Lott, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C. (1st July, 1956).

Air Commodore to be acting Air Vice-Marshal.—G. Bearne, C.B. (11th May, 1956).

RETENTION OF RANK

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Lawrence Darvall, K.C.B., M.C., granted permission to retain the rank of Air Marshal (30th April, 1956).

RETIREMENT

Air Marshal Sir Harold Lydford, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C. (16th April, 1956).

ORGANIZATION

PIONEER SQUADRONS.—Two new squadrons are being formed, one at Dishforth and the other at Aden. They will be equipped with single-engined Pioneer aircraft, later probably to be replaced by twin-engined aircraft of the same type. These aircraft can land and take off in a very small space. The main purpose of these squadrons is to carry troops of the Army Strategic Reserve, which is specially trained for colonial internal security and policing duties.

HELICOPTERS IN CYPRUS.—The number of Sycamore and Whirlwind helicopters for reconnaissance and liaison duties in Cyprus has recently been increased.

MATERIEL

ALL R.A.F. SABRE FIGHTERS NOW REPLACED BY HUNTERS.—The last of the North American F.86E Sabre fighter aircraft, which have been in squadron service with the Royal Air Force since 1953, have now been replaced by Hawker Hunters.

GNAT FIGHTERS.—The first of six Folland Gnat light jet fighters for the Ministry of Supply is expected to make its maiden flight in the near future. It will be handed over only some nine months after the contract was placed. This aircraft will also be the first armed Gnat to fly. It has two 30 mm. Aden guns.

FORTY PARATROOPS IN HERALD.—In the projected military version of the Handley Page Herald the floor is reinforced to carry concentrated loads and there are changes in the size and position of doors. Provision is also made for the fitting of paratroop static lines. The still-air radius of action (no allowances) with 40 paratroops is 265 miles, or with 32 paratroops 535 miles. Typical loads are a jeep or Land Rover and trailer ; a 25-pounder gun and ammunition ; two aero engines ; or one aero engine with equipment, tools, and servicing crew. In the trooping role 44 troops with equipment and baggage could be carried over a still-air range (no allowances) of 500 miles.

RESERVES

AUXILIARY FIGHTER SQUADRONS' CAMPS

The two weeks' Summer camps of the 20 fighter squadrons of the R.Aux.A.F. are being held this year between 12th May and 29th September. All but one of the squadrons are camping at Malta or Gibraltar.

MISCELLANEOUS

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR'S FLIGHT TO MOSCOW.—The Secretary of State, Mr. Nigel Birch, and a party of senior R.A.F. officers flew to Moscow in a Comet 2 of Transport Command on 23rd June. Mr. Birch was attending the Soviet Union Air display at Tushino at the personal invitation of Mr. Bulganin. The party flew back to England on 29th June.

FOUR LINCOLNS FLY TO THE NORTH POLE.—Four Lincoln bombers of the Royal Air Force Flying College, Manby, Lincs, carried out flying exercises to the North Geographic Pole during the period 4th–8th June with staff and students of No. 14 Specialist Navigation Course. The flights started from Bodo, northern Norway, a base of the Royal Norwegian Air Force.

W.R.A.F. DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE'S OVERSEAS TOUR.—Before taking up her appointment as Director of the Women's Royal Air Force later this year, Group Officer M. H. Barnett is visiting units where members of the W.R.A.F. are stationed in the Far East, Middle East, Malta, and Germany.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTHS IN THE R.A.F.—Five new trade groups are now open in the Royal Air Force to boy entrants between the ages of 15 and 16½ who want to join the Service on leaving school. This is part of the 'opportunity for youth' plan which during the Summer offers 1,150 places in the R.A.F., and means that these youths can, in addition to other crafts, study mechanical transport, supply, accounting and secretarial, general engineering, and photography.

CANADA

SURVEY OF THE R.C.A.F., 1956

The Royal Canadian Air Force has now a strength of over 50,000 men and women. The up-to-date equipment of the Air Defence squadrons includes CF-100 Canuck interceptors and F-86 Sabres. Nine of these Air Defence squadrons work in close co-operation with the U.S. defence system. An important link in the air defence chain is the Ground Observer Corps composed largely of civilian spotters and observers.

Overseas, the R.C.A.F.'s 12-squadron Air Division, equipped with Sabres, forms one of Canada's major contributions to N.A.T.O. The R.C.A.F.'s Maritime Air Command, equipped with Neptunes and Lancasters, in Canada with headquarters in Halifax, N.S., forms a sub-component of N.A.T.O. Atlantic forces.

Air transport is provided by R.C.A.F. Transport Command equipped with C-110 Packets and North Stars with Headquarters at Lachine, P.Q.

AUSTRALIA

NEW DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF AND AIR MEMBER FOR SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.—Air Commodore C. D. Candy, O.B.E., Senior Air Staff Officer, No. 3 Bomber Group, in the United Kingdom, has been appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (May, 1956).

Air Commodore H. G. Acton has been appointed Air Member for Supply and Equipment with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (June, 1956).

GOODWILL FLIGHT TO THE U.S.A.—A goodwill visit to the United States was made in May by five R.A.A.F. Canberras under the command of Air Vice-Marshal A. L. Walters.

SOUTH AFRICA

DELIVERY OF CANADIAN FIGHTERS

The South African Air Force is at present taking delivery of its first eight Canadian-built Sabre Mark VI fighters. They are part of an order for 34 placed last year. The S.A.A.F. has also ordered Avro Shackletons and Sikorsky S.55 helicopters. The possibility of South Africa buying American military jets for the defence of Southern Africa was mentioned by Mr. George Allen, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, the Near East, and India, after his talks in Capetown during May with Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Defence.

INDIA**AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION**

A team of approximately 20 aeronautical experts led by Professor K. Tank, designer of the famous FW.190, is being employed by the Indian Government for the development of a fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force. A development design office has been attached to Hindustani Aircraft Limited, Bangalore, and will be opened shortly. Work will then commence on the design of a fighter aircraft, and it is hoped that the prototype will be ready for trials within a reasonable period.

The object of this programme is not only to manufacture in course of time an adequate number of modern planes for India's defence, but also to train a large number of Indian technicians for aeronautical engineering.

**FOREIGN
ETHIOPIA****ETHIOPIAN AIR FORCE VISIT R.A.F. IN ADEN**

A three-day goodwill visit to Aden by 53 officers and airmen of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force led by the Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier-General C. Nilsson, took place in April when Swedish-built aircraft landed at the Royal Air Force Station, Khormaksar.

FRANCE

HELICOPTER IN NORTH AFRICA.—The outstanding feature of the North African operations has been the use and value of the helicopter. The French Government has placed large orders both at home and abroad for nearly 400 of these aircraft. The orders are for all types of helicopter. Large troop carrying helicopters are invaluable in terrain which is inaccessible to any other form of vehicle.

MYSTÈRE B.2 IN PRODUCTION.—The Dassault Super Mystère B.2 made its first flight on 15th May at Melun-Villaroche with M. Muselli at the controls. The aircraft exceeded Mach 1 without using the afterburner. This first pre-production Super Mystère is powered by a S.N.E.C.M.A. Atar G. engine with afterburner. Mass production is already under way.

GERMANY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.—On 6th June, Lieut.-General Josef Kammhuber became Head of the Air Force Department of the Federal German Ministry of Defence. General Kammhuber, who will be 60 in August, is an air defence and night fighter expert. He was A.O.C.-in-C. German Night Fighters.

GERMANS TO TRY OUR JETS.—It is reported that three ex-*Luftwaffe* pilots are to test in Britain some of our most secret and up-to-date military aircraft with a view to buying them for the new German Air Force. They are to fly aircraft such as the Hawker Hunter, the Gloster Javelin, which is only just entering squadron service, the Percival Provost jet trainer, the Seahawk, and a Bristol helicopter. It is likely that the Germans' chief interest is in a jet trainer, such as the Percival Provost, so that her pilots begin on those before transferring to operational aircraft. Later they will require all-weather fighters. For this reason they will study the Javelin.

WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE BEING FORMED.—Plans for the establishment of West Germany's air force at a cost of about £500,000,000 have been presented to Parliament by the Defence Ministry. Appropriations of over £40,000,000 for the acquisition of between 300 and 500 planes have already been approved.

ISRAEL**MYSTÈRES FOR ISRAEL**

Israel is to get 24 jet fighters to strengthen her defences. This is a counter-balance to Egyptian purchases of Czech-built Ilushin medium bombers. France will supply Israel with 12 Mystère fighters besides the 12 she has, and Canada will send 12 Sabre jets.

JAPAN

EXPANSION PLANS.—During the current financial year, 1st April, 1956, to 31st March, 1957, the Air Self Defence Force is to increase its uniformed personnel by 4,769, which will bring it to 15,065 by April, 1957. The aircraft strength will also be increased by some 220 aircraft, half of which will be trainers and most of the remainder F-86 Sabres.

FIRST JAPANESE AIR FORCE UNIT FORMED.—The 1st March, 1956, was an occasion for the new Japanese Air Force, which was reborn just 18 months before. Training of jet pilots by American instructors started at the Tsuiki Air Base, Kyushu, in January, 1955, and a ceremony was held on 1st March to mark the establishment of the first air training squadron, the first Japanese Air Force unit in existence since the war, for training pilots in F-86 jet fighters.

RUSSIA

RUSSIAN ATOM-PLANE IMMINENT ?

E. P. Slavsky, chief of the Soviet atomic energy administration, outlined on 23rd May the Soviet Union's plans for utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and indicated optimism on the prospects for the development of an atomic-powered aircraft. In an interview with a correspondent of the Government newspaper *Izvestia*, E. P. Slavsky declared: "We have every basis for developing in the near future an atomic-powered aeroplane."

UNITED STATES

4,000 AIRCRAFT DELIVERED TO U.S.A.F.—During 1955, deliveries of aircraft to the U.S.A.F. averaged 343 per month, with a peak of 413 in June.

FIRST F-102As DELIVERED.—First deliveries of the Convair F-102A delta-wing supersonic interceptor have been made to a tactical unit of the U.S.A.F., although the first squadron has not, at the time of writing, become operational.

F-104 SHOWN IN PUBLIC.—A new jet fighter, the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, which can carry atomic bombs and has a speed of up to 1,400 m.p.h., was publicly demonstrated at Palmdale, California, on 17th April. The F-104A is a day and night fighter powered by a General Electric J-79 engine. It has a wing span of 21 ft. 11 in. and a length of 54 ft. 9 in. The prototype was first flown in February, 1954. Its weight has been given as about 15,000 lb. and its ceiling at over 60,000 ft. Its maximum speed capability is said to be 1,200 m.p.h. The initial order was for 17 aircraft and the F-104A is now in production.

BIG U.S.A.F. CONTRACT FOR C-130.—The award of a definitive U.S.A.F. contract to Lockheed Aircraft's Georgia Division at Marietta, covering manufacture of a large quantity of C-130 Hercules turboprop transports, has been announced. The total value of the contract is approximately \$106,000,000. This is the fourth U.S.A.F. contract for production of the Hercules, which will join the Tactical Air Command's 18th Air Force later this year; production schedules now extend into early 1958.

U.S. UNMANNED MIDGET AIRCRAFT.—The U.S. Navy has authorized the construction of an experimental, automatic, unmanned aircraft, so small that it can be stored aboard a submarine, it was announced on 24th June. The contract has been awarded to the Piasecki Aircraft Company. Mr. F. Piasecki, President, said that it was a vertical lift aircraft called the Sea-Bat and would be controlled electronically.

U.S. ROCKET 117 MILES UP.—A United States Navy rocket reached a height of 117 miles at White Sands, New Mexico, on 8th May, and, though it failed to establish the hoped-for altitude record, scientists were jubilant. They said that it justified the Navy's entire 'aerobee-hi' rocket programme, which is connected with the plan for creating a new satellite for the Earth.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

Behind the Lines. Edited by Irwin R. Blacker. (Cassell.) 18s.

There is a theory, shared by many profound students of war, that the invention of nuclear weapons may put an end to full scale international warfare of the traditional type. It is based upon the belief that no sane statesman will resort to a method that is bound to destroy his own national existence, whichever side wins. Whether or no this theory is correct, one thing at least is certain. The old forms of war may become obsolete, but war itself will never cease till human nature and international relations change out of all recognition.

This book illustrates, by 28 well varied stories, a form of war which is likely to achieve great importance in the post-nuclear era. It is unfortunate that no satisfactory word exists in the English language to define sufficiently precisely the coming form of war. Thereby confusion of thought can arise, as may be seen in this book. The terms 'guerrilla,' 'irregular,' and 'partisan' are used as though they are practically synonymous. Definitions of these three, quoted from Webster's Dictionary at the beginning of the book, do little to clear the confusion. Actually these terms mean three very different things. Regular troops have often conducted guerrilla operations. Irregulars (e.g. the Boers) have often fought successful campaigns in the open field. The term 'partisan' carries a certain politico-ideological significance which does not necessarily attach itself to the other two expressions.

All this looseness of nomenclature detracts slightly from the value of this book as a serious contribution to serious study of this important branch of war. The editor has expended much trouble in collecting his stories, ranging from a buccaneer exploit of the Spanish Main to several examples chosen from widely diverse theatres of the 1939-45 War. But he seems just to have missed his opportunity of making his book the text-book of guerrilla warfare which it could easily have become.

It is curious too that, although he gives Spain the credit for 'inventing' true guerrilla warfare and giving it that name, he gives no incident at all from the successful operations described by Napoleon as the "ulcer which destroyed him." The guiding principle of guerrilla war, "Attack the indefensible—defend nothing," is generally ascribed to Juan Martín, "El Empecinado," one of the ablest guerrillas of all. One of his exploits would have been instructive.

There is, however, a great deal of useful information to be found among these 28 stories by a serious student of post-nuclear war. The immense increases in fighting power given by new weapons and equipment are clearly illustrated in the later chapters. Automatic weapons, portable radio, plastic explosives, and air supply have revolutionized the possibilities of guerrilla war.

For the less serious reader, who merely wants an interesting war book, this one can be highly recommended. Each story having been written by a different author, there is a wide variety of literary style. There is variety in treatment of narrative also—from the introspective emotionalism of a chain-smoking young airman to pithy accounts of railway sabotage, obviously written by a practised hand.

Defeat Into Victory. By Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C. (Cassell.) 25s.

This is the story of the retreat from Burma, the return, and the final decisive success of the Fourteenth Army, "the sum of many men's efforts" of all three Services. The author's object is to tell of the problems he faced, why he made certain decisions, the factors which helped or hindered, the intervention of chance and luck, and the mistakes made. Not only is this work a study in the art of command, it also gives the uninitiated some idea of the burden of responsibility in war. The narrative and comments are so

written that they are of great value to the student of war, yet can be readily comprehended by the general reader who, besides being thrilled by this epic of the 'Forgotten Army,' will find that there is much to be learned from it.

Rangoon had fallen when the author arrived from the Middle East to command the Burma Corps. He describes the appalling difficulties which had to be faced, many of which were due to unpreparedness for which the Government must be held responsible. He stresses the fact that credit for the long, arduous, but successful withdrawal is due not only to the commanders, but to the ragged, emaciated British, Indian, and Gurkha regiments who, fighting units to the end, at last reached India. Wars are not won by successful withdrawals, so the author pauses to describe how the moral and material foundations of eventual victory were laid.

The failure of the campaign in Arakan, started in December, 1942, and run by Army Headquarters direct, was a setback. But in April, 1943, the author, with Headquarters XVth Corps, was sent to take over. Shortly afterwards he was appointed to command the newly formed Fourteenth Army, consisting of the IVth and XVth Corps, and General Sir George Giffard became Army Group Commander. Things then began to move on the right lines; air supply was included in the plan for a new offensive in Arakan. The weapon was severely tested there early in 1944, when the first major success was gained, again in the decisive battle of Kohima/Imphal, and then in the long pursuit over appalling country in bad weather. Meanwhile, planning for the final offensive went on in spite of many distractions. The development of what the Japanese termed the "Master Stroke," and its execution are narrated in detail.

The author pays tribute to General Giffard for whom he had great respect. On the other hand, Wingate appears as a dangerous 'enthusiast' who claimed he had permission to by-pass his superiors and appeal direct to the Prime Minister if they showed "signs of thwarting his operations." The author succeeded in establishing good relations with that difficult person 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell, but does not overlook the other problems involved in dealing with Allies.

The reflections contained in the final chapter are of great interest. The author remarks on the characteristic lack of mental flexibility in the Japanese, comments on our own forces and the growth of the 'administrative tail' elsewhere than in Burma, where we fought first from necessity and later from choice on a lower scale of transport and equipment. The advantages and limitations of air power and air transport are considered and some pungent comments are made on 'private armies' and 'special forces' which "did not give, militarily, a worth-while return for the resources in men, material, and time they absorbed." Finally, a summary of the form of war which emerged in Burma is given, and the author states the reasons for his opinion that the lessons of this campaign are of special interest for the future.

This is one of the most outstanding works on any part of the last war, and one of the few which considers both administrative and psychological problems adequately. It ought to be studied by all three Services and will, it is to be hoped, be widely read by the general public. The volume is provided with 21 excellent sketch-maps in the text and a good index.

The Fatal Decisions : Six decisive battles of the Second World War from the viewpoint of the Vanquished. (Michael Joseph.) 25s.

The fatal decisions discussed in this book are: the Battle of Britain, by General Kreipe; the Battle of Moscow, by General Blumentritt; the Battle of El Alamein, by General Bayerlein; the Battle of Stalingrad, by General Zeitler; the Battle of France, 1944, by General Zimmerman; and the Battle of the Ardennes, by General von Man teuffel. Each is preceded by a commentary by General Westphal; and the whole is introduced by Captain Cyril Falls.

Like most symposiums, the book lacks unity, and, with the exception of General Zeitler, the writers do not let themselves go. As one reads on, one has the feeling that

they wish to be meticulously correct, that they are too reserved, and that a little more criticism of their enemies, like salt, would have added savour to their discourses. Such criticism as there is is directed against Hitler, and most of it is justifiable; yet no clear picture emerges of this extraordinary man. That he committed appalling blunders is undoubted; that from Stalingrad on he was not in his right mind is probable. Nevertheless, under his leadership the German armies conquered Poland in 27 days, Denmark in one, Norway in 23, Holland in five, Belgium in 18, France in 39, Yugoslavia in 12, Greece in 21, Crete in 11, and in Russia carried their flag from the Bug to the Volga. These are achievements so extraordinary that it is folly to ascribe them to a lunatic. Further, could the German General Staff have accomplished them without Hitler?

The trouble was that there was no trust between Hitler and his generals, therefore no true unity of command. They looked upon him as an upstart corporal; he looked upon them as antiquated sergeant-majors; he doubted their loyalty—in this he was not altogether wrong. To protect himself against them, he surrounded himself with 'yes' men, as Zeitzler makes clear, and when in Russia disaster followed disaster, he smelt treason everywhere; this Zeitzler does not mention.

Hitler's crucial blunder in Russia was not that his strategy was defective, which it was; but that his policy was asinine: he went there as a conqueror instead of as a liberator. This is barely mentioned, and all that is said of it is put by General Westphal in half a dozen lines. He calls it "a fine opportunity thrown away"; but it was far more than an opportunity, it was the only possible way of dissolving the Soviet Imperium.

The difficulties of fighting in Russia are well brought out by General Blumentritt, and one which is frequently overlooked is the shortness of the winter days. "Until nine o'clock in the morning," he writes, "the wintry landscape was shrouded in thick fog . . . by about eleven it was possible to see a little. At three o'clock in the afternoon dusk set in, and an hour later it was almost completely dark again."

The battle of El Alamein is clearly described by General Bayerlein, though there is nothing in his account of it which has not been written before, and General von Manteuffel's description of the battle of the Ardennes contains much detail which is likely to be new to most English readers.

Gallipoli. By Alan Moorehead. (Hamish Hamilton.) 21s.

The British are inclined to cherish their military setbacks with almost greater devotion than their victories, which they are apt to take for granted. Fontenoy, Yorktown, the retreat on Vigo and Corunna, the Scheldt fiasco of 1809—to this ensanguined catalogue of misadventure must certainly be added the Gallipoli campaign of 1915.

Yet as a strategic conception, the venture had much to commend it. Had it proved successful, the Tsarist régime might have been bolstered up sufficiently to rule out the possibility of the Bolshevik *coup d'état* of 1917; with consequences to the world at large upon which it would be a supererogation to enlarge. But highly imaginative strategy demands extremely practical and sinewy planning; and all that Gallipoli got was a series of mentally shoddy improvisations. Nothing was thought out *right through*: at the outset it was thought possible to purchase victory on bargain basement terms.

So, disregarding the lessons learned at Kronstadt, Bomarsand, and Sveaborg, during the Crimean War, and oblivious to the fact that warships are virtually helpless against a powerful, fully mobile field artillery, supplemented by mines, the Navy gallantly sought to reduce the Dardanelles' defences and 'rush' the Straits without more ado. Ironically enough, heavy losses and the reprehensible timidity of the "Hostilities Only" mine-sweeper crews halted operations at the very moment when the Turks and their German allies were down to their last few rounds of ammunition.

It was then, and not till then, that the Gallipoli venture was envisaged as the amphibious 'combined op.' that clear thinking would have seen it to be from the outset.

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Military History of the Second World War

Grand Strategy

VOLUME V

By JOHN EHRLMAN

Six volumes of the United Kingdom Military History of the Second World War are to be devoted, under the general title *Grand Strategy*, to an account of the central direction of the war at the highest level. The first to be published is one of two written by John Ehrman, and covers the important twelve months beginning in August 1943. Mr. Ehrman begins his story immediately after the Quebec Conference at which the operations to defeat Germany in Europe and the first stage of the offensive against Japan were planned. He describes the complicated concurrent planning of a number of campaigns which were destined within the year to relieve much of Italy, France, and the Low Countries of German occupation, while the Russians made comparable advances along the Eastern European front and the Japanese were driven eastwards from the Indian frontier and west and north across the Pacific. The withdrawal of four enemy countries from the war was brought about. Pervading the entire scene are the complexities of Anglo-American relationship: how their differences in background begot differences in outlook and how the resulting difficulties were overcome.

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But the Navy, knocking so persistently on the door, had given the Turks ample warning of what might lie in store. It followed that their preparations to meet a forced landing by troops so drastically reduced the assault force's numbers as to render it impossible for them to exploit the lodgment they had achieved. It is impossible for one survivor not to feel that had a couple of fresh brigades been immediately available to 'leap-frog' the exhausted and disorganized remnants that had seized the bridgehead, Achi Baba could have been won and held. And this despite a chain of command so amorphous and wanting in grip that it might just as well have been functioning from the Shetlands. But with the hill's capture, the Straits would have been dominated, and the object of the enterprise triumphantly achieved within 48 hours of the initial landing.

Instead, with the Turks reinforcing more rapidly than the British, stalemate supervened; with sporadic but violent attempts to break the *impasse* which only piled up casualties. At home, meanwhile, the Dardanelles had become a weapon with which unscrupulous office-seekers sought to undermine the Asquith Government, and oust a Secretary of State for War who, admittedly, was never in the same mind about Gallipoli for two days together.

The brightest gleam in the whole unhappy prospect was the astonishing success which attended the daring submarine campaign in the Marmara and the Bosphorus, an epic of resourcefulness and 'five o'clock in the morning courage' that was only matched by the stoic endurance of the troops clinging to their narrow lodgments on the rim of the peninsula.

The subsequent attempt to revitalize operations at Suvla was an anti-climax founded on sheer lack of vitality. The speed and drive and resolution so desperately wanted on the beach-heads seemed exclusively confined to the Turkish lines, where Mustapha Kemal raged like a cornered wolf.

Thereafter came the long agony of divided councils at home, military indecision on the spot, and steadily worsening weather; and then the final miracle of the evacuation.

Mr. Moorehead has brought to this sombre but magnificent story a cool judgment and objectivity that pulls no punches but never descends to the level of mere vituperation. His description of the troops' intrepidity in action and their unwhining endurance under almost intolerable living conditions is a model of good reporting. If he magnifies the exploits at Anzac Cove at the expense of the equally sterling work performed at Cape Helles, allowance must be made for a perfectly understandable bias. Not the least interesting disclosure reveals that, but for aloof and fumbling diplomacy, the Turks might well have been our allies rather than our enemies.

Gallipoli could have been a triumph; it was nothing less than providential that it was not an unqualified catastrophe.

"Of all the words of tongue and pen
The saddest of these—it might have been."

The Long Road Home. By Adrian Vincent. (Allen and Unwin.) 15s.

The long road home led from a mining village in Poland through Upper Silesia and Czechoslovakia into Bavaria. It was trodden by thousands of prisoners of war of many nationalities, herded by their German guards away from the advancing Russians. On the march many prisoners died from hardship and exposure and the brutalities of their escort. Towards the end, before American troops were encountered not far from Regensburg, came attacks from Allied aircraft. The author was one of those who came through and is able to describe it all with a stark simplicity which concedes nothing to sentiment and avoids heroics.

This recital follows a realistic personal account of nearly five years as a prisoner of war. Rifleman Vincent had only a few months' service when his battalion, the 1st Queen Victoria's Rifles, was hurried across the Channel to take part in the defence of Calais. Thus he experienced almost nothing of war before he found himself in German hands

He tells us little of his civilian background—merely that he held “an insignificant clerking post”—but he certainly possesses the gift of graphic narration and the determination to describe life in a prison camp without mincing matters. It seems that he kept some sort of a journal during his captivity.

There are no thrills, no stories of daring escapes or attempts to escape. Some passages are not pleasant reading: petty quarrels, mean thefts, and various other episodes display human nature at its worst. It was by no means a classless society. Those who received private parcels from home were the rich; the poor relied upon the Red Cross for those commodities which made life tolerable; racketeers and ‘wide boys’ were in evidence. Even so, the ‘average prisoner’ made the best of things and waited patiently for the end, whatever that might be.

Morale was poor at first, when a defeatist spirit prevailed, but improved as time went on—at least among the British. Rifleman Vincent does not enlarge upon the enterprise by which the British at Stalag VIII B in Upper Silesia provided themselves with so many amenities, but he has much to tell of life with the working parties away from the camp. He was sent to a cement factory and then to the Polish mines where working conditions were so terrible that some prisoners resorted to self-mutilation in order to bring the ordeal to an end. There is, however, ample evidence of the stubborn British spirit which sought by every means to shirk labour which was for the benefit of the Reich. It was possible to play off the local commandant and his subordinates against the higher authorities who wanted no trouble in the prison camps; and the German guards could always—or nearly always—be bribed. A commandant was often ready to grant favours by the regular gift of a Red Cross parcel.

By acquiring a little German the author managed to get appointed to the ‘staff’ as a kind of interpreter and he was then able to exploit the venality of his captors to a greater extent, even being allowed to carry on a liaison with a Polish girl in a neighbouring village.

The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume II. By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., and others. History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series. (H.M.S.O.) 35s.

This volume describes the main events which occurred in the Mediterranean and Middle East between March and November, 1941. In Volume I we saw what was left of the Italian forces practically driven out of Cyrenaica. After that, the course of the Desert campaign changed for the worse with the arrival on the scene of General Rommel and the *Afrika Korps*. The *Afrika Korps* was composed of seasoned troops who had already been victorious in Poland and France; their well-tried equipment of both tanks and guns was far superior to that of the limited British forces, whose tanks and vehicles were, by March, 1941, worn out. The Germans, however, were as yet without experience of desert conditions. In the circumstances, General Wavell was obliged to retire to the eastward. Meanwhile, the *Luftwaffe* had also appeared in the Mediterranean area, and their attacks on Malta and the Suez Canal were imperilling our sea communications.

Rommel began his advance in the beginning of April—sooner than had been expected—and the ensuing operations in the Western Desert are described up to the failure of “Battleaxe” in June. Thereafter, there was stalemate in that area for the next few months while both sides refitted. The German attack on Russia—“Barbarossa”—at this time also contributed to the pause in the enemy’s desert offensive, both land and air.

Concurrently with the foregoing there were separate campaigns in Greece, Crete, Iraq, Syria, and East Africa, all of which were the ultimate responsibility of General Wavell. These are related in their appropriate chapters, as is also the defence of Malta.

The naval side of this story includes a good description of the battle of Cape Matapan, which had an important bearing on the subsequent disinclination of the Italian surface forces to interfere with the evacuation of troops from Greece and Crete, during which the

Navy suffered such crippling losses. The arduous work of the Inshore Squadron in maintaining the army in the Western Desert, and more particularly the garrison in Tobruk, is briefly outlined. The successful running of the "Tiger" convoy, laden with tanks, in May and the efforts to keep Malta supplied by both sea and air are related, as is also a summary of the constant attacks made on the enemy troop and store convoys running from Italy to Tripoli. In all areas the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm played their parts in greater or less degree according to their resources at the relevant times.

Contemporary with these separate campaigns are the political and administrative problems which cropped up. It is shown how the short-lived and disastrous campaigns in Greece and Crete gravely affected the capacity of the forces left in the Western Desert to prevail against the enemy. The calibre of the troops which came out in 1941 was, to begin with, not on a par with that of the seasoned veterans of 1940, who after all had only the Italians to contend with. In 1941, for various reasons, there were only too few left of those with experience of desert warfare to train the new arrivals, let alone to fight; the newcomers, both officers and men, therefore sometimes had to go into action before they were really battleworthy. This was not their fault but their misfortune.

With regard to the other areas, the revolt in Iraq was soon suppressed and the operations in Syria against the Vichy-French were satisfactorily concluded; by the end of November all the Italian forces in East Africa had surrendered. In this last campaign it is related (p. 314) that the Italian 79th Colonial Battalion was taken into British service as the "79th Foot." Did they wear the No. 4 (Cameron) tartan?

The index is adequate and there are 10 useful appendices; a chronology of the main events in each campaign area shows what was happening concurrently at any given time. How the train of events interacted one upon the other is clearly set out in the text. Good photographs, diagrams, and maps are provided, but in Map 4 the movements of the British columns have been omitted. In view of the paramount importance of the tank and the anti-tank gun in desert warfare, it is hoped that in later volumes photographs of British and enemy tanks and guns will be given, showing how these weapons were gradually improved as time went on. The method of showing the forces engaged at the beginning of each phase of activity could be improved, even if only the units had been arranged in tabular form, as has been done in places. A continuous footnote in small print is not easy to follow. An appendix giving the complete Order of Battle for all areas mentioned in the book would have been still better.

This is a well-arranged, overall narrative of a complicated period, in which the editor and authors have embodied all the essential features.

The Soviet Secret Services. By Otto Heilbrunn. (Allen and Unwin.) 18s.

The title of this book seems calculated to attract the interest of two categories of readers—the serious student of war, or of political methods, and the lighter-minded seeker after thrills. Both these classes, I am very sorry to say, may be doomed to some slight disappointment.

The thriller-reader will find here no hair-raising tales of knocks on the door at midnight. The serious reader will certainly find much valuable information, conscientiously collated and methodically arranged. But he will also find some irritating omissions. For example, if he does not know it already, he will surely wish to discover the precise meanings of the many sets of initials which form part of the Soviet stock-in-trade, initials of which indeed the author himself makes great use—GRU, MGB, MVD, and others. Incidentally, Dr. Heilbrunn rather implies that the alteration of NKVD to MVD had some sinister motive of deceiving outside investigators. Actually in this one instance at least the explanation was quite an innocent one—simply the abolition of "Narodnii Komissariat" as a label for governmental departments and its replacement by "Ministerstvo."

The foregoing criticisms may seem severe, but they are intended to be helpful. This difficult and little-known subject has all too meagre a literature devoted to it. Dr. Heilbrunn has made it his special study, and is a recognized authority. Later editions of his work will certainly be needed to keep pace with changing tactics of the secret enemy. In these the trifling improvements suggested here may be embodied.

The general arrangement of the book forms a progressive series of lessons to drive home, to all concerned in our security, three vitally important points—our “three-point programme” as the author calls it. These are the need to assess correctly the strength of the hidden Soviet fighting power, the need to strengthen our own defences against this menace, and our need to carry the secret war into the enemy’s camp by copying his methods. The author’s argument is lucidly developed, and will do much to awaken the British public as a whole to the serious nature of this threat.

Since the book is intended presumably for a *British* public it seems a pity that the easy flow of words is interrupted here and there by cumbersome Americanisms such as, for example, “high ranking officers,” an expression slightly reminiscent of an over ripe cheese. What is wrong with the simple English term “senior officers”?

A particularly interesting chapter is the one dealing with the Mihailovitch-Tito rivalry and its sequel. A great deal of hitherto undisclosed history is given, which may perhaps draw counter-statements from the other side. It would be interesting to know the views of British officers, who were closely connected with these rival leaders, on Dr. Heilbrunn’s version of the affair.

There is, however, no doubt that here, as in all the other cases in the book, Dr. Heilbrunn is absolutely correct in seeing the hands of an evil world conspiracy at work behind the scenes.

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NAVAL

The Atlantic Battle Won, May, 1943-May, 1945. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. By Samuel Eliot Morison. (Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege.) 45s.

This new volume of the United States official naval history is the tenth in Rear-Admiral Morison's monumental series. Four more volumes are promised to complete the full story. They will make this history one of the most remarkable single-handed achievements in the world of letters, performed with a skill and a speed that puts the British official historians to shame.

In this volume Admiral Morison returns to the Atlantic, to complete the story which he began in his first volume. By May of 1943, when this account of the Atlantic battle starts, the first faint signs of a crack in the U-boat façade were beginning to show, though at the time it was difficult enough to recognize them. The great U-boat aces had gone, and although the battle was raging as fiercely as ever there was not the same skill and fierceness in attack as in the earlier stages of the campaign. The arrival of the escort carrier in the anti-submarine armoury was also having its effect, providing the Allies with a weapon against which the U-boats could find no answer.

Although in this volume Admiral Morison deals in considerable detail with the main battle, it is of course the United States operational angle that catches his eye more than those of Great Britain and Canada. Yet he has never forgotten that it is the battle as a whole which counts, and his overall eye covers the vast scene of conflict with a steady appraisal that produces a remarkably balanced account of the whole campaign. His graphic style, which may occasionally sound a little strange in British ears which are attuned to the sober recital of our own particular brand of official history, makes the most of this vital and prolonged battle. It brings out into vivid relief the ups and downs of conflict, and the delicate balance of advantage that for a spell swayed precariously before the last corner was turned and the U-boats went down into irrevocable defeat.

Admiral Morison pays due tribute in this book to the debt owed to the scientists in the waging of this tremendous battle. It was their ceaseless effort which, time after time, placed in the hands of the sailors the weapons which, almost throughout the whole of this period, kept them always one step ahead of the enemy. That, allied to effective training, immaculate discipline, and fine seamanship, won the battle for the Allied cause.

There are one or two small errors in this account of the campaign, but they in no way detract from the great merit of this book, which paints the overall picture in memorable and glowing colours. This tenth volume is a worthy companion to the preceding nine, and Admiral Morison is now within sight of the end of his great task, which which must surely stand as a monument of endeavour and achievement in the realm of contemporary historical narration.

H.M. Destroyers. By Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Kemp. (Herbert Jenkins.) 16s.

In two previous books Lieutenant-Commander Kemp has recounted the genesis of British submarines and of naval aircraft and their history in two great wars. He has now written in similar vein of destroyers, a task which has clearly been more difficult. Though those serving in destroyers have always had pride in their ships as a class—the especial skills involved in their employment and a readiness to meet any emergency emphatically and at high speed—their actions in war have been less distinct from the affairs of other warships than have those of the craft which operate under or over the sea. As a result, much of this book comprises severely condensed accounts of surface actions (e.g. Jutland, Malta convoys, destruction of the *Bismarck* and the *Scharnhorst*) with the destroyer part emphasized with names of ships and captains and some stories of individual gallantry. *Per contra*, in the chapters about the battles against German submarines, all

the ships employed, whether destroyers, sloops, frigates, or corvettes, are referred to as if they were destroyers.

Despite these handicaps, however, a good account is given of what destroyers have achieved and the conspicuous and gallant part they have played in so many and such various operations of war. To those who have served in them this book will recall with interest the great deeds of the past. But it may be that some of the older hands will regret that their fine ships of the first war are so often referred to as boats; and they may be disappointed, also, that there is no indication of what was once their particular pride—manœuvring in close order at high speed, when close order was one cable, and so, when in line ahead, only a ship's length from one's stem to the stern of the next ahead. This did not in itself win battles, but the confidence it inspired contributed strongly to the destroyer spirit.

In his final chapter Lieutenant-Commander Kemp shows how far we have travelled from the days when the destroyer, despite its name of torpedo-boat destroyer, had as its main function attack by flotillas on the enemy's battle fleet, to the present time when the *Daring* class are so large and expensive that we can no longer afford the great numbers which were formerly an essential destroyer characteristic. From this it seems to follow, as the author implies, that it may be the frigates of today that are the rightful heirs of the destroyers of former times. When there were no battle fleets accessible to attack, it was to action with submarines that destroyers were increasingly transferred; and now that the heir to the battle fleet, the carrier force, is so unlikely a target for surface attack with torpedoes it seems that the anti-submarine role is what chiefly remains. Though ships of 2,000 tons and more will still play an important part, it will be a part more akin to the work of fleet cruisers than to the destroyer tradition of former years.

The book is well illustrated with photographs.

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Royal Naval Medical Services, Volume II (Operations). By Surgeon Captain J. L. S. Coulter, D.S.C., R.N. (H.M.S.O.) 57s. 6d.

This is the second and concluding clinical volume of the United Kingdom Medical Series which relates to the Royal Naval Medical and Nursing Services during the 1939-45 War. Surgeon Captain Coulter first outlines the medical organization and the work of the naval medical officer afloat in time of war. Beginning with a *résumé* of the regulations as they affected the medical officer before the outbreak of war, he shows how many of the pre-conceived ideas of what a modern naval action would be like, and the basic principles of how to organize the distribution of the medical resources in a ship, were found to be wide of the mark when the time came. In particular, the effects, both psychological and *matériel*, of successive air attacks, which sometimes continued for several days on end, had not been fully realized, for the aircraft bombs of the 1914-18 War were as nothing to what was to come.

We next have a typical senior medical officer's daily journal while at sea on active service, during which he was present at the landing in North Africa and in some of the Arctic convoys. (These events are described more fully in Chapter 4.) This is followed by "Lessons to be learnt from the Daily Journal," which are set out in some detail.

War-time medical operations on shore are normally more of an Army commitment, but occasions arise when the naval medical officer comes into the picture. One such was the Royal Naval Tented Hospital—the first of its kind—which was primarily intended for the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization (M.N.B.D.O.(1)). Its first experience of active service was gained in Crete in 1941, when all the equipment was lost though the personnel fortunately escaped. After being re-equipped it performed much useful service in the Maldivé Islands and in Burma in 1942. M.N.B.D.O.(2) also had a similar hospital organization which at first worked in Sicily and elsewhere in conjunction with the Eighth Army. These two organizations were disbanded in 1944, being revived for the liberation of South-East Asia, when the Mobile Landing Craft Advanced Bases (M.O.L.C.A.B.) needed hospital facilities for the crews of minor landing craft. They had much to do at Singapore after the Japanese surrender. Other naval medical officers were attached to the Serbian guerillas in Yugoslavia, and also to the Chinese guerillas in Malaya.

Naval medical personnel were sometimes captured by the enemy. Detailed accounts of their experiences when their ships were attacked and finally sunk, and the survivors became prisoners of war, are given in two cases—the *Gloucester* in the Mediterranean and the *Exeter* in the Far East. The individual behaviour of their German captors varied, but that of the Japanese in the shore prisoner of war camps had nothing to recommend it.

One other incident is related in full because it emphasizes the vital necessity for detached or isolated parties to include at least one member with medical experience and training. It describes what happened to a party of 48 officers and men of all three Services who got away from Singapore only to be marooned on Tjebia Island, where the mortality from disease amounted to 41 per cent. in the short space of 14 weeks. The survivors eventually became prisoners of war to the Japanese.

A moving story of heroism in adversity, also told here, is that of the trials and tribulations of the medical and nursing staff of the Royal Naval Hospital at Hong Kong. This was the only naval hospital to be captured by the enemy.

The second half of the book is devoted to the medical aspect of the chief naval events throughout the war. These are recorded chronologically and often in considerable detail.

Throughout the book there is no lack of constructive criticism of our faults and failures, a necessary factor if errors are not to be repeated; and the reactions of individuals when under fire from guns or bombs are discussed impassionately from the medical aspect. Some, although evidently very frightened, managed to control themselves and carried out their duties; others cracked.

The brief index provided is confined chiefly to the headings of the various events and matters of interest. This, however, is all that is really necessary for the lay reader, for whom a fully comprehensive list of hurts and diseases is not essential. The photographs show various methods of transporting wounded men, examples of damage to ships caused by mine or torpedo, and the severe conditions which prevailed in the Arctic convoys in winter time.

This well-written history will be of absorbing interest to both doctors and laymen. In his opening sentences the editor remarks, "One of the most difficult questions which a naval medical officer may be asked by a civilian doctor is this: How do you manage to pass the time?" The answer is to be found in these pages.

Open the Ports. By J. Grosvenor and L. M. Bates. (Kimber.) 18s.

This is the story of a small body of men specially selected and trained to work under water on the hazardous task of clearing German mines and booby-traps during the Allied invasion of 1944. It is divided into two parts. The first starts at the early part of 1943, six days before the final surrender of the Axis armies in North Africa, when two lighters at Bizerta were found to be loaded with German ground mines fitted with clocks. These had alarming implications as they could be set to explode at any time, adding enormously to the hazard of their disposal. True the enemy had lost the opportunity of laying them in Bizerta harbour, but could be expected to use them in other abandoned ports. There was only one possible antidote—teams of divers trained to find the mines and render them harmless under water.

By D-day, 6th June, 1944, the new teams had been recruited and trained and two of them were standing-by at Falmouth to cross the Channel, but it was the 27th before

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they arrived off the Normandy beaches. Cherbourg had just fallen and some fighting was still going on in the dock area. The Germans had completed their programme of destruction in the docks with their accustomed thoroughness and no doubt believed the port useless for many months to come. This chaos was the scene of the new teams' first active service, a combined operation in which the Americans cleared the jetties and the British the mines from the harbour bed. For a time the careful search of the P-parties, as they were called, yielded nothing, but at last they found and destroyed their first mine, a perilous task carried out with great daring and complete success. By 14th August, Cherbourg was clear of mines and ships were discharging their vital cargoes alongside the few undamaged quays. The parties had searched 1,708,150 square feet of sea bed, spending nearly 300 hours under water. They had shown that they were able to give an undertaking that any part of the sea bed they had searched was clear of mines. Before long Cherbourg was handling more ships and cargoes than it had ever done in peace-time. It was a magnificent achievement and a real success story.

The second part of the book tells how this success was repeated all the way from Le Havre to Bremen. That this was done without a single casualty speaks volumes for the skill and care with which the work was accomplished.

This gripping story of men carrying out under water, and often by touch alone in complete darkness, precise operations, in which the slightest error would have meant death, is a worthy tribute to the P-parties and the great part they played in the Allied victories of the last 12 months of the 1939-45 War.

Walker, R.N. By Terence Robertson. (Evans.) 16s.

This is a biography of the late Captain Frederic John Walker, C.B., D.S.O. and three bars, R.N., the man who during the 1939-45 War did more than any other to free the Atlantic of the U-boat menace. It covers his naval career from his early years as a midshipman in the battleship *Ajax* during the 1914-18 War, to his last voyage in the sloop *Starling* in 1944. In 1916 he joined the destroyer *Sarpedon* employed on screening the Grand Fleet against submarine attack, and this service provided him with a new interest that absorbed and fascinated him for the rest of his life.

After serving two years in the battleship *Valiant* he started technical courses in H.M.S. *Osprey*, the new anti-submarine school at Portland. Thus he became one of the navy's first anti-submarine specialists, and was anti-submarine officer successively in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets from 1926 to 1931. After commanding the destroyer *Shikari* and the sloop *Falmouth* between 1931 and 1937 he again served in the *Osprey*, till January, 1940. Then, after serving a few months at Dover, he joined the sloop *Stork* as senior officer of the 36th Escort Group.

As might be expected the author devotes the major portion of his book to Walker's great exploits during the period October, 1941, to July, 1944, during which he proved a veritable Goliath among killers of U-boats. On his very first homeward voyage he and his escort group destroyed four and shared with a Liberator aircraft the destruction of a fifth. Thereafter success followed success.

In June, 1942, he was promoted captain and for a brief spell served ashore at Liverpool. But early in 1943 he was back at sea in command of the new sloop *Starling* as senior officer of the now famous Second Support Group, consisting of six sloops of the same class, *Starling*, *Wild Goose*, *Wren*, *Kite*, *Cygnets* and *Woodpecker*. In February, 1944, this group sank six U-boats on a single trip, bringing Walker a third bar to his D.S.O. and the most unusual reward of two years seniority. By mid-1944 his grand total of U-boat kills had reached 20, but the constant strain was relentlessly taking its toll, and on 9th July he died of a stroke at the naval hospital in Liverpool. As he lay dying his escort group was steaming into the Channel battlefield. Before the war ended it had destroyed another seven U-boats.

This most readable and interesting book is well illustrated, has an adequate index, and can be thoroughly recommended.

ARMY

Soldier's Glory. Major-General Sir George Bell. Arranged and edited by Brian Stuart. (Bell.) 21s.

There can have been few men who exercised active command both in the Peninsular and Crimean campaigns; the author of these reminiscences himself affirming that, at the time of the Alma, there "was not above eight or ten officers amongst us all who had seen active service." But General Bell went on to indulge himself with a glimpse of the American Civil War; which for sheer variety of experience must constitute something of a record.

George Bell joined his regiment—the 34th Foot—in Spain, in the Spring of 1811. He had just turned 17, quite a mature age by contemporary standards, and five years older than the Maurice Saxe who had smelt powder at Malplaquet. A born soldier, he quickly fell into the ways of the veteran Peninsular Army; whose experiences he shared at Badajos, Salamanca, Vittoria, throughout the withdrawal from Madrid, and during the Pyrenees battles and the final advance into France. Bell underwent his full share of the dangers and of the privations which were the common lot. For with the best will in the world Wellington could never quite make good the chronic deficiencies begotten of the muddle and ineptitude exhibited by the Government departments responsible for supplies. Normally, a retreat is at least advantaged by the fact that the troops are falling back on an increasing bulk of provisions. But it was not so with the retirement from Madrid, when the men were thankful to stay the gnawing pangs of hunger with a handful of roasted acorns. Bell bore it all with philosophical resignation, cheerfully recording of his respected leader that "the great commander was unrivalled in skill, vigour, and genius, but could not see at once into the wants and necessities of 70,000 men."

With the war's end Bell, without social influence or political 'interest,' perforce went on half-pay—a miserable pittance of 4s. a day. It was not until 1825 that the Duke of York—"the soldier's friend" if ever there was one—restored him to full employment. Service in India was followed by the dreadful experience of the 1st Burma War. So it must have been with a considerable feeling of relief that Captain George Bell, accompanied by his wife, took ship for Canada. But unhappily it was not a placid spell of garrison duty that lay ahead; the Papineau rebellion speedily calling for the exertion of all the matured officer's energies in as ugly a business as any he encountered.

A tour of duty was followed by Bell's return to England, the outbreak of the war with Russia, and his appointment to command a battalion of the Royals.

There have been many personal memoirs of the Crimean campaign, but none, perhaps, that so vividly brings home the avoidable squalor, hardship, and unnecessary waste of life suffered by the troops for want of the most elementary foresight, and abysmal failure to support their army's efforts, of which the contemporary administration was wantonly guilty. "England," wrote Francis Bacon, "can never be undone unless by Parliaments," and it was Parliament and its chosen leaders that did its utmost to sacrifice an army and send it down in undeserved defeat. It was only the unquenchable spirit of George Bell and the thousands like him that prevailed alike against the enemy at home and the opponent in the field.

Bell was never actively employed in the rank of Major-General which in due course was grudgingly awarded him. So it was as a distinguished visitor that he was welcomed by the Federal leaders, during a flying trip to the Eastern Department and Washington.

Simply and unaffectedly, he sets it all down; his lack of style and occasional prolixity more than redeemed by his sharp eye for the significant and his robust, unfailing good humour. "Courage is always value," and straight-forward, unaffected George Bell possessed it in unstinted measure. A book, in short, that no man with pride in his Service can afford to miss.

The Story of the Royal Dragoons, 1938-1945. By J. A. Pitt-Rivers, M.A.(Oxon), D.Phil. Published for the Royal Dragoons. (Clowes.) 30s

It is perhaps a sign of the times that the sumptuous first volume of the history of the Regiment should be followed by this more austere production. In his foreword, however, General Makins intimates that a second volume comparable with the first may appear "in the fulness of time."

Meanwhile Mr. Pitt-Rivers provides a worthy record of the achievements of the Royals in the 1939-45 War, and by starting his story in 1938 has preserved a much to be desired continuity. At that time the Royal Dragoons and the Royal Scots Greys, both stationed in Palestine, were the only cavalry regiments which had retained their horses. The 1939-45 War caused the change. In September, 1940, the Royals being still in the Holy Land, their commanding officer asked that the Regiment should be mechanized. So came the armoured cars; and the transition from horses to fighting vehicles with new weapons and equipment was carried out in business-like fashion. The Regiment went to school again.

Then came the real business, first in the Western Desert and then in Syria, then back again to the Desert where Tobruk was invested and reverse had followed upon victory. The Royals bore their full share throughout the heavy fighting from the close of 1941 until the German and Italian surrender in Tunis in May, 1943. At Alamein the exploits of two squadrons can be remembered with particular pride. After North Africa one squadron served in Sicily and was among the first troops to land in Italy; but soon the whole Regiment was brought back to England to prepare for the campaign in North-West Europe. Reorganized and re-equipped the Royal Dragoons landed in Normandy in time for the thrust at Falaise. They were prominent during the pursuit into Belgium,

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fought near Arnhem, performed notable service at the passage of the Rhine, and, at the end of hostilities, crossed into Denmark.

Mr. Pitt-Rivers aims at, and succeeds in, giving an authentic impression of the life of the Royal Dragoons on active service in various theatres of war. He shows how an armoured car regiment fights, recounting the exploits of individual squadrons and even of troops. Changes in equipment, armament, and tactics are duly noted. As is to be expected, a list of honours and awards and a Roll of Honour find their appropriate place. The illustrations are full of regimental interest.

In Their Shallow Graves. By Benno Zieser. (Elek Books.) 16s.

These recollections of a German private who took part in the Stalingrad campaign make interesting reading from many points of view. One, which is indeed surprising to a British reader, is the apparent lack of realization and complete unconcern at the fact that the operation in which they were fighting was bare-faced invasion of another nation's country. Yet the author, though serving as a private, was on his own admission well educated. Never once, during the two years of his service in Russia, does he seem to have asked himself the question what it was that he was doing there, apart from killing the 'Russkies,' as he puts it. Some of the methods employed, particularly with prisoners-of-war, do not make pleasant reading.

Yet, as an account of life in the German Army during the first two years in Russia, the book is memorable for the picture it paints. It is written with an obvious sincerity and in its way is strangely moving. It is a simple enough tale, one that could probably be told by any private in any army engaged in war, and it is this quality of unpretentiousness which makes the book so much worth reading.

The translation is slightly inconsistent. The expletives traditionally beloved by the British private are apparently equally beloved by the German. Occasionally the translator disguises them as b—, f—, sh—, etc., more frequently they are paraded in their full, startling nakedness. The author seems to have scattered them over his narrative with a remarkably liberal hand.

The York and Lancaster Regiment, 1919-1953. By Major O. F. Sheffield. (Gale and Polden.) 35s.

This, the third volume of the history of the old 65th and 84th Foot, tells the story of the Regiment from the end of the 1914-18 War to the aftermath of that of 1939-45. Nine units of the York and Lancaster fought in theatres of war in three continents and there is much to record. The volume is well arranged; the narrative is clear, concise, and includes adequate descriptions of the major events which formed the background to the Regiment's activities. The first two chapters deal with the 'years between' and a summary of the York and Lancaster's services during 1939-1945; the final chapter is devoted to the post-war years. Each battalion has a chapter to itself covering the war years with a concluding summary of its services. One brief chapter is concerned with training units and the local Home Guard.

Forming part of the 5th Division, the 1st Battalion served in France, Norway, Iraq, Sicily, Italy, and arrived in North-West Europe in time to take part in the final advance to Lubeck. The unit particularly distinguished itself at Monte Natale in January, 1944. The 2nd Battalion, in the Sudan at the outbreak of war, took part in the successful defence of Heraklion, Crete, in May, 1941, and in the defence of and breakout from Tobruk later in the year. After a period in Syria the Battalion went to India and finally served in the second Chindit expedition of 1944 in Burma.

The 4th Battalion (Hallamshire) distinguished itself in heavy fighting in Normandy, Belgium, and Holland during 1944. The 6th Battalion served with the 46th Division in the retreat to Dunkirk, in Tunisia, where it did well at Medjaz-el-Bab, and in the Salerno landing, which was followed by six months of severe fighting. After a rest in Egypt, the

unit returned to Italy in time to add to its fine record during the Gothic Line and later battles. The 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions served in India and Burma, as did the 10th, converted to an armoured regiment. Finally, the old 5th Battalion, now the 67th Heavy A.A. Regiment, R.A., fought at home, in Egypt, at Imphal, and in the final advance to Rangoon. One of the batteries served in North-West Europe.

The author has succeeded in writing a good regimental history. The volume is very well produced; it includes illustrations, 27 clear sketch-maps, and an index.

AIR

The Challenging Sky. The Life of Sir Alliott Verdon-Roe. By L. J. Ludovici. (Herbert Jenkins.) 15s.

It is uncommon for anyone, however distinguished, to be invited to co-operate in the writing of his own biography; it is even more uncommon for anyone to be invited to unveil a plaque commemorating his own achievements. Both these experiences have fallen to the lot of Sir Alliott Verdon-Roe, better known to his friends and the world of aviation as A.V. The former has resulted in this volume; the latter took place at Brooklands 47 years after A.V. had flown for the first time in a machine of his own design and construction.

It is still a matter of dispute whether he was in fact the first Englishman to fly in this country: he was certainly the first Englishman to fly in a heavier than air machine of his own creation.

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